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PREFACE
The delegates to the 1971-1972 Montana Constitutional Convention will need historical, legal and comparative information
about the Montana Constitution.
Recognizing this need, the
1971 Legislative Assembly created the Constitutional Convention Commission and directed it to assemble and prepare
essential information for the Convention. This series of
reports by the Commission is in fulfillment of that responsibility.

This study on local government in Montana was written by Bruce
R. Sievers, research analyst on the Commission staff.
The
Commission has authorized publication of the report as approved
by the Research Subcommittee on Education consisting of
Commission members Mrs. Firman H. Brown, Missoula; Charles
L. Harrington, Butte; Bruce R. Toole, Billings, and Dr. Ellis
Waldron, Missoula. The report concerns not only present constitutional provisions on education in Montana and other states,
but also questions of general educational rights and responsibilities.
The Commission extends its appreciation to local and state
officials who cooperated in the preparation of the study.
This report is respectfully submitted to the people of Montana
and their delegates to the 1971-1972 Constitutional Convention.

ALEXANDER BLEWETT
CHAIRMAN
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Our wisdom aonsists of servile prejudices ; our oustoms
are nothing but subjection , restriction^ constraint.
Civilized man is born, lives, dies in slavery: at his
birth he is bound in swaddling clothes , at his death
nailed in a coffin; and, all the time he has worn the
image of man, he has been held no less fast by our

institutions

Jean-Jacques Rousseau
fmile

I see the facilitation of learning as the aim of
education , the way in which we might develop the
learning of man, the way in which we can learn to
live as individuals in process
I see the facilitation of learning as the function which may hold
.

constructive , tentative , changing , process answers
to some of the deepest perplexities which beset man
today

.

Carl
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SUMMARY

CHAPTER

I

EDUCATION AS A CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE

— BACKGROUND

The first questions to face constitution-writers in the field of
education are whether educational provisions are essential
to a constitution, and, if so, how extensive they should be.
This study examines constitutional issues in education, first
in terms of the broad questions of goals, rights, obligations,
freedoms, powers and equality, and then in terms of the specifics
Structural specifics can be
of administration and financing.
more easily determined once the general questions have been
answered.
The American educational system evolved out of a disparate
assortment of religious, private and public schools inco a
unique system of primarily public education which stressed the
characteristics of local control, freedom from cost and
universality. As a function left almost exclusively to the
states, education takes its particular character from the state
Montana education grew up on the basis
in which it exists.
Gradually the state
of the widely scattered local school.
assumed a greater burden of support and a greater degree of
control of local education until today education is the largest
single area of state governmental activity.

The century of educational development in Montana has brought
it to the point where the early aims of providing a free and
However, once
equal basic education for all can be achieved.
their goals of quality and equity are attained new problems
will remain, arising from the conditions in which modern men
How the legal structure can provide for an educational
exist.
system to adequately prepare people for the demands of contemporary society remains the central question of public policy
in the field of education.

CHAPTER II
THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF EDUCATION

What constitutes an education? Changes in society and in
human goals and aspirations bring about changes in men's notions
Critics of contemporary educational systems focus
of education.
upon a revitalization of a long-valued American goal in
education education for the full development of the individual

—
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rather than for the most efficient work force. Technology
and the bureaucratic society threaten to make education a
cog in a great social machine, by causing schools to adapt
This, in turn, creates
to' the exigencies of modern life.
problems for society, for any institution with such a profound
influence on the formative states of growth will have a
determining effect on the quality of both public and private
life.
A society's educational system is so interwoven in
the social fabric that it becomes both a cause and a symptom
of the condition of society as a whole.

Proposed remedies are as many and varied as the sources from
which they come. But almost all share one recommendation
that the pxiblic re-examine its educational system in light
of its own deeply held values and re-establish a conscious
guidance of the system on this basis. What this may mean in
practical terms is not simply experimentation with new
techniques in the school system but a whole rethinking of
educational forms and practices. Constitutional provisions
depend on what their authors forsee as the future of education.

CHAPTER III
EDUCATION AS A RIGHT AND AN OBLIGATION
The basic question of a right to an education has two sides:
the right to receive an education and the right not to be
educated. Courts have stressed the former and generally have
enunciated a doctrine that there does exist a basic right to
The latter right remains the subject of active
an education.
dispute. The courts generally have struck a balance between
the right of the parent and the right of the state to educate,
although a famous U.S. Supreme Court case Pierce v. the Society
of Sisters ) and several recent cases dealing with Amish children
suggest a new consideration of parents' and childrens' rights
to protect themselves from potential state domination.
(

CHAPTER IV
EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY
Beyond the question of the right to an education lies the question
The evolution of the "new
of the equality of that right.
equal protection" doctrine under the Fourteenth Amendment has
-2-
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placed increasing emphasis on the right to equal educational
opportunity.
Substantial inequalities have been shown to exist in the
American educational system. Courts have begun to assess
critically these conditions and have gradually developed the
doctrine that education falls under the new equal protection
The doctrine holds essentially that a "suspect"
doctrine.
classification (such as race or wealth) cannot be used by the
state to impair a "fundamental right" (such as the equal right
to an education) absent a compelling state interest to do so.
Under this test, the noted Serrano decision determined that
the present financing system for California schools was unconstitutional. What this means in terms of alternative financing
programs appears also to apply to Montana but the long range
results remain to be worked out in practice.
The second half of the chapter concerns Indian education.
Studies show that Indians not only suffer great inequities in
educational opportunity and therefore ought to come under the
scope of the equal protection doctrine, but also that they hav^
particular needs arising from their existence as a unique
Indian education has been widely assessed
cultural group.
as a national failure, whether in the form of federal boarding
schools or state public schools.
Those who advocate reform
suggest both that greater support be given to Indian education
and that the right to a substantial degree of cultural autonomy
be recognized and encouraged.
Experiments in schools oriented
to Indian cultural integrity have proven extremely successful.
A possible constitutional provision in this area could provide
for the right to Indian cultural autonomy in education.

CHAPTER V
PUBLIC AND NONPUBLIC EDUCATION
Two separate issues are involved in the question of public and
nonpublic education:
the relationship between private education
and state education and the relationship between religion and
The two often are confused, and it is important
the state.
The
that they be distinguished in constitutional arguments.
former has to do primarily with the question of regulation
and support of educational endeavors outside the public school
system; it centers around the controversy between a strong public
On the other hand,
school system and educational diversity.
the latter concerns the ambiguous relationship between church

-3-
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and state and focuses on the balancing of principles of nonestablishment and the free exercise of religion.
This chapter concentrates on the question of church-related
education, because the primary constitutional questions have
to do with this issue and because a large body of legal theory
stands behind contemporary discussions. The U.S. Supreme Court
has moved away from the relatively doctrinaire position
articulated in the Everson decision and towards the more
pragmatic approach embodied in the recent Lemon and Tilton
decisions.
In general, the Court has accepted certain forms
of state aid to students in nonpublic, church-related institutions (transportation, released time, tax exemption, and textbooks) on the principle that the aid primarily benefited the
child and only indirectly assisted the institution. The Court's
present emphasis is on the factors of state neutrality toward
and nonentanglement with religion.

The constitutional provisions of other states on this issue
vary greatly, from very restrictive to the absence of restrictions.
Montana's Article XI, Section 8 is eimong the more
stringent ones. Constitutional questions with respect to both
religious and nonreligious nonpublic education are primarily
focused on Article V, Section 35 and Article XI, Section 8
of the present Constitution.

CHAPTER VI

DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS
The governing authority over education is distributed throughout
all levels of government. Although the state has the primary
responsibility for education, local boards and federal agencies
also exercise substantial control over the educational system.
American education began with locally controlled schools and
only later developed more centralized powers and duties. Present
trends are toward greater state and federal responsibility.
The Montana system is balanced, with a slightly greater emphasis
on local control than in many other states

The principle constitutional issue in this area is that of
centralization versus decentralization. Arguments in favor of
greater efficiency and equality stress the importance of the
centralization of authority, while arguments emphasizing local
control and public involvement urge decentralization.

-4-
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CHAPTER VII
HIGHER EDUCATION

Higher education occupies a distinctly separate position in
the educational system. The structures and functions of higher
education have developed in a way fundamentally different
from those of primary and secondary schools. Contemporary debate
about the underlying purpose of higher education focuses on
whether it is to be seen primarily as a "service" unit in
society or as a flexible and far-sighted adviser.
This debate becomes translated in some degree into questions
regarding the structure and governance of higher education.
A majority of states either constitutionally establish state
institutions of higher education or mandate the legislature
to do so; twenty-one states establish a separate governing
board for higher education. The duties and responsibilities
of these boards vary from state to state.
Possible alternativts
in providing a governing board for higher education are discussed
in this chapter, as are other studies of the Montana situation.

CHAPTER VIII
THE STRUCTURE OF EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION
The specific issues in the structure of education which pose
constitutional questions are those of the state board or boards
of education, the superintendent of public instruction and
the county superintendent of schools.
Decisions must be made
as to whether there shall be one or two (or more) boards, how
board members should be chosen, and what the board's relationship to the superintendent should be.
The present Montana
Constitution is cimbiguous on these points. There is some trend
among other states toward an elected board.
The superintendent of public instruction is one of several
presently elected officials whose position depends to some
degree on the larger structure of the executive arm of government.
Some states see the superintendent as the chief policymaker in education, receiving only advice from a board; others
view the position as an administrator subordinate to the board.
The position of superintendent thus varies according to its
relationship to the board; the elective or appointive status
The
of the superintendent corresponds to this relationship.

-5-
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present Montana Constitution leaves the relationship between
the board and the superintendent in a rather vague state.
Local school government often is not dealt with in state constitutions.
Some states do mention local boards and/or school
superintendents in their constitutions. Montana's present
constitution provides for the county school superintendent
along with other county officers. Some argue for increased
administrative flexibility gained by the removal of constitutional
mention of such officials; others argue that the county superintendent serves a valuable function and should remain in the
constitution.

CHAPTER IX
FINANCING EDUCATION
Most of the issues in the field of educational financing are
of a statutory rather than a constitutional nature.
However,
constitutional provisions should take into account possible
developments in educational financing which require broad
constitutional authorization. Recent court decisions in the
area of equal educational opportunity have a particular bearing
on constitutional provisions for educational support.

Education can be viewed as an economic investment as well as
a vital social process.
Support nationally has been strong,
but it could be improved, with a potential result of greater
cultural and economic returns. Although the school finance
system is still heavily tied to the local property tax, this
may change radically as a result of Serrano and other recent
court cases. If the system does tend to become a state operated
one, a wide variety of alternative financing programs become
available.
Montana ranks high presently in overall tax effort in education,
but low in the percentage of school support provided by the
state vis-a-vis the locality. Montana also has disparities
in its educational financing system equal to or greater than
those in other states whose systems have been constitutionally
challenged.
Some constitutional changes would be necessary
if Montana were to reorganize its educational taxing and
distribution mechanisms.

-6-

CHAPTER

I

EDUCATION AS A CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE

—

BACKGROUND

Constitutional revision in the field of education begins with
the question: Does education belong in a constitution at all?
The answer is not inevitably "yes," because education, as a
substantive area, is not inseparably part of a governmental
framework.
If the answer is "no," however, this study will
have completed its work in the first paragraph, and the
reader need go no further.
If one assumes that education is a legitimate constitutional
.issue, then a wide var.iety of existing and possible state

constitutional provisions on education present themselves for
consideration.
Every state has at least a minimal provision
The reasons are not hard
for education in its constitution.
Education is probably the single most important
to find.
function for which states are given primary responsibility.
This "fourth arm" of state government, as it has been called,
exerts a uniquely pervasive influence on the life of every
individual and on society as a whole.
To it falls the prime
responsibility for preservation and advancement of knowledge,
development of culture and preparation of the citizen for
self-government.
Thomas Jefferson considered education the
foundation of the democratic state.
In the modern era, educational functions have, if anything,
gained in importance, but so have the corresponding strains
States, in attemptand pressures on the educational system.
ing to meet contemporary needs have had to re-examine their
fundamental authority in education and to reconsider the
basic framework within which education is administered in
their respective jurisdictions.
Questions about constitutional revision are central to this process of reassessment.
,

The importance accorded education in state and local government is seen by the fact that more than one-third of all
expenditures and more than one-half of all government staffing at the state and local level in the United States is
devoted to education.
In 1970, state and local governments
spent an estimated $44 billion for education.-'- In Montana,
more than one-quarter of the 1971-73 state budget is allotted
to education, by far the largest share devoted to any one
purpose.
Educational institutions are to receive almost
one-half of current state building program appropriations.
How this largest sector of domestic governmental activity is
to be publicly authorized and controlled has traditionally
proven to be a question central to the structure and operation

-7-
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In addition to this fundamental issue, new
questions arise when one considers afresh at the constitutional
level the relationship between the state and modern education.
What form will education take in the future? What should be
public goals in education? What means should be used to attain
them? How should the state be involved in education?

of the state.

This study is organized around these questions in the following format:
Part I deals with the character, powers and
responsibilities of an educational system; Part II deals with
the administrative structure existing and potential of the
state educational organization; and Part III considers the
financing of education. Taken in this sequence goals,
administrative means, financial means the three make up the
core of the educational problem as it presents itself for
constitutional consideration.

—

—

—

—

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The scattered schools which made up the educational system of
post-revolutionary America were a motley collection of religious,
private and public institutions attended by a tiny portion of
the school age population.
Education was largely a privilege
of wealth and status; the few public schools which did exist
had to struggle with private academies for public support.
Indeed, it was not until fifty years after Jefferson's death
that his ideal of free public education approached realization
in the state educational systems, and then it was for reasons
very different than those Jefferson had envisaged.

The unique American system of public education which was to
evolve in the nineteenth century from the plans of Jefferson
and other educational theorists had even earlier origins.
Its roots lay in both European experiments in universal education and in the isolated colonial schools of pre-revolutionary
America.
By 1716 Prussia already had departed from the traditional elitist concept of education and had introduced a
system of free elementary schools. This system was expanded
and permanently established by Frederick the Great in 1768.
Still earlier, Calvinists in Scotland, following the sixteenth
century plans of John Knox for the spread of religious learning, had designed a system of free universal primary and
selective higher education and had in part implemented it by
the first half of the eighteenth century.
These examples
were available to early American advocates of educational reform and are known to have influenced them. 3 Although these
experiments were radical departures from the previous form of
highly restricted European systems, they still adhered

i
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unquestioningly to a cardinal principle of all traditional
educational systems: centralized control by church or state.
The American colonies, on the other hand, witnessed the ad
hoc growth of a wide variety of educational institutions'!
Meeting indigenous needs of the scattered colonial settlements,
a multiplicity of religious, private and public schools emerged
with the novel characteristic of local control. Although this
departure from traditional organizational dogma emerged more
from circumstance than from theoretical intent, it rapidly
evolved into a new and fundamental principle of TVmerican
education.
By the time of the framing of the federal Constitution, the principle of local control of education had
become a firmly established doctrine.
It was primarily a combination of these two essentially
new ideas free education for all and local control which
determined the character of the emergent American educational
These were, in effect, the educational counterparts
system.
of two cardinal principles on which the new nation was
founded: equality and democracy.
The federal Constitution
embodied the general principles in the governmental framework, and at the same time set the terms for their application
This accounts for the peculiar
to the educational field.
relationship between the federal Constitution and education:
omission from the Constitution of any direct mention of
education and at the same time reservation to the states of
authority over areas of public concern not mentioned in the
Constitution, i.e., education among others.
Thus, while the
federal government assumed general responsibility for guaranteeing equality of treatment under the law, which applied
in education as in other areas, control was purposely left
in the hands of state and local governments.

—

The intent by the framers to leave education to the almost
exclusive responsibility of the states is evident both in
their deliberations and in the "residual powers" clause in
the Tenth Amendment.
According to the chronicles, only rare
and limited references were made to education in the
Constitutional Convention, and what suggestions there were
made for instance, the establishment of a national university
or the encouragement of the arts and sciences were rejected.

—

—

With respect to the "general welfare" clause, which subsequently has been used as a source of federal responsibility
in education, James Madison noted that it was not the original
intent of the framers to sanction through this device the
exercise of any broad powers by Congress. Rather, he said,
the phrase containing the "general welfare" wording was an
innocuous one, borrowed from the Articles of Confederation

-9-
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"

for the settlement of war debts:

The result of this investigation is, that the
terms "common defence and general welfare" owed
their induction into the text of the Constitution
to their connexion in the "Articles of Confederation,"
from which they were copied, with the debts contracted by the old Congress, and to be provided
for by the New Congress; and are used in the one
instrument as in the other, as general terms,
limited and explained by the particular clauses
subjoined to the clause containing them; that in
this light they were viewed by the State Conventions
which ratified the Constitution, as is shown by the
records of their proceedings; and that such was the
case also in the first Congress under the Constitution,
according to the evidence of their journals, when
digesting the amendments afterward made to the
Constitution. ^

Moreover, the Tenth Amendment clearly establishes that all
powers not specifically given to the federal government are
reserved for the states or to the people. This has set the
pattern for the assumption by the states of almost sole
authority in the field of education. The U.S. Supreme Court
has held:
The education of the people in schools maintained
by state taxation is a matter belonging to the
respective states, and any interf erejice on the
part of Federal authority with the management of
such schools cannot be justified except in the
case of a clear and unmistakable disregard of
the rights secured by the supreme law of the land.
In disputes between states and localities over jurisdiction
in educational matters, the courts have also consistently upheld the superior authority of the state. A landmark decision
in this area was Springfield v. Quick in which the U. S.
Supreme Court upheld the right of the State of Indiana to
distribute school funds as it saw fit, contrary to the desires
in another case, the Supreme Court of Minnesota
of a township. 6

stated:

This court so frequently has affirmed the
that the maintenance of the public school
of state and not local concern that it is
further to review the authorities at this

The Tennessee High Court determined that:

-10-
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The exercise of the taxing power to promote
a system of public schools for all of the
counties does not infringe upon the right of
local self government, because a public school
system, like a highway system, a penal system,
or a matter of public health is not purely local,
The state is a unit, and
but of state concern.
state source of legislative
legislature
is
the
the
power, from which flows the mandate of the state.

Other provisions of the federal Constitution also have determined the role of the state in education; these will be taken
up in a later chapter.
The principles written into the federal and state constitutions
set the scene for future development of the American educational
States and, by explicit delegation, localities assumed
system.
for providing a system of free public
responsibilities
the
These legal developments
citizens.
their
for
education
reflected
processes of social tranand,
part,
in
accompanied
in
nineteenth
century America.
occurring
which
were
sition
Europe,
increasing
urbanization
from
influx
of
migration
A vast
create
strong
pressures
combined
to
industrialization
and rapid
mobility.
Educameans
of
upward
schooling
as
a
for universal
this
period
local
concern,
but
during
and
tion remained a state
there developed increasingly favorable attitudes for a system
although tempered by continued
of truly free public schools
The result was
tax
to run them.
provide
monies
reluctance to
competition among a strange assortment of public, private and
religious schools. Out of this, in the latter half of the
nineteenth century, emerged the free publicly supported elementary school as it exists today.
,

The scene of conflict next became the public secondary school.
Tradition had supplied only the example of the private academy,
which provided college preparation for the children of the
wealthy and a very few selected students from poor families.
Gradually, the demand arose for the extension of the public
education concept to secondary education, and by the end of
the nineteenth century, after another long battle to overcome
public unwillingness to tax itself for schools, the system of
universal education through the high school level had estabThe crucial court decision which
lished itself firmly.
In defending
settled the legal issue was the Kalamazoo case.
the right of the state to provide at public expense such
schooling as it determined necessary. Justice Cooley of the
Michigan Supreme Court stated that:
[W] e must confess to no little surprise that the
legislation and policy of our state were appealed

-11-
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to against the right of the state to furnish a
liberal education to the youth of the state in
schools brought within the reach of all classes.

.

.

.

We content ourselves with the statement that neither
in our state policy, in our constitution, or in our
laws, do we find the primary school districts restricted in the branches of knowledge which their
officers may cause to be taught, or the grade of
instruction that may be given, if their voters consent in regular form to bear the expense and raise
the taxes for the purpose.

Although still only a relatively small percentage of children
were in public high schools by the early twentieth century,
the present century was to witness the realization of state
support for free public schooling through the secondary level.
Although the ultimate goal of universal education through high
school has never been reached (the rate of high school completion ranges from 50 percent to 90 percent among the states) ,10
the focal point of educational change and controversy has shifted
in most recent years to other areas of modern concern such as
higher education, vocational schools, adult education, experimental teaching and learning methods, and the quality and
equality of contemporary schools. Major changes in the social
and economic structure of the nation have subjected the local
educational systems to new pressures and have created new
relationships among local, state, federal and private organizations involved in education.
The technological society is
placing previously unknown strains on the local school system,
which evolved out of the needs and ideals of eighteenth century
America.

Development in Montana
The history of education in Montana reflects the national
developments.
The inauspicious beginnings of the Montana
school system are found in the scattered religious schools
founded by Jesuit fathers and private schools served by itinWith the estaberant teachers in the pre-territorial days.
lishment of the Territory, 11 Governor Edgerton asked the first
legislature for legislation to provide a common school system
which would make the Territory eligible for possible federal
In January 1865, the legislature passed the act
grants.
"establishing a common school system for the Territory of
Montana. "12 This provided the legal basis for the delegation
of authority and responsibility to local districts for the
creation of a system of locally run free public schools.

-12-
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What had taken half a century to establish in principle for
the nation the duty of the state to provide a free public
education for all was written into the original statutes
The call to make this ideal a
of the Montana Territory.
reality was voiced by the Montana Post

—

—

;

In every inhabited spot, let schools be erected.
Humble and deficient in many respects they must
be, at first, but in a marvellously short time,
if the endeavors of the mothers and fathers of
Montana are persistent and well directed, a
school system shall arise in our midst, worthy
of our name and station, and the riches our
children will inherit will fall into hands
fitted to receive them, and to apply them
intelligently for their good and the welfare
of the lands of their birth. 13

The emphasis in this period was clearly on the local level;
the territorial superintendent of public instruction, made
appointive by the 1872 school law, 14 served primarily as a
collector of information and link of communication between
The county superintendents
the governor and the local boards.
also had only secondary functions as school administrators
because they were county treasurers acting in ex officio
capacity in education.
The devolution of authority to the local level reached an
extreme in the authorization of groups as small as five
This power,
families to create new school districts.
while meeting the needs of widely dispersed families, inevitably led to the vast multiplication of poor small districts with few students.
This has become a major source of
difficulty in Montana education, foreshadowing the continuing
dilemma in providing efficient schools to a widely scattered
population.

This dilemma became a central preoccupation of the territorial
school superintendents and provided the main reason for the
increasing importance as administrators. One of the strongest
figures in early Montana educational history. Superintendent
Hedges, was the first to assert the leadership of the superintendency in directing the territory's educational policy.
He called for a more coherent and efficient educational system
supported by higher standards for teachers, school houses,
textbooks, curricula and for the general requirement of compulsory education. To accomplish this he also recognized
the need for higher tax support:
Our population is too scattered; our school houses
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deficient in accommodation, rare, and widely
separated; school terms too short, and teachers
deficient in qualifications. ... We must
have more means from some source to sustain longer
terms of schools.
If we can by no means obtain
help from the National Government, if we must
be left, in the days of our poverty and struggles
to subdue a wilderness
to depend only on ourselves, I hope our people will awake to the
hard necessity, and be willing to bear even
greater burdens of taxation to serve the first
necessity of any community education for its
,

—

youth. 15

Hedges set the tone for future superintendents in efforts to
improve Montana's educational system through advocating higher
state standards, more efficient schools and increased financial
support.
Hedges also was instrumental in the creation of the first bonding authorization in Montana for school construction.
A later
superintendent, Clark Wright, objected to the use of school
funds for tiny districts:

During the past year school was taught containing
only two scholars, and owing to a previous contract
with the Trustees of the District, the teacher drew
pay from the school fund, refusing to relinquish
the school.
The law at present [1878] allows the
establishment of a school on the petition of five
families, but does not designate the number of
scholars requisite to entitle the teacher to a
share in the school fund. 16

Wright's successor, W. Egbert Smith, also complained publicly
that sparsely settled districts, short terms and small but
costly schools unnecessarily hampered educational quality
in the territory 17
.

The efforts of the territorial superintendents to overcome
the inadequacies of the fragmented and expensive system which
grew up in territorial Montana ultimately enhanced their
position and led, with the arrival of statehood in 1889, to
the establishment of the state superintendent of public
instruction as an elective rather than appointive post. The
Montana Constitution of 1889 also recognized the increased
state role in supporting free public education by specifying
guaranteed state financial assistance to the public schools
and to a university 18 i>he achievement of a complete and
creditable educational system thus was recognized fully as a
.
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primary goal of state government, and the new state constitution
embodied the necessary organizational and financial provisions
for the attainment of this goal.
The newly established state directions and support of the
Montana educational system facilitated its adaptation to rapid
growth during the last years of the nineteenth and early part
The number of students enrolled in
of the twentieth century.
public and private schools jumped from 11,857 in 1889, the first
By 1910 that number had
year of statehood, to 20,787 in 1891.
quadrupled to 85,126 and it nearly doubled to 147,374 in 1916.19
In the face of this explosion of the school population in these
early years of statehood, the state did remarkably well in
maintaining standards of quality, particularly in non-rural
The celebrated "Ayres Report," a national study of state
areas.
school systems which appeared in 1919, ranked Montana first in
the nation in terms of five basic financial indicators of
educational support. This report had an unexpectedly adverse
effect, however, in that it painted an overly optimistxc picture
of Montana education, ignoring the plight of the rural schools.
As one study notes

The Ayres survey revealed that Montana ranked first
of all the states when five financial components
were averaged. Montana citizens felt jubilant
about the state's educational showing, and the Ayres
report was widely quoted.
The survey failed, however,
to account for such factors as schoolchildren with
no opportunity to attend school, retardation, educational requirements for teachers, supervision, or
methods of raising or distributing school funds. Moreover, in 1924, 46 percent of Montana schoolchildren
were enrolled in rural districts (districts with a
population of less than 1,000), which were commonly
the poorer districts.
For example, one Montana
county had, in terms of wealth behind each teacher,
a district with a figure of $225,000 and a second
district with less than $25, 000). 20
The complacency which resulted from the Ayres report was
shattered just a few years later in 1926 when another comparative study based on the same indicators showed that Montana
had fallen to thirteenth place. 21 The realization of the inequities in the existing school system caused by radical disparities in financial support led the legislature to pass a
bill establishing the state equalization fund to right the
imbalances.
State Superintendent Trumper noted in her 1928
report

—

—

The establishment of a state equalization fund.
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even though it is not large, and even though
it is derived from funds previously distributed
to all of the schools of the state, has definitely
provided for the past two years for more uniformity
in school support than Montana has ever previously
had. 22

The equalization fund was successful in bringing rural schools
more into line with the state's norm; however, the financial
situation of the schools as a whole began to deteriorate
during the 1920s, causing a reduction in some programs and an
inability to meet increasingly higher state standards for
teachers and curriculum.
The depression provided the final
blow from which the school system did not recover until after
World War II.
In Montana, as in the nation as a whole, the Second World War
created a disruption of the educational system.
In addition
to a scarcity of teachers and resources, society as a whole
was beginning to undergo a dramatic transformation as a result
of increased population mobility, the revolution in technology and changes in the economic structure.
The need to
provide education for new groups of the population, including
veterans, the disadvantaged, younger children and adults,
and for new social and vocational purposes required the
educational establishment to adopt new patterns of thinking
and to seek new resources.
State aid to public schools
jumped from $1,647,427 in 1941 to $7,265,509 in 1949-50.23
And even this was but a beginning in meeting the long frustrated needs in areas of school construction, teachers'
salaries and curriculum improvement.
It was only with the
substantial injection of state, and later of federal funds
that the state began to make major headway in overcoming
deficiencies and responding to new challenges in the
educational system.

The primary vehicle of this new financial assistance in
Montana was the "School Foundation Program," created in
1949 by the legislature.
The passage of the act creating
the Foundation Program was a major advance in rectifying
existing inequalities in the school system. The program
was effective in eliminating some of the gross differences
between wealthier and poorer school districts and in increasing overall state aid to public schools.
State
equalization monies grew from $5,382,000 in 1949-50 to
approximately $33,480,000 in 1969-70.24 Further refinements in the Foundation Program were made in 1963 and 1969
in order to eliminate other inequalities.
However, Montana
still has difficulty in providing sufficient state funds
for its schools, as shown by the fact that Montana ranks
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thirty-ninth among the states in percent of state support
provided for all current operating expenses. Montana state
funds provided 27.6 percent of operating costs in 1968-69,
compared with a 39.9 percent national average. ^5
The century of educational development in Montana has brought
it to the point where the early aims of providing a free and
equal basic education for all can be achieved.
Once the goals
of quality and equity have been attained, however, there will
be new problems arising from the conditions in which modern
men exist. How the legal structure can provide for an educational system which will adequately prepare people for
the demands of contemporary society remains the central question
of public policy in the field of education.
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I

CHARACTER, RIGHTS, AND RESPONSIBILITIES
Tlon is surely a labyrinth ^ but it is a labyrinth
devised by men, a labyrinth to be deciphered by men.
The contact and the habit of Tlon have disintegrated
this world.
Enchanted by its rigor, humanity forgets
over and again that it is a rigor of chess masters
not of angels.
Already the schools have been invaded
by the (conjectural) "primitive language" of Tlon;
already the teaching of its harmonious history (filled
with moving episodes ) has wiped out the one which
governed in my childhood; already a fictitious past
occupies in our memories the place of another , a past
of which we know nothing with Gertainty--not even that
it is false.

Jorge Luis Borges
Labyrinth

It is a grand and beautiful sight to see a man emerge
from obscurity somehow by his own efforts ; dissipate
by the light of his reason, the darkness in which
nature had enveloped him; rise above himself ; soar
intellectually into celestial regions; traverse with
giant steps, like the sun, the vastness of the universe
and--what is even grander and more difficult--come back
to himself to study man and know his nature, his duties,
and his end.
All of these marvels have been revived in
recent generations

Jean-Jacques Rousseau
First Discourse
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CHAPTER II

THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF EDUCATION

What constitutes an education? Since the times when three
years of the three R's was considered sufficient preparation
for life, we have come to question the fundamental content
Is education the acquisition
and goals of formal education.
of basic skills? Advanced technical training? General
development of thinking ability? The inculcation of basic
humanistic values? Encouragement of creativity? What are
the powers and limits of society in developing the mind,
character, and personality of the individual?
In response to
One trend in education is quite clear.
social needs for technical expertise, education has become increasingly a training course in specific professional
This has resulted more from the exigencies of inskills.
dustry and science than from a conscious design on the part
Now, however, as people are
of educators or government.
beginning to take stock of their educational system, the
question arises as to what, if anything, we expect from our
schools in addition to technical skills. This question goes
to the heart of our educational system and to the philosophy
behind it.

A central theme in American education has been to treat the
individual as a whole being, as an emerging citizen and
contributing member of society, rather than as simply a
potential element in a workforce. This is a principle
announced by Jefferson and reiterated by Emerson, Thoreau,
Dewey and other major contributors to American educational
The school system has attempted to implement
philosophy.
this ideal through comprehensive and universal elementary
Locally controlled school systems have
and high schools.
displayed a particular genius in providing the conditions
for the development of a practically oriented, autonomous
But the pressures of financing and specialindividual.
ization have continually drawn the schools away from this
ideal, and in the modern era the additional forces of
inflation, technology and centralization have pulled even
harder in the direction of defining education in terms of
narrowly conceived spheres of expertise.
Strong critics of the modern system of American education
have voiced disappointment in its results:

One had to cram all this stuff into one's
This
mind, whether one liked it or not.
coercion had such a deterring effect that.
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after I had passed the final examination, I
found the consideration of any scientific problems
distasteful to me for an entire year. ...
It
is in fact nothing short of a miracle that the
modern methods of instruction have not yet entirely strangled the holy curiosity of inquiry;
for this delicate little plant, aside from
stimulation, stands mainly in need of freedom;
without this it goes to wrack and ruin without
fail.
It is a very grave mistake to think that
the enjoyment of seeing and searching can be
promoted by means of coercion and a sense of duty.-'That comes not from a professional critic or from a political
source but from one of the greatest of modern scientists,
Albert Einstein. A contemporary writer and student of modern
education, Paul Goodman, expresses a similar view:
In our situation.
overcrowding and interference make individual attention and real
teaching impossible; so that it could be said
that the schools are as stupifying as they are
educative, and compulsory education is often like
.

.

jail.

Goodman uses the dramatic term "compulsory mis-education" to
refer to the restrictiveness and misdirection in the contemporary school system. 3 But one need not be as harsh a
critic as Einstein or Goodman to appreciate the force of their
comments.
Eminent figures in the field of education such as
James Conant4 and Admiral RickoverS have attacked many aspects
of the existing educational system as being antiquated for
modern conditions and inhibitory to the full development of
youth.
In general the criticism goes to two fundamental points:
that the existing system is too preoccupied with producing
technically trained people to fill roles in the labor force
and consequently ignores the broader educational needs of a
healthy society, and that the technical education which is
provided is overly narrow and deficient. Together, these
points articulate a widely held view that the modern educational system is falling short of an ideal which is within
its potential to reach, the ideal which has guided American
thought since Jefferson: the development of the "whole man"
who is prepared to participate fully in society as a citizen
and is able to contribute to the advancement of science and
culture.

To the extent that the system is failing to attain or oven
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pursue that ideal, society as a whole is the victim.
High
dropout rates, unfavorable comparisons with systems in other
advanced societies^ and harsh criticism by both teachers and
students^ suggest that the American educational system is not
fulfilling its potential.
This, in turn, is bound to create problems for society, for
any institution with such a profound influence on the formative stages of growth will have a determining effect on the
quality of both public and private life. Democracy and human
advancement, for example, are predicated on the existence of
an enlightened public and creative leaders.
A society's
educational system is so interwoven into the social fabric
that it becomes both a cause and a symptom of the condition
of society as a whole.

Even if the critics are only partially right, there is reason
for serious concern that the trends in American education may
be taking us farther from, rather than closer to, basic social
Trends in the direction of rigidity, narrowness and
goals.
excessive competitiveness are exactly the opposite of the
qualities of flexibility, openness and cooperativeness which
characterize a free and vital society. Our educational system
may be becoming, rather than a force for the cultivation of
the well-rounded citizen, simply a reflection of and contributor to the mechanistic tendencies in modern society.

Commentators suggest the causes for the problems of American
education include insufficient financial and human resources,
immobility in thinking and organization and structural deficiencies in society as a whole.
Rickover and Conant for
instance, see a failure to provide sufficient funds and
talent, especially in certain areas of education, for
operation above a mediocre level. ^ Eurich, Griswold, McMurrin,
Campbell, Jackson and many others, on the other hand, complain
of a strong resistance to innovation in the schools, which
inhibits changes that could assist them in making better use
of existing resources. 9 Goodman and IllichlO offer the most
pervasive criticism in declaring that the problems of education are a part of a general social malaise which is intensified under the pressures of modern life:
Thus, a perhaps outmoded institution [the modern
educational system] has become almost the only
allowable way of growing up. And with this preempting, there is an increasing intensification
of the one narrow experience, e.g. in the shaping
of the curriculum and testing according to the
increasing requirements of graduate schools far
off in time and place.
Just as our American
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society as a whole is more and more tightly organized, so its school system is more and more
regimented as part of that organization.
The 'process described here is circular: as the society becomes more and more specialized in serving the needs of the
mass consumption age, the schools adapt themselves accordingly.
But the schools, by producing students with increasingly
limited perspectives adjusted to technological needs, tend to
reinforce the trends toward narrowness and organized rigidity.
The school system thus becomes an unwitting function in a
technocratic system, which, once established, continues to
expand through its own dynamics toward a potential Brave New
World or 1984.12

However much Huxley and Orwell may have overdrawn their grim
societies of the future, the trends they forecast are distinctly
visible in the present.
If the crucially formative functions
of an educational system are neglected in favor of its efficient
operation as part of the productive social machine, there is
nothing to break a potentially vicious circle of institutional
reproduction.
In the descriptions of experts ranging from
Conant to Goodman, from Rickover to Illich, education is in
danger of becoming a self-propelling subsystem within the
larger social system, immune to any fundamental change and
subject only to the forces of purely technical interests.
[W]hen we look at what the modern ideal of
knowledge has become in the university, we find
that at every turn it threatens to diminish what
it had provised to enlarge:
freedom, efficacy,
and sharing.
The modern ideal is summed up in
the slogan about the "knowledge explosion,"
which the universities have done so much to
detonate.
So great is the proliferation of
knowledge that the problem now is how to retrieve it from the swelling data banks where
it is stored.
Realistically, the knowledge
means that a few know a great deal about how
nature and society "work," while the rest of
us are about as ignorant as we have always been.
Further, as knowledge has become increasingly
refined it becomes more inaccessible to the
many, more esoteric, more removed from the
world of common experience. 13

The remedies proposed by the critics are as many and varied
as the sources from which they come.
But almost all share
one recommendation that the public re-examine its educational
system in light of its own deeply held values and re-establish

—
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a conscious guidance of the system on this basis.
Whether
this means increasing economic support and a changed
curriculum, as advocated by some; a vast introduction of
educational experimentation, as suggested by others, or the
wholesale restructuring or even dismantling of the existing
school system, as prescribed by still others, the recommendations all call for a public reassessment of the goals of
education and a clear understanding of the means necessary
The common assumption behind this position
to achieve them.
is (1) that the educational establishment could become and,
in fact, might be on the road to becoming as immobile and
self-serving as any other bureaucracv and (2) that this stagnating trend can be interrupted only if people will get clear
in their minds what they want out of an education and will
act on these goals.
The critics are in a sense turning an
academic version of an old phrase to the effect that "education
is too important to be left to the educators."
,

The general alternative suggested is the task articulated
by Wolin and Schaar:
It will require something more of the humanists
than a deeper retreat into the sanctuary of ingeniously obscure research, while mumbling
incantations about "higher values." What it will
require is a new focus, and the courage to withdraw human and material resources from the subjects which have high value on the current market,
re-allocating them to the task of re-discovering
and redefining the humanity and sociability which
have become twisted and frustrated by the "single
vision" of contemporary modes of organization and
public purpose. 14

What this means in practical terms is not simply experimentation with new techniques in the school system but a whole
rethinking of educational forms and practices. Certainly
the raising of achievement levels through better educational
techniques is a part of this, so that more people can be
educated to higher levels for less money; even more important is a reconsideration of what the "schooled" society is
all about.
If the present educational system is to some
degree simply a baby-sitting and career-ticket issuing agency,
then the question becomes what institutional farms might better
serve the development of skilled workers, active citizens and
sound thinkers.
Goodman proposes the elimination of compulsory education and
its replacement by opportunities for training in practical
activities outside the classroom, such as work in agriculture,
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construction or journalism, together with a loosely decentralized system of small classrooms taught by both
professional and non-professional educators. He envisions
a highly fluid and multi-faceted educational framework in
place of the rather monolithic one which has installed itself
One possibility
as the only legitimate dispenser of learning.
he suggests is that
on the model of the late Gl-bill we experiment,
giving the school money directly to the adolescents
for any plausible self -chosen educational proposals,
such as purposeful travel or individual enterprise.
This would also, of course, lead to the proliferation
of experimental schools. 15

Similarly, he advocates a two-year interim of practical work
experience between high school and college and modern use of
He
the Athenian model of an open-ended primary education.
reminds us that the word "school" derives from, the Greek word
for serious leisure.
In sum, Goodman aims to provide an alternative to an educational system which he maintains is increasingly becoming a lockstep channeling into preordained
patterns of career and life:
My purpose is to get people at least to begin to
think in another direction, to look for an organization of education less wasteful of human resources
In reconstructa'nd social wealth than what we have.
principles
seem to
ing the present system, the right
easier
for
youngme to be the following:
To make it
provide
and
them,
to
sters to gravitate to what suits
many points of quitting and return. To cut down the
loss of student hours in parroting and forgetting,
and the loss of teacher hours in talking to the deaf.
To engage more directly in the work of society, and
to have useful products to show instead of stacks of
examination papers.
To begin to decide what should
be automated and what must not be automated, and to
educate for a decent society in the foreseeable future.

'-°

Another similarly oriented student of modern educational
techniques recommends four approaches by which such an open
system could be made to function:
(1) a vast increase of
reference services to facilitate access to objects or
processes used for formal learning;
(2) "skill exchanges"
to provide a central listing service for people with particular skills who are willing to serve as models for others;
(3) a "peer-matching" network to provide for communications
among those looking for others to join with in a given learning activity, and
(4) reference services to "educators-at-large"
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who would not operate in a particular institution but would
furnish their services to a wide variety of groups. 17

Some of these innovations are being tried today.
Others,
which may seem unrealistic at present, very likely will not be
With rapidly changing technology and attitudes, the
tomorrow.
possibilities for new styles and structures in education are
becoming greater and greater. The question becomes not whether,
but in which direction we want to move, with what goals in mind,
and through what means.
Goodman and Illich describe some possibilities; there are countless others.
The point is that it is
at the base a matter of public choice; if the public does not
take in hand its responsibility for the aims and designs of its
educational system, the choice will be made by default, probably
through institutional inertia.

»
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CHAPTER III

EDUCATION AS A RIGHT AND AN OBLIGATION

Although the notion of education as a right can be traced
to classical sources such as Plato, Rousseau and Schiller,
intensive concern with educational rights has been largely
This
a product of the modern mass educational system.
concern is directed toward the dual characteristics which
hold for rights in general: the right of access to and the
right of protection from a particular function of society.
In this case, the issue becomes, on the one hand, the right
to the benefits of a public educational system, and, on the
other hand, the right to secure an individual from domination by that educational system.
THE RIGHT TO AN EDUCATION

Education gradually has come to be considered a right in the
United States and the courts across the country commonly have
interpreted it as such. For example, the Colorado Supreme
Court has variously described free public education as a
constitutional right,! a civil right or privilege2 and a duty
of the state. ^ The effect of these decisions is summarized
as follows:
"A public schooling is both a right of the student
."4
and his parents, and a legal duty that both must meet.
,

.

.

Only North Carolina and Puerto Rico specifically enumerate the
right to an education in their constitutions. Most states,
however, include a provision declaring it a duty of the legislature to provide a system of free public schools.
The Montana
provision, for instance, reads.
It shall be the duty of the legislative assembly
of Montana to establish and maintain a general,
'uniform and thorough system of public, free,
common schools.
[Art. XI, Sec. 1]

Montana, in addition, goes further than most states in spelling
out in two more sections what this duty shall be:
It shall be the duty of the legislative assembly
to provide by taxation, or otherwise, sufficient
means.
to maintain a public, free conunon
school in each organized district in the state, for
at least three months in each year.
[Art. XI, Sec.

...

The public free schools of the state shall be open
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to all children and youth between the ages of six
and twenty-one years.
[Art. XI, Sec. 7]

The close connection between the concepts of the right of an
individual and the duty of a state is evident in the North
Carolina provision:

The people have a right to the privilege of
education, and it is the duty of the State to
guard and maintain that right.
[Art. I, Sec. 27]

Courts across the country have predominatly ruled that the
state's duty to provide schools implies an individual's right
to attend them.
However, a distinction between right and duty
arises in cases involving eligibility for attending school.
For example, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the right
to an education does not extend to mentally deficient persons:
Under the constitutional provision requiring the
General Assembly to provide a system of common
schools whereby all children may receive a good
"common school education," the quoted implies
capacity as well as the right to receive the
common training.
The Montana Supreme Court also recognized the distinction between duty and right in citing a famous decision in which the
New Hampshire Supreme Court stated:
The primary purpose of the maintenance of the
common-school system is the promotion of the
general intelligence of the people constituting
the body politic and thereby to increase the
usefulness and efficiency of the citizens, upon
which the government of society depends. Free
schooling furnished by the state is not so much
a right granted to the pupils as a duty imposed
upon them for the public good [emphasis added]
.

In Montana, the notion of viewing education from the standpoint of the state rather than of the individual goes back
to early decisions of the State Supreme Court.
In Evers v.
Hudson (1907), the Court declared Article XI, Section 1
("It shall be the duty of the legislative assembly of Montana
to establish and maintain a general, uniform and thorough
system of public, free, common, schools") to be a "solemn
mandate to the legislature for the purpose of insuring to the
people the system described. "7 The Evers decision is referred
to in a later case in which the Court asserted in strong terms
the state's interest in the child:
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By its voluntary act, the state has assumed the
function of education primarily resting upon the
parents. ... In doing so, the state is not
actuated by motives of philanthropy or charity,
but for the good of the state, and, for what it
expends on education, it expects substantial
returns in good citizenship.
In another case, the Montana Court invoked both the notion of
the duty of the state [from Art. XI, Sec. 1] and the right of
an individual in deciding in favor of the right of a primarily
The Court
Indian group to establish a new school district.
cited a California decision in which it was held:

The common schools are doorways opening into
chambers of science, art, and the learned
professions, as well as into fields of industrial and commercial activities. Opportunities for securing employment are often
more or less dependent upon the rating which
a youth, as a pupil of our public institutions,
These are
has received in his school work.
rights and privileges which cannot be denied.

However, in a recent case it was held that the duty of the
state to provide an education for all children as provided
in Article XI, Section 1 was subject to a limiting interpretation;
[W]e shall examine the wording of the Constitution
and statutes to determine what was meant by the
In other words, what
framers of the Constitution.
does the term "all" mean? Should it be taken in its
universal and omnibus sense, that is, literally all?
Or rather, was it meant to be limited and qualified
to conform to good reason to carry out the other
purposes of the Constitution such as to have a
general, uniform and thorough system of public

schools?10
Thus, the commonly acknowledged right to an education can be
more easily limited by the courts when it is only implied from
This applies to disputes
duty and not guaranteed as a right.
involving eligibility requirements, such as age, as well as
to those involving extensions of the educational program,
such as vocational and community college programs.
•'--'-

Other fundamental aspects of the right to an education, such
as equal educational opportunity and religious freedom in
education, are so basic that they will be treated separately
These issues involve rights guaranteed
in a later chapter.
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under the federal Constitution and thus transcend matters
purely internal to state constitutions.

Another important issue relative to educational rights is the
distinction between the right of the parent to educate and
the right of the child to be educated.
The discussion in this
chapter is almost exclusively in terms of parental rights, in
spite of the fact that increasing attention is being given to
the rights of children themselves. The legal situation is as
yet far from being resolved; one writer refers to the Question
of children's rights as "a legal vacuum. "-'^ To what degree
parental rights to education devolve upon children thus
judiciallv is still an open question. The federal Supreme
Court however, has ruled in In re Gault that some federallv
protected rights extend to children. ^^ Presumably, then, to
the extent that the right to an education is derived from the
Ninth (unenumerated rights retained by the people) and
Fourteenth (due process and egual protection of the laws)
amendments of the U.S. Constitution, this right also would
apply to children. Further discussion of children's rights
appears in the report on the Bill of Rights in the series of
studies for the Montana Constitutional Convention.
THE RIGHT NOT TO BE EDUCATED

The other side of a basic educational right is the right to
determine one s own educational fate free from state dominThe clarification of this right has emerged primarily
ation.
in disputes involving com.pulsory education and parental choice,
The U.S. Sunreme Court has decided a group of cases which
place greater stress on the right of the parent as opposed to
that of the state, but this protection has been asserted primarily in the face of arbitrary state actions.
In Meyer v.
Nebraska (1923), for instance, the Supreme Court ruled invalid
a state statute which prohibited the teaching of German to
children under twelve. This became the Meyer Doctrine which
recognized the constitutional right of parents to educate free
from state legislation that "unreasonably interferes with the
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the uobringing and
education of children under their control."
'

,

The Meyer decision relied primarily on the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee that no person shall be deprived of "liberty
without due p'^occss of law." The court stated:
.

.

.

While this Court has not attempted to define with
exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term
•
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Without
has received much consideration.
the right of the indidoubt, it denotes.
marry, establish a home and
vidual to.
bring up children, to worship God according to
the dictates of his own conscience. 15
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

The most notable case establishing the right of the parent to
educate is Pierce v. Society of Sisters decided two years
In it, the Court pronounced unequivocably that
after Meyer
parents possess at least some rights over their children's
education which are immune from state control:
,

.

The fundamental theory of liberty upon which
all governments in this Union repose excludes
any general power of the state to standardize
its children.
The child is not the mere
creature of the state; those who nurture him
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him
for additional obligations. 16
.

.

.

Since those two landmark decisions, other cases have upheld
the constitutionally mandated duty of the state not to
"unreasonably interfere" with the parents' right to control
In West Virginia State Board
the education of their children.
for example, the U.S. Supreme Court
of Education v. Barnett
held that:
,

The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the
states, protects the citizens against the State
itself and all of its creatures Boards of
Education not excepted.
That they are
educating the young for citizenship is reason
for scrupulous protection of constitutional
1'^
freedoms of the individual.

—

.

.

.

.

.

.

However, the rather strong doctrine articulated in Pierce and
the other cases has been somewhat softened by the fact that
in none of these cases was there a direct confrontation between the right of the parent and what could be considered
to be a valid state interest.
The courts, in fact, have sought
to avoid such confrontations in the form of the balancing
doctrine, as stated in a New Hampshire case:
In the adjustment of the parent's right to choose
the manner of his children's education, and the
impinging right of the state to insist that certain
education be furnished and supervised, the rule of
reasonable conduct upon the part of each toward
the other is to be applied. 18
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In reference to the general position which emerges from these
cases, one commentator states:

One fundamental characteristic common to all such
cases is their recognition of an inherent constitutional privilege possessed by every parent;
but which privilege has never been properly defined. 19

The court decisions in the Amish school cases thus have become
important in providing elaboration of this issue. Although
the additionally complicating factor of religious freedom was
involved in these, the cases in general involved a direct conflict between the state's power under compulsory school laws
to require school attendence and parents' rights to determine
the kind of education given their children.
The doctrine that
the state's power to interfere in private educational systems
is limited was already established in Farrington v. Tokushige
in which the Court declared that the state has no power
,

to give affirmative direction concerning the
intimate and essential details of such schools,
entrust their control to public officers, and

deny both owners and patrons reasonable choice
and discretion in respect of teachers, curriculum and textbooks. 20
K

The Amish cases provide a further test of this principle in
that Amish schools fail to meet state educational standards
in numerous ways.
In most cases, courts have deciced against
the Amish on the basis that no fundamental rights were being
interfered with by compulsory school attendance and that the
Howstate had an overriding interest in public education.
ever, in the Petersheim case, the Pennsylvania court ruled
that compulsory attendance laws could not be enforced against
the Amish, because to do so would constitute "an abridgement
and infringement of their constitutional rights of liberty
and conscience. "21 Paul T. Burin notes in "The Right Not
to Be Modern Men: The Amish and Compulsory Education," that
counter to the state's interest in compulsory school attendance.

There is a countervailing, though largely undefined, policy of pluralism and deference to
minority ethnic groups that supports the Amish
refusal to be modern men.
Pluralism is a
shibboleth of American society, perhaps more
honored in oratory than in practical tolerance. 22
In a more recent decision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in State
Yoder ruled in favor of the Amish, largely on the basis that

v.
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compulsory school attendance for Amish children represented
an infringement upon the free exercise of religion. 23 However, in passing, the court also ruled that compulsory education, although a permissible area of state regulation,
is not a compelling state interest.
This ruling, if applied
consistently in other areas and if upheld by the U.S. Supreme
Court, would constitute a significant strengthening of paternal
rights to educate at the expense of state power.
An alternative means for protecting the same right, without
directly challenging the state's "compelling" interest in
compulsory education, is suggested in Prance's commentary
He suggests that a strict distincon the Amish decisions.
education" and "mandatory
drawn
between
"compulsory
tion be
attendance."
distinction,
one could uphold
With this
school
education,
(i.e.
protection of
the policy behind compulsory
interests
of the state)
the welfare of the individual and the
instances
to the rule
while making exceptions in reasonable
of mandatory school attendance:
One would be hard pressed to argue that Amish
agricultural or vocational training resulted
in a deprivation of fourteenth amendment freedoms while terminal education in an overcrowded,
Indeed the
understaffed city school did not.
alternative,
acknowledged worth of the Amish
contrasted with the well known shortcomings of
bring that
formal public education, should.
of
conalternative well within the scope
stitutionality.
.

.

In summary, it seems clear that Amish constitutional protection could readily coexist
with mandatory school attendance laws if those
laws were enforced with an eye to the policies
behind them and an appreciation of the unique
function and utility of the Amish alternative
to formal secondary education. 24

The Amish cases, as many commentators have noted, have a
significance far beyond their immediate issue. The fundamental principle involved is the protection of minority freedom of conscience from state domination:

—

Public schools like Amish, Hutterite, Black
Muslim, Lutheran, Catholic, Jewish, Greek
Orthodox, and Seventh Day Adventist schools
seem inevitably the servants of their constituencies, reflecting the dominant values of the
What agency of the
subcultures they serve.
.

.
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state, then, may be trusted to select an educational format so superior or allegedly neutral
that it may be imposed on every child? The destinies
of the young will often be misguided by parents, but
this state seems far less lethal than the alternative
of giving government the ultimate power of indoctrination. 25

The possibility of development of a wide variety of nonpublic
educational institutions, both religious and nonreligious which
offer viable alternatives to traditional educational structures
is a very likely prospect with which all states must reckon.
The protection of self-determination within reasonable limits
for both the parent and child in educational matters is a significant factor in this potential development.
,

Another aspect of individual educational rights is the increased
concern for the protection of the individual in the face of the
growing power of the modern state. The state in the contemporary
era has gained an enormous amount of power through information
storage facilities and other products of technology.
One
writer observes

Modern technology and an emerging social ethic
have placed unprecedented bounds on the realm
of individual liberty.
Technology has severely
limited the scope of behavior which affects only
the actor.
This interdependency makes
purely individual behavior almost non-existent
and justifies an ever increasing claim to societal
control of individual action for the collective
.

.

.

good. 26

The general concern with protecting individual liberty from a
state which has the potential of becoming a technological
leviathan has as a corollary an emphasi s on in dividual educational rights.
Just as the right to privacy is currently argued
to be among the unenumerated rights referred to in the Ninth
Amendment, 27 so an individual's right to be educated and to
determine the form of his education may come to be part of the
basic protection of the individual from the state.

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
The present status of educational rights is less than clear.
Decisions in state and federal courts have molded something
of a broad doctrine of the right to an. education and the right
to self-determination in educational matters, but this doctrine
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is evolving in a sometimes contradictory fashion.

The courts
issues
head-on
because
tackle
the
been
reluctant
to
often have
of
authority
in
the
educational
field.
nebulous
state
of the
The definition of educational rights that has occurred generally
has been derived from applicable parts of the First and
Fourteenth amendments to the federal Constitution. The U.S.
Supreme Court has been hesitant to involve itself directly in
the issue of states' rights and powers in education (other than
on the question of equality of educational opportunity) because
this is an area traditionally reserved to state jurisdiction.

This seems to leave the matter squarely in the lap of the states.
But the states generally have preferred to rely on court interpretations of existing constitutional provisions and statutes
concerning the establishment of a school system and mandatory
attendance. And because of the vagueness of the legal situation,
the courts, for their part, seem to be finding increasing difficulty in setting out the rights of the individual in relation
to the state in educational matters.

One way out of this circular process would be simply to wait
until state and federal courts have sorted out the respeci::i.ve
rights and powers to their own satisfaction. Another solution
would be to specify in a state constitution the right of the
individual to an education and/or the right to freedom of
Puerto Rico goes
choice, to the kind of education received.
farthest among all the units of American government in specifying
such rights in its Bill of Rights:

Every person has the right to an education which
shall be directed to the full development of the
human personality and to the strengthening of
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Compulsory attendance at elementary
public schools to the extent permitted by the
facilities of the state as herein provided
shall not be construed as applicable to those
who receive elementary education in schools
established under non-governmental auspices.
.

[Art.

.

II,

.

Sec.

5]

The Puerto Rican Constitution subsumes all provisions for
education under this section on educational rights, making
the right the paramount concern in educational matters.
It can be argued that this is the correct priority because
of the pre-eminence of the individual over the state in
American democratic theory. On the other hand, if one wishes
both to secure educational rights and to establish more extensive provisions on the structure and operation of the educational
system, there is a strong argument for inclusion of separate
constitutional articles on each topic.
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CHAPTER IV
EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY

Beyond the question of the general right to an education lies the
question of the equality of that right. Courts and legislatures
in recent years have established the principle that not only do
all persons have the right to receive an education, but that they
have the right to receive it on approximately equal terms.
"Equality of educational opportunity" has become an accepted
maxim and a standard for assessing state educational programs.

Despite that commitment in principle, however, a great deal of
factual inequality still persists. America spends approximately
twice as much educating the children of the rich as it does
educating the children of the poor.-^ A substantial amount of
de facto segregation still exists in the schools. 2 Educational
facilities available to minority groups often are significantly
inferior to those available to the rest of the populatj.on. ^
The existence of such clear inequities in a system of such
crucial importance, theoretically guaranteed to be open and t^^e
to all, raises general questions of equality as a social value.
What is meant by the term "equality" in modern society? Certainly
not eibsolute equality, because such an ideal, which would require
all members of society to be absolutely identical, is clearly
unattainable even if it were desirable. Neither is meant a
classical laissez faire equality, under which everyone is equally
free to compete, although not with equal means a sort of majestic
equality of the law, Anatole France once remarked, which forbids
rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets
The concept of equality in contemporary
and to steal bread.
lies
somewhere
between these two extremes in an area
society
defined by resolution of concrete issues of equitable treatment.

—

The progressive definition of equality in the modern sense began
in the classical liberal utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill and
Jeremy Bentham in their articulation of the principle, "every
man to count for one and no man to count for more than one."^
At first this was defined in a moral, or at most, a political
But with the gradual weakening of the notion of an
sense.
"invisible hand" of society which operated to maximize the common
good on the basis of equal moral or political rights, this maxim
was broadened to include other social and economic factors.
Beyond the traditional notions of equality in the courts and in
the voting booths, there arose the concept of the equal right
of an individual to some minimum enjoyment of the benefits of
society, such as nourishment, health care and education.
The
modern concept of equality thus became the product of two principles:
(1) that the rules of law must be equally applied, and
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(2) that laws themselves must satisfy some broader standard of
equity.

Education, as a fundamental service provided by the state, as
a primary means to the acquisition of property and as an essential
factor to development of the individual, became a particularly
crucial concern in contemporary thrusts toward social equality.
The nineteenth century effort in the United States to establish
a universal, free primary and secondary education system contributed greatly to the egalitarian movement.
Education involved
both the demand for uniform application of the laws (for example,
states constitutionally stated obligations to provide a system
of free public schools) and the demand for equal access to the
basic benefits of society (such as knowledge, wealth and security)
In the latter respect, education v;as seen as the single most
important social means for opening the door to the opportunities
afforded by the new world.
School preempted even money as the
great social equalizer, because school became a prerequisite to
the attainment of wealth.

With the modern acceptance of equal rights as a concept which
transcends simple equality before the law and the gradual
recognition of education as a fundamental right and interest
of man, the question arises as to how far the state is required
to go in guaranteeing equal educational rights.
To be sure,
equality is only one among a number of cardinal social values
and one which may, if promoted far enough, come into conflict
with others such as liberty and fairness.^ Yet it is such a
basic value and education such an indispensible part of men's
lives that political and judicial bodies have pressed for the
realization of some substantial amount of equality in the kind
of education available to all children.
The modern state has
accepted its responsibility to go far beyond the mere elimination
of overt legal hindrances to obtaining an education and has
taken positive steps to provide minimum standards of education.

Richard Wollheim suggests a distinction between "an equal right
to property" and "a right to equal property."^ This distinction,
an important one when applied to rights and private spheres of
action, tends to blur when applied to a benefit provided at
public expense by the state; thus, the right to an equal educational opportunity merges into the right to a substantially
equal education.
Recent TVmerican court decisions have adopted
the principle that if substantial inequality in education can
be shown, the presumption is that the state must show a compelling
reason why the inequality exists, rather than that one affected
must show why equality should exist.
This position is discussed

i
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Equal educational opportunity thus has come
at length below.
to mean in the modern context not only that everyone deserves
an equal opportunity for an education but that everyone should
have the opportunity for an equal (basic) education.
COURTS AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT;
HAVING ONE'S
CAKE AND EATING IT TOO VS. HAVING NO CAKE AT ALL

Although the meaning of equality may be set forth rather easily
in abstract terms, the actual interpretation of what it means
in practice must await resolution of conflicts on specific issues.
The concrete determination of educational equality has occurred
through a series of judicial decisions in several areas of
Underlying them all has been the fundamental principle
education.
articulated in the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution:
No state shall .
deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
.

.

The primary emphasis in these decisions has been on the "equal
protection clause" of this Amendment, but some reliance has also
been made on the "due process clause." The general standards
which have emerged from the recent test cases have been that
(1) the state's classification of citizens for the purpose of
state action must be related to a valid state interest; (2) the
basis of classification must not be of a "suspect" sort; (3)
the state must preserve the "fundamental interests" of its
citizens, and (4) the more fundamental the interest and the more
suspect the classification, the more compelling must be the
state's interest in preserving the classification in question.
•That is, the state must have overwhelming reasons to discriminate
through a classification which provides unequal treatment for
citizens in an area of vital human concern.
In the field of
education these tests have been invoked primarily against classifications by race and wealth.

Classification by Race
The perspective of the United States Supreme Court has changed
a great deal since the time when it declared the Negro race to
be "a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been
subjugated by the dominant race" and that a Negro slave was
"like an ordinary piece of merchandise and property" who had none
of the rights declared for all men in the Declaration of
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Independence.^ Change came only gradually, however.
In 1896
the Court upheld in Plessy v. Ferguson a statute providing for
"separate but equal" railroad accommodations for white and
"colored" persons.^ This landmark decision set the precedent
in interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment for the following
The "separate but equal" doctrine was first applied
sixty years.
specifically to education by the U.S. Supreme Court in a case
involving the closure of a Negro high school in Georgia.^

Although the "separate but equal" doctrine never was directly
and publicly questioned by the Court until it was reversed in
19 54, the Court's rulings in the preceding years began to make
it increasingly costly for a state to maintain equal and separate
facilities.
The following list summarizes the major Supreme
Court decisions which led to the transformation in 19 54:^^
Missouri v. Canada , 305 U.S. 337 In this
[1938]
case, the Court declared that a state denied equal
protection of the law when it failed to provide a
comparable legal education for Negroes within the
state.
Sipuel y. Board of Regents , 322 U.S. 631
[1948]
Oklahoma was obliged to provide legal education for
a qualified Negro applicant.

Fisher V. Hurst 333 U.S. 147
[1948]
The Court required the admission of a Negro to the
state law school in Oklahoma, holding that no other
applicant could enroll until a law school with equal
facilities should be provided for Negroes.
,

Sweatt v. Painter 339 U.S. 629
[1950]
A separate law school for Negroes was held to be
inferior and therefore the equal protection clause
required that qualified applicants must be admitted
to the University of Texas.
,

[1950]

McLaurin v. Oklahoma

,

339 U.S.

637

In the latter two cases the Court weakened the "separate but
The
equal" doctrine considerably but refused to abandon it.
McLaurin case demonstrated that the justices v;ere unwilling to
allow segregated status within a single institution to be considered "equal" education. The plaintiff, McLaurin, had classes
with white students but was assigned a special "colored" seat
in each classroom, was required to sit at a special table in
the library and was allowed to dine only in a segregated portion
This, the Court declared, amounted to an
of the cafeteria.

I
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unequal education imposed by the state and was therefore unconstitutional.

H

The watershed decision on segregation in education came in
Brown V. Board of Education (1954). 12 j^ ruling that Mr. Brown's
daughter could not be forced to attend a separate school solely
on the basis of her color, the Supreme Court finally struck down
the entire "separate but equal" doctrine.
This case and the
second Brown decision^^ in the following year sent shock waves
into American education which are still being felt more than
fifteen years later. Two primary principles were thereby
announced: (1) that classification on the basis of race in
education is discriminatory and is therefor unconstitutional
per se and (2) that education has fundamental status as a right.
,

The Court articulated the first principle as follows:
To separate [Negroes] from others of similar age
and qualifications solely because of their race
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their
status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone

....

We conclude that in the field of public education
the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no place.
Separate educational facilities are inherently
unequal.
Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs
and others similarly situated for whom the actions
have been brought are, by reason of the segregation
complained of, deprived of the equal protection of
the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. ^^

The second principle was stated as follows:

We must consider public education in the light of
its full development and its present place in
American life throughout the Nation. Only in this
way can it be determined if segregation in public
schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal
protection of the laws.
Today, education is perhaps the most important
function of state and local governments. Compulsory
school attendance laws and the great expenditures
for education both demonstate our recognition of
the importance of education of our democratic society.
It is required in the performance of our most basic
public responsibilities, even service in the armed

»
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i
It is the very foundation of good citizenforces.
Today it is a principal instrtunent in awakening
ship.
the child to cultural values, in preparing him for
later professional training, and in helping him to
adjust normally to his environment.
In these days,
it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity,
where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a
right which must be made available to all on equal
terras. ^^

The Brown decision began not only a transformation in education
but also sponsored, as one author notes, an "egalitarian
revolution in judicial doctrine that has made dominant the
principles to be read into the equal protection clause."!^
Brown represents a radical departure from the traditional
interpretation of equal protection that "the classification
must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation
to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike. ^^ In place of this
test. Brown ushered in what has been termed the "new equal
protection" doctrine:
[T]he court must decide (a) whether the classification
results in a discrimination against a disadvantaged
relates
group; (b) whether [the classification]
to an interest that is "basic" or "fundamental" or
"critical," and, assuming a sufficiently affirmative
answer to these two questions [separately or] in
combination, (c) whether the state's asserted justification is "compelling" enough to overcome the
presumptive invalidity ... in a phrase like "strict
scrutiny. "^^
.

.

.

.

.

.

Justice Harlan, in a dissenting opinion to Shapiro v. Thompson
provides a more concise version:
(1969)
,

[S]tatutory classifications which either are based
upon certain "suspect" criteria or affect "fundamental
rights" will be held to deny equal protection unless
justified by a "compelling" governmental interest . •'-^

Education, as has been seen in Brown, has been imputed the
status of a "fundamental interest." Classification by race,
above any other factor, has been interpreted as "suspect" or
"invidious. "20 Thus, classification in educational matters on
the basis of race is by this standard clearly unconstitutional.
In addition, the Court has enumerated at least two other sorts
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of suspect classifications which, in interference with a fundamental interest, invalidate a state's action: wealth and geogThese are discussed in the following section.
raphy.

A further dimension of the "new equal protection" which has
evolved since Brown is a focus upon the activity or passivity
The first Brown opinion declared school segof state action.
regation "inherently unequal," but only the second Brown decision
directed the states to provide relief.
In the latter opinion,
the Court began to develop the notion of a mandate for positive
.state action to eliminate discrimination in education.
Racial
discrimination was unconstitutional, the Court declared, and
"[a] 11 provisions of federal, state, or local law requiring or
permitting such discrimination must yield to this principle"
[emphasis added]. ^^ With this holding, the courts began to
forge a new notion of state action in countering racial discrimination; that notion has evolved in the form of two principles:
(1) states must not be implicated in supporting de faczo segregation, and (2) states must take positive action to eliminate
both de jure and, in some instances, de facto racial segregation
in the schools.

The issue involved here, Kurland notes, is

whether the command implicit in equal protection
constitutes merely a ban on the creation of
inequalities by the state or a command, as well, to
eliminate inequalities existing without any
direct contribution thereto by state action.
"Equality" like "liberty" has both a positive and
negative aspect
[The question is] whether the
state was not only required to abstain from commanding segregation but was under the affirmative duty
to integrate the school system. 22

....

The Supreme Court for some time avoided the issue by refusing
to rule on lower court decisions which, as in Bell v. School
City of Gary 23 denied the duty of the state to eliminate de
facto segration.
On the other hand, the Court appeared to accept
the principle that a state may take positive steps to eliminate
de facto discrimination by also refusing to rule on cases in
which lower courts had upheld action taken by education boards
to integrate schools. 24
,

More recently, the Supreme Court has moved closer to the position
that positive action to achieve integration is required of the
state.
In Green v. County School Board the Court held that
school boards "operating state-compelled dual systems
[are]
clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps
might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial
,

.
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discrimination would be eliminated root and branch. "^^ In
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (19 71)
the
Court unanimously held that neighborhood schools were insufficient if a greater racial balance could be created by requiring
students to attend a more distant school, thus giving the Court's
sanction to busing. 26
,

In this case, the Court upheld a decision by a district court in
which the district court judge had clearly set out the contemporary
reasoning about state action:

The system of assigning pupils by "neighborhoods" with
"freedom of choice" for both pupils and faculty, superimposed upon an urban population pattern where Negro
residents have become concentrated almost entirely in
one quadrant of a city of 270,000, is racially discriminatory.
This discrimination discourages initiative
and makes quality education impossible. The quality of
public education should not depend on the economic or
racial accident of the neighborhood in which a child's
parents have chosen to live or find they must live
nor on the color of his skin.
The neighborhood school
concept never prevented statutory racial segregation;
it may not now be validly used to perpetuate segregation
[emphasis in original]. 2'

—

The Court appears to have come very close to an unqualified
assertion of the state's duty to take positive action to eliminate
de facto as well as de j ure racial discrimination which violates
the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Other forms of discrimination are being tested by this principle;
the results are exerting a powerful influence on the educational
structure.

Classification by Wealth
A second major category of state classification which has come
into question under the equal protection clause is classification
by wealth.
In contrast to the well-established principles of nondiscrimination in racial cases, the principles involved in
classification by wealth are the subject of considerable legal
Such commentators as Wise and Carter, for instance,
dispute.
argue that decisions involving voting rights and rights of indigent
defendants in criminal prosecutions have established wealth as a
properly "suspect" classification for the purpose of state action. 28
Michelman and Brest dispute this interpretation of "wealth as
an invidious category and prefer to emphasize instead the particular

i
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kind of interest (e.g., voting or legal defense) disturbed by
the state's action. 25

Part of the controversy centers around the nebulous distinction
between de jure and de facto wealth classifications. While it
seems generally agreed that an out-and-out de jure classification
by wealth which adversely affects an individual is "suspect"
under the equal protection clause, the difficulty arises in
determining what in fact is a wealth classification. A required
payment for the enjoyment of any governmental activity may and
often does pose a deterrent to the poor but not to the rich,
but it would be a very sweeping change indeed to abandon all
On the other hand, when certain court costs effecsuch fees.
tively deprive an indigent of his day in court, the U.S. Supreme
Court has ruled such payment barriers unconstitutional. ^0 There
is a broad area of fuzziness between areas which can be clearly
staked out as de jure and those which can be labelled as de facto
governmental wealth classifications.
The courts have picked their way through the mine-fields of suc^
theoretical difficulties and appear to have arrived at something
like a "new equal protection" doctrine applied to wealth:
Given
that a state's action results in some general classification
on the basis of wealth (such as costs for a government service)
the more "fundamental" the indiviaual's right or interest deprived,
the more compelling must be the state's reason to preserve the
classification. ^^
The primary Supreme Court cases involved in the evolution of
this general position are:
1941 Edwards v. California , 314 U.S.

160

The Court reversed an earlier decision which declared persons
without funds a "moral pestilence" and declared than a man could
not be deprived of his freedom merely because he had no property.
1956 Griffin v. Illinois

of
to
an
in

,

351 U.S.

12

A landmark case in which the Court declared it a violation
the Fourteenth Amendment for a state court to deny appeal
an indigent by not furnishing him with a free transcript.
Such
act, while not discriminatory on its face, was discriminatory
its operation on the basis of wealth.

1963 Douglas v. California

,

372 U.S.

353

The principle of Griffin was extended to include the right
of indigents to free counsel.
"In either case the evil is the
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same: discrimination against the indigent.
For there can be no
equal justice where the kind of an appeal a man enjoys "depends
on the amount of money he has. "(355)

1966 Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections

,

383 U.S.

663

In outlawing a poll tax, the Court declared:
[A] state violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes the affluence
of the voter or the payment of any fee an electoral
standard. Voter qualifications have no relation to
wealth nor to paying or not paying this or any other

tax. (666)

The cumulative effect of these decisions has been to establish
the principle that a man cannot be deprived of at least some of
his basic rights on the basis of a lack of wealth.
There is a
strong analogy to questions involving education (assuming education
to be a fundamental right or interest)
and such analogies have
been made in several important recent decisions by district and
state courts.
In the earliest of these, Hobson v. Hansen (1967)
the District Court of the District of Columbia grouped poverty
with race as a discriminatory classification when found to
deprive children of an adequate education. The Court asserted a
positive obligation on the part of the responsible government to
rectify a situation in which both "racial minorities and the
poor are denied equal educational opportunity [emphasis added]. "^2
The specific problem of school district taxation and its relation
to educational opportunity was addressed in Hargrave v. Kirk 33
In striking down a limitation on local school district taxation
by the state of Florida, the District Court invoked the "new
equal protection" theory. One commentator notes:
,

.

One possible interpretation of Hargrave is that a state
cannot create classifications based on geography and
wealth which result in unequal educational opportunities
absent a compelling state interest. This rationale can
be used to attack the school finance provisions of all
states except Hawaii which has a single, state-wide
school district. All financial schemes which rely upon
local taxes have created classifications based on
geography and wealth.
If unequal educational opportunities
can be shown to result from this classitication, following
Hargrave the classif ical -.on would be a denial of equal
protection
Hargrave oy correctly assuming that
unequal education is a necessary result of a great disparity
in expenditures, defines the first parameter of possible
standards and provides a rationale to strike down classifications made for administrative convenience that create
obviously unequal educational opportunities. 34
,

....

,
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This case also involves a treatment of the effect of geography
Several authors have discussed the question
as a classification.
of geographical classification, basing their evaluation primarily
on reapportionment decisions stemming from Baker v. Carr ,35 (1962)
In Reynolds the Court said:
and Reynolds v. Simms ^S (1964)
"The resulting discrimination against those
living in
."^^
disfavored areas is easily demonstrable
In another
issue involving geographical classification, the Court struck
down in Shapiro v. Thompson (1969)38 a law which required an
indigent to be a state resident for one year prior to claiming
state public assistance benefits.
However, the classification
appears less significant in these cases than the importance of
the rights denied (suffrage and subsistence benefits)
and the
classification by geography is not itself invidious in the same
sense as a classification by race or wealth.
Thus, in the
educational opportunity cases geographical classification has
been mainly seen as a de jure state action with the important
secondary effect of producing a de facto oppressive classification by wealth.
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

,

The outstanding recent case in the field of equal educational
opportunity is Serrano v. Priest decided by the California
Supreme Court in August, 19 71.
This decision represents, in
one sense, the culmination of the new equal protection doctrine
as applied to wealth and education.
Here the suspect classification is declared to be wealth, and the fundamental interest
adversely affected to be education; in the face of these two
components, the state is found to have no compelling interest
which requires maintenance of the classification:
,

We are called upon to determine whether the California
public school financing system, with its substantial
dependence on local property taxes and resultant wide
disparities in school revenue, violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We have
determined that this funding scheme invidiously discriminates against the poor because it makes the quality
of a child's education a function of the wealth of his
parents and neighbors. Recognizing as we must that the
right to an education in our public schools is a
fundamental interest which cannot be conditioned on
wealth, we can discern no compelling state purpose
necessitating the present method of financing. We have
concluded therefore, that such a system cannot withstand constitutional challenge and must fall before the
equal protection clause. 39
In reasoning
the case in terms of the new equal protection
doctrine, the California Court provides a step-by-step analysis
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of the components of the test.
Under the heading "Wealth as a
Suspect Classification," the Court carefully develops an
argument similar to the one described above, relying on the
thesis developed in H arper Griffin and Douglas
In these cases,
the Court says, classifications by wealth, although "unintentional,"
were found to be "classifications whose impact simply fell more
heavily on the poor. "40 Moreover, the Serrano Court finds that
school district classifications are not simply the source of
de facto discrimination, but, to the contrary, "we find the case
unusual in the extent to which governmental action is^ the cause
of the wealth classifications."^! The opinion blames school
districting in California for inter-district differences of as
much as 10,000 to 1 in assessed value per unit of average daily
attendance. And this, the Court holds, is clearly governmental
discrimination in education on the basis of wealth. ^2
.

,

The second leg of the argument is made by the Court under the
heading "Education as a Fundamental Interest ." '^^ The Court
admits that education has not specifically been designated a
"fundamental interest" by the United States Supreme Court,
but concludes on the basis of Brown v. Board of Education and
of its own reasoning that education is indeed such a fundamental
interest:
We
begin by examining the indispensable role
which education plays in the modern industrial state.
This role, we believe, has two significant aspects:
first, education is a major determinant of an
individual's chances for economic and social success
in our competitive society; second, education is a
unique influence on a child's development as a
citizen and his participation in political and community life
Thus, education is the lifeline
of both the individual and society. ^^^
.

.

.

....

Moreover, in comparing the right to an education with the right
to vote or the right to the right of a criminal defendant, the
Court concludes that, "from a larger perspective, education may
have far greater social significance than a free transcript or
a court-appointed la\Aryer," and that "education makes more
meaningful the casting of a ballot. "45
The court finds that the existence of viable alternative systems
of educational financing negate any compelling state interest
in retaining the preseat system.
Thus fulfilling the equal
protection test's thrt:e criteria (wealth as a suspect classification, education as an adversely affected fundamental interest
and the absence of a compelling state interest to require
maintenance of the classification) the Court holds the financing
system unconstitutional:
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The California public school financing system
since it deals intimately with education, obviously
touches upon a fundamental interest.
For the reasons
we have explained in detail, this system conditions
the full entitlement to such interest on wealth,
classifies its recipients on the basis of their collective affluence and makes the quality of a child's
education depend upon the resources of his school
district and ultimately upon the pocketbook of his
parents. We find that such financing system as
presently constituted is not necessary to the attainment of any compelling state interest. Since it does
not withstand the requisite "strict scrutiny", it
denies to the plaintiffs and others similarly situated
the equal protection of the laws.^^
.

.

.

Soon after the Serrano decision, two federal district courts
ruled against similar school financing schemes in Minnesota and
Texas46aNineteen challenges to school financing systems are
pending in the courts and at least twelve more are in pr^oaration.
As a result of attacks on local financing systems
under the new equal protection interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, it seems safe to say that massive changes are under
way in the traditional methods of financing education in the
United States.
Two fundamental questions arise in considering alternative
financing plans to meet the new equal protection requirements:
(1) How can the cost burdens best be equalized?
(2) What
constitutes educational equality? In answer to the first
question, statewide rather than local financing would appear to
meet the necessary requirements of an equalized burden; this
most likely would take the form of either a statewide property
tax or a fully equalized foundation program or some combination
of the two.
Hawaii already has such a state-based system of
financing; similar plans are under study in almost all states.
Alternatively, approximate equality of tax burden might be
achieved by the redrawing district lines, as required in a
recent District Court decision in Virginia (to achieve both
greater racial and financial equality among schools in the
Richmond area) 47 or by going to a nationalized financing scheme.
The primary source of funds in all of these plans could remain
property taxation, as it is at present, or it could be shifted
to income, sales or other forms of taxation.
The chapter on
educational financing in this study considers the alternatives
in greater detail.

—

The second question, "What constitutes educational equality?,"
raises the difficult issues of distribution and assessment of
educational need. Aside from the problem of relative tax
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burdens, there remains the dilemma of determining relative needs.
An important challenge to the existing school finance system in
Illinois failed primarily because of the plaintiff's reliance on
the rather vague concept of "educational need."'*^ The district
court found this concept too "nebulous" for the application of
However, the Serrano Court, while not
judicial standards.
equating expenditure exactly with quality, placed the burden
on the defendants to show that "substantial disparities" in
spending do not in fact create educational disadvantages in
poorer districts. ^^ Moreover, a large number of possible criteria
for the assessment of need and corresponding distribution mechanisms have been suggested by various analysts. ^*^ The problem
appears to be not one of whether there are standards, but of
which standards to select.

The simplest "equal" distribution plan, of course, is a uniform
However,
per student or per capita allotment for an entire state.
ignores
the
expenditure-quality
this
relationship, varying
educational needs and questions of effort.
In the first case,
Coleman and others^-^ have suggested that educational expenditures
may have only a weak relationship to educational quality, and,
since equal quality is what is finally desired, the state must
base its equalization scheme on some basis other than expenditures.
Secondly, educational needs vary (for example, schools may cost
more to run in remote areas or in cities) and therefore some
factor of need or cost should be taken into account in an equalThird, the effort a family or a district is willing
izing plan.
to give to provide an education may vary from place to place,
and this, some argue, should be given recognition in the form
A number
of increased allotments for increased local tax effort.
of plans to meet these criteria have been proposed, including
"family power equalizing," vouchers, cost-pegged expenditures,
classification of schools (with varying amounts to go to different
kinds of schools)
high minimum foundation programs and so on.
A consideration of the merits and demerits of these various
distribution schemes appears in the chapter on educational financing in this study.
,

MONTANA:

STATUS AND ALTERNATIVES

Three fundamental decisions relevant to equal educational opportunity pose themselves to the Constitutional Convention:
(1)
the inclusion or noninclusion of a statement of principle
regarding equal educational opportunity; (2) provisions on
educational financing; (3) Indian education.
1.

Statement of principle

.
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on equal educational opportunity was included in the proposed
New York state constitution of 1967:

Equality of educational opportunity shall be
guaranteed to all the people of the state. The
Legislature shall provide necessary programs to
develop the educational potential of each person.
[Art.

IX, Sec.

IC]

A similar provision could be included in the Montana Constitution,
either in an education article or in the Bill of Rights.
The
arguments against inclusion of such a provision rest primarily
on desire for constitutional brevity and potential difficulties
The major arguments for inclusion, on the
in interpretation.
other hand, are that such a provision would provide a general
statement of aim for the entire educational system, including
its methods of financing, and that recent court decisions on
the subject of equal protection have made such a stattir-ent of
principle pertinent at this time, whereas it was not before.
The present Montana Constitution has no provision dealing eiti.ar
with equal protection of the laws or with equal educational
opportunity.
However, four sections of Article XI do suggest
that the state is committed to maintaining some minimal equitable standard of education:
It shall be the duty of the legislative assembly of
Montana to establish and maintain a general, uniform
and thorough system of public, free, common schools
[emphasis added]. [Art. XI, Sec. 1]

,

Ninety-five per centum (9 5%) of all the interest
received on the school funds of the state, and ninetyfive per centum (95%) of all rents received from the
leasing of school lands and of all other income from
the public school funds shall be apportioned annually
to the several school districts of the state in
proportion to the number of children and youths between
the ages of six (6) and twenty-one (21) residing therein
respectively, but no district shall be entitled to
such distributive share that does not maintain a public
free school for at least six months during the year
for which such distribution is made
[Art. XI,

....

Sec.

5]

It shall be the duty of the legislative assembly to
provide by taxation, or otherwise, sufficient means,
in connection with the amount received from the general
school fund, to maintain a public free common school
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in each organized district in the state, for at least
three months in each year. [Art. XI, Sec. 6]

The public free schools of the state shall be open to
all children and youth between the ages of six and
twenty-one years. [Art. XI, Sec. 7]

One other section prohibits discrimination in admissions to
educational institutions on the basis of religion, political
party or sex, but says nothing of race or wealth; nor does it
mention equality:
No religious or partisan test or qualification shall
ever be required of any person as a condition of
admission into any public educational institution of
the state, either as a teacher or student
nor
shall any person be debarred admission to any of the
collegiate departments of the university on account
.

of sex.

[Art.

XI,

Sec.

.

.

9]

The Convention could (1) leave the present provisions in the
Constitution unchanged; (2) condense them into a single general
provision on equal educational opportunity and/or nondiscrimination in education (assigning other topics in these
provisions to the relevant sections); (3) modify particular
parts of the existing provisions in accordance with desired
changes, perhaps with respect to age, school terms and distribution schemes; or (4) strike all of the existing provisions,
or all of the existing provisions with the exception of Section
1.
2.
Educational financing
The basic means for the attainment of equal educational opportunity, other than through nondiscrimination provisions, is through equitable financing
schemes.
The pros and cons of particular schemes are discussed
later; the prior, more general question is what sort of
constitutional language is required to allow creation of a
more equitable financing plan than that now employed.
.

Under the present School Foundation Program, Montana attains a
significant amount of equalization of distributed funds and
some equalization of tax burdens.
However, substantial differences in expenditures remain; some districts in Montana have
as much as three cimes more to spend per pupil for elementary
schools and nine times for high schools than do others. ^^
Enormous differences also exist in taxable valuation per pupil;
the ratio is 120 to 1 among some districts and 13 to 1 between
the richest and poorest counties. 53 ^s a result, some counties
must tax their citizens more than twice as much as others for
schools which still are less well supported than those in rich
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counties. One study rates Montana thirtieth among the states
in the degree to which its school foundation program actually
equalizes. 5^* Another study finds that in Montana if educational
funds were distributed equally among all classrooms, more than
half of the classrooms would receive additional money. ^^

Some changes in the direction of greater equalization could be
accomplished in Montana without any constitutional change.
Sections 1 and 6 of Article XI (cited above) clearly establish
the duty of the state legislature to provide funds for local
In addition. Article
schools through taxation and other means.
grants
authority
to
the
legislature
to modify
Section
la
XII,
taxation
for
schools
of
the source

The legislative assembly may levy and collect taxes
upon incomes of person, firms and corporations for
These
the purpose of replacing property taxes.
income taxes may be graduated and progressive and
shall be distributed to the public schools and to
the state government.
However, a constitutional change would be required if one important
alternative financing plan were implemented: a statewide property
Article XI, Section 9 of the Montana Constitution limits
tax.
the rate of a state property tax to two and one-half mills:

The rate of taxation on real and personal property
for state purposes, except as hereafter provided,
shall never exceed two and one-half mills on each
dollar of valuation

....

A uniform statewide system of property taxation, however, would
require a levy at a rate of at least forty mills and probably
more, if it were to support schools at approximately the present
Thus, this limitation would have to be substantially
level.
raised or eliminated altogether in order to establish the new
system.

The existing constitutional provision on distribution of a
portion of the school funds [Art. XI, Sec. 5] also might have
to be changed or elminated should a new distribution system be
Under this provision, part of the state educational
desired.
funds (interest from the permanent school fund and income from
school lands) must be distributed on a strict per capita basis.
This is an "anti-equalizing" device under the present system of
district funding which enriches poor and rich districts alike; it
is a type of flat grant criticized by some educational economists. 56
Moreover, to the degree that cost-quality factors and considerations
of educational need should be taken into account, such per capita
distribution also fails to meet standards of equity.
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If it desired to change the existing provision with respect to
concerns for equal educational opportunity, the Convention could
either eliminate Article XI, Section 5 completely, modify it to
contain additional factors of distribution and need or replace
it with a new provision which specifies a general aim of
equality in distribution.

A provision drafted by the Committee on Education of the
Illinois Constitutional Convention was designed to achieve the
goal of equalizing the financial burdens and benefits of education:

To meet the goals of Section 1, substantially all
funds for the operational costs of the free public
schools shall be appropriated by the General Assembly for the benefit of the local school districts.
No local governmental unit or school district may
levy taxes or appropriate funds for the purposes of
such educational operation except to the extent of
ten percent (10%) of the amount received by that
district from the General Assembly in that year. 57

The Convention, however, chose to adopt only a general commitment to state support, omitting the 10 percent limitation on
local funding.
The new Illinois Constitution [Art. X, Sec. 1]
"The State has the primary responsibility for
provides:
financing the system of public education."
3.
Indian Education
The well-documented disadvantages
suffered by Indians in educational matters ^^ bring the topic
of Indian education under the scope of a treatment of equal
educational opportunity. However, in addition to educational
disadvantage, other important factors, such as the federal
relationship to Indian tribes and cultural integrity, complicate a discussion of Indian education. Therefore, this topic
is analyzed at greater length below.
.

INDIAN EDUCATION:

BEYOND THE MELTING POT

A report by the United States Senate has labeled Indian education a "national tragedy. "^^ Detailed studies of the failures
of both federal and state governments to develop even minimally
successful educational programs for Indians are almost as
numerous as the failures themselves. ^0 One such study, the
Carnegie Report, states the case baldly:

The education provided Indian children is a
failure when measured by any reasonable set of
1.
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The educational system has not succeeded
criteria.
in providing a majority of Indian children with the
minimum level of competence necessary to prepare them
to be productive citizens in a larger society.
Addiitionally, very little attempt has been made to
perpetuate the values and culture that might be unique
to the Indian people, provide them with a sense of
pride in their own heritage, or confidence that they
can effectively control their own future development.
It should be noted that the fault for these inadequacies
in education does not lie entirely within the school;
the whole system of relationships between the white
majority community and the Indians is the source of the
problem. While the schools, both public and Bureau of
Indian Affairs supported, are in great need of improvement in curriculum, methods, teacher training, teacher
turnover, and in the teacher's understanding of the
unique problems of the students and their parents, any
increase in money, time, and effort spent on Indian
education can only relieve some of the more important
symptoms of the underlying problem.
These efforts will
be relatively ineffective unless the basic relationships
between Indians and white people can also be altered,
and, specifically, unless the paternalistic relationship
between the white power structure and the Indian community can be changed.
The crucial problem in the education of Indian
2.
children is the general relationship between white
society and the Indian people. This relationship
frequently demeans Indians, destroys their selfrespect and self-confidence, develops or encourages
apathy and a sense of alienation from the educational
process, and deprives them of an opportunity to develop
the ability and experience to control their own affairs
through participation in effective local government. 61

Such studies develop a picture of unequal educational opportunity
A racial minority with among the lowest
of classic proportions:
average income ($1,500 annually per family for on-reservation
Indians) 62 and the highest unemployment rate (37.3% for onreservation Indians in 1967)^3 of any social group must send
their children to the lowest quality schools in the country.
Moreover, in addition to purely economic factors, Indian
education is fraught with problems of a psychological and
cultural nature.
The results are enormous drop-out rates (as
high as 50 percent in some areas) 64 and perpetuation of
economic and cultural deprivation.
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At least part of the problem appears to result from a lack of
clear governmental responsibility for Indian education. This,
in turn, results from the traditional haziness of law which
surrounds state-federal relationships with Indians.
The early
landmark case in this area was Worcester v. Georgia ^^ in which
the Court ruled, in an opinion delivered by Chief Justice
Marshall, that the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction
over Indian tribes on Indian lands.
In 1858, on the other hand,
the Court ruled that the state of New York had police powers
over its own citizens on Indian lands. ^^ The trend, however,
has been toward the primacy of federal authority in Indian
affairs and the eventual holding in United States v. Forness
(1942) that, without the express consent of Congress, state laws
do not apply to Indians on reservations. 67
,

The issue is further complicated by the lack of clarity in the
federal government's own claim to jurisdiction over Indians.
Part of the confusion stems from the federal Constitution's
grant of power to Congress " [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes" [Art. I, Sec. 8], which suggests a view of Indian
tribes as sovereign states, rendered subject to the power of
Congress by conquest. ^^ Chief Justice Marshall reinforced this
view in terming the Indian tribes "domestic dependent nations"
and "wards. "69 One author describes the twisted course of
subsequent legal doctrine on the Indian:

The term "ward" became something of a catchword for
later Supreme Court decisions, so that, in United
States V. Waller [243 U.S. 452 (1917)], the Court
felt free to speak indiscriminately about the power of
Congress to grant the Indians varying degrees of
emancipation at its pleasure. The federal courts in
one breath would describe Indian tribes as sovereign
nations or states, and in the next designate them
wards of the Government, who had to be treated as the
beneficiaries in a trustee relationship with the
Government. They could not manage their own property,
which they had held for thousands of years they could
not manage their own health or welfare services; they
could not even provide education for their children,
so that treaty after treaty contained provisions for
Government sr'.ools. Thus, the Indians were separate,
and quasi-equal; they were citizens as well as wards,
residents as well as aliens; they could vote and serve
in the armed forces, but they could not serve on local
school boards because they were not part of a town or
school district. They did not pay taxes on the land
on which they lived, but they paid income taxes on
money they earned. They seemed to straddle a fence
;
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along an uneasy border between two worlds.
omitted] .70

[Citations

Significantly, Indians did not receive formal citizenship until
(Further discussion of the legal
relationships among the nation, the states, and Indians appears
in the study on the Bill of Rights in this series of reports
for the Montana Constitutional Convention.
a Congressional Act of 1924.'-'-

It is not surprising, then, that the state's relationship to

Indian education is ill-defined. While authority over Indians
is in the first instance federal, the state has the primary
authority for education of its inhabitants. More than 60 percent
of all Indian children attend state schools .72 states receive
federal support for the education of reservation Indians, but
the major sources of this support ("Federal impact" aid under
Public Laws 815 and 874) are not specifically directed to
Indians.'-^ In practice, states appear to have assumed 3 major
amount of responsibility for educating Indians without ever
formally accepting the task.
Such de facto arrangements often
have merit, but they also can lead to negligence.
Thus, one area of possible constitutional action with respect
to providing equal educational opportunity for a heavily disadvantaged minority might be inclusion of a provision clarifying
the state's responsibility with respect to Indian education.
The New Mexico Constitution [Art. XII, Sec. 10] has such a
provision covering children of Spanish descent:

Educational rights of children of Spanish descent
Children of Spanish descent in the State of New
Mexico shall never be denied the right and privilege
of admission and attendance in the public schools or
other public educational institutions of the State,
and they shall never be classed in separate schools,
but shall forever enjoy perfect equality with other
children in all public schools and educational institutions of the State, and the legislature shall provide
penalties for the violation of this section
.

....

There are other factors, however, which qualify the state's
relationship to Indian education. The assumption of responsibility
by the state for Indian education is not an unmitigated blessing
for the Indian.
The particular cultural and historical factors
involved in Indian affairs demand that special consideration
be given to cultural autonomy.
Indians have been belabored for
centuries with the white man's attempts to "assimilate" them
into the "dominant culture." Comments made by Thomas Jefferson
on the Indians sound quite as jarringly chauvinistic as the
words of the Supreme Court on another racial minority (cited
above in the Dred Scott decision). Jefferson said:
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[T]he Indians backward [in civilization] will yield,
and be thrown further back. They will relapse into
barbarism and misery
and we shall be obliged
to drive them with the beasts of the forest into the
Stony Rocky mountains 74
.

.

.

.

In the face of the movement toward their domination and absorption by the European settlers, Indians have maintained an
amazing degree of cultural integrity. One of the main vehicles
for the "acculturation" of the Indian by the white civilization
has been the school system, and many writers have suggested
that Indian resistance to this process is responsible for the
educational dilemma. One particularly articulate statement of
this point is by Lloyd New, director of the Institute for
American Indian Arts:

For almost five centuries the American Indian has been
subjected to a process of attrition which has slowly
eroded the roots of his cultural (and economic) existence.
His physical ways have been completely obliterated
in many areas and, presently, his spiritual existence
is in extreme jeopardy.
The many and varied attempts that have been made to
"help" him, and particularly "educate" him, have been
largely unsuccessful.

Perhaps in part because it was assumed that the sooner
the Indian was forced to abandon his ways and join the
melting pot of America, the better off he would be.
But he has displayed unique resistance to that idea,
possibly because his psychological relationship to the
land was different from that of the immigrant groups
who eventually surrounded him. Failure on the part of
those who have dealt with the Indian to understand the
basis of his tenacious observance of his own cultural
mores has resulted in the abortion of almost every
attempt to assist him. Even now, various kinds of human
salvage operations, such as urban relocation, employment
assistance, on-the-job training, and other rehabilitation
efforts are, at best, only stopgap efforts to meet his
worldly needs, while failing miserably to provide the
cultural and .'motional substance -required to put his life
in balance.
The American Indian has always been devoted to a philosophy which holds that one's existence should blend into
the comparatively passive rhythms of nature, as opposed
to the dominant society's quest for control of nature

68-

EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY

through scientific manipulation of its elements.
In
the main, direct attempts to switch him from his philosophical position have failed, much to the consternation
of those who have tried.
In the past, public apathy and disinterest permitted him
to maintain a certain degree of privacy in this way of
life but in recent times he has been forced into the
public struggle for economic survival, due to the lack
of an environment supportive of his old ways.
With
limited land holdings and the inevitable encroachments of
the dominant society the American Indian is hard pressed
in his efforts to maintain his viewpoint while adjusting
to the exigencies of the modern world.
No longer in a position to make war with the opposition,
the Indian, in general, has adopted a tendency to withdraw and lie quietly in the remnants of his old world,
only halfheartedly picking at the offerings made to him
by his multitudinous and dominating neighbors.

Poverty, poor health, unemployment, and a growing rate
of alcoholism among Indian adults, and a shocking
prevelance of suicide, dropouts and delinquency among
Indian youth attest to the fact that there has been an
overall failure to provide an educational approach
sufficiently effective to promote constructive social
transition. '^

The Indian has a great deal to protect in his own cultural
Thus, while he may require aid in some forms from
integrity.
white society, he does not necessarily want the control which
seems inevitably to accompany institutional support.
In
educational matters, this relates to the right to retain cultural
autonomy and educational diversity discussed in connection with
other minority groups in Chapter III. Among such groups, one
writer argues,
the American Indians, by virtue of their occupation
of a unique position in the history and legal scheme
of the United States, have the best claim to "unique"
treatment, with regard to education.
The documentation
of past and present physical oppression, violent
coercion, enslavement, and social stigmatization is
quite as lurid as that which obtains for the Negro,
while the tactics used to "civilize" the Indians, under
the rubric of "education," are more blatantly repugnant
than those employed against other groups. ^^
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The argument discussed in the previous chapter in support of
educational diversity thus would hold doubly true for Indian
education. The U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Priest y. Society
of .Sisters ^^ that the state does not have the right to "standardize" its children would seem to reinforce claims for the
protection of a truly distinct cultural minority.
Similarly,
the cultural considerations articulated in the Amish school
cases have bearing on the analogous requirements for Indian
cultural autonomy.
The special circumstances surrounding the Indian peoples,
however, lend even greater support to claims voiced for protection
against dominant social institutions.
The Montana Supreme
Court recognized such a right of independence in an 1881 ruling
upholding the right of Indians to consent or not to consent to
government-provided education. The case concerned an 1819
federal statute as it applied to a treaty with the Blackfoot
Indians providing for a government school on the reservation.
The Court held that Indian parents could not be compelled, by
a writ of habeas corpus, to send their children to the school.
The treaty and statute daily illustrate the policy of
the government towards the Indians.
The purpose is
to civilize and educate them.
But the government does
not assume to force upon the Indians an education, nor
to compel them to adopt the modes of civilized life.
The fundamental idea is that whatever is done in the
premises must be by consent of the Indians. ^8
A later federal statute, the Wheeler-Howard Indian Reorganization
Act of 19 34, provides another means of securing a measure of
tribal autonomy.
The Act allows Indian tribes to incorporate
as governing bodies and business entities.
The tribal council
or tribal government becomes the duly constituted governing
body for those tribes which do incorporate, and because the
constitutions of some of the incorporating tribes expressly
provide for tribal control of education, such an act of incorporation opens the door to complete tribal authority over eduUnder these provisions, a tribe might choose to withdraw
cation.
its consent to federal and state education laws and substitute
a school system of its own choosing. ^^

Although severe financial obstacles stand in the way of such
developments, there are good reasons for the attempts to protect
Indian cultural integrity in some manner.
The history of the
white man's attempts to "acculturate" the Indian through
educational indoctrination has included intense efforts to
absorb and mold the Indian's character. One former teacher
in an Indian boarding school in the 19 20's obliviously recounts
her difficulties with language training:
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Among all Indian tribes there is the universal and
decided aversion to using the English language. Even
those who have been at school and who understand and
speak it well will often call for an interpreter
when summoned to the agency on business or to answer
charges brought against them.
In the more remote schools one of the trials of a
teacher's life was to get her pupils to speak out,
or to talk loudly enough when reciting, to be heard.
In these places it sometimes became necessary to
punish children for using their own language while
at play or while engaged in outside work.
If this
was not done, there was no progress at all made in
acquiring English, and if the children did not know
English, all attempts at teaching them were useless. ^^

A modern version of this attempt to impress the Indian into a
single cultural mold is found in a recent report by an analyst
in the Indian section of the Office of Economic Opportunity:
Well, then, why don't we put into practice some of
our psychological knowledge about human beings and
proceed with a plan of deliberate conditioning for
specific purposes. First, we must decide as members
of the dominant culture what we want of these
Reservation Indians and then, secondly, we must draw
our plans, and third, proceed without hesitation to
shape the behaviors which in combination will give
us the kind of people we want.^-^

Crass attempts, such as these in federal schools, to erase the
distinctiveness of Indian culture often have been matched by
a kind of demeaning neglect of the Indian in public schools.
The Senate Report on Indian Education lists major problems of
Indian participation in the public school system:
1.
American Indians have little, if any, influence
or control in the education of their children in the
public schools.
2.
Public schools educating Indians rarely include
coursework which recognizes Indian history, culture or
language, and often use materials and approaches which
are derogatory toward Indians.

Many school administrators and teachers consider
3.
Indian pupils inferior to white students, and thus
expect them to fail, both in school and in life.°^
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A report on Indian education just completed by an educational
research group at the University of Montana levels similar
criticisms at the treatment of Indian students in the public
school system:
The handicap from which Indian children suffer most
is that usually the off-reservation public school is
too busy following the state adopted curriculum and
meeting the needs of all students to make the adaptations
necessary to meet the needs of the non-English speaking
Indian child who is already behind his group in knowledge of how to study and in comprehension. °-^

What are the alternatives to the traditional federal and state
patterns of assimilative Indian education? Three of the most
widely acclaimed are Indian-run demonstration schools developed
recently in New Mexico, Arizona and Montana. The primary
emphasis in these schools is community control and the provision
of an education germane to the Indian experience.
Although the
highly successful Rough Rock school in Arizona is probably the
best known, the newly created school on Montana's Rocky Boy's
Reservation demonstrates the workability of an imaginative
approach to Indian education in Montana. After several years
of frustrated efforts, the Rocky Boys finally were able in 1970
to establish an independent public school district under their
own control.
In place of their previous submersion in a school
system run by an all-white board, which Indians felt ignored
some of their important needs, the tribe now has a school which
they feel is more in tune with their own cultural heritage.
Bert Corcoran, the Cree principal of the new school, describes
the difference:
We are a community school. We serve the community.
That is the basic difference from the old system. The
school here is a community center.
It stays open five
nights a week. We have 41 adults in a basic education
course. We've got a bilingual program in Cree and English
that ranges from adults down to five-year-olds with
teaching done by people from the reservatioix. This is no
longer an institution.
I like that because I'm not an
institution man. The school is for the people.
It's
their school anc they know it. They're no longer afraid. °^
The major remaining concern of the scho^-l is its heavy reliance
on federal financial support.
Under various special grants,
the federal government provides more than half of the operating
expenses of the school.
The tribe is continuing its effort to
place the school on a secure financial footing.
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The trend is toward an increasing responsibility assumed by the
In California, Idaho, Michigan,
state for the education of Indians.
Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, Texas, Washington and Wisconsin,
the state has taken over total responsibility for Indian education
In view of this trend, schools
from the federal government.
such as the Rough Rock and Rocky Boy assume major significance
as models for state programs
schools which provide the alternative
of state assistance without state domination.
Three main goals
for state activity in Indian education emerge from experience
with such schools and from similar conclusions arrived at in
many studies of Indian education. States have the obligation
to (1) provide equal educational opportunities for Indian children
through adequate financial support; (2) eliminate all forms of
discrimination against Indians in education, and (3) allow for
the existence of schools which meet the indigenous cultural
needs of Indians, by fostering educational diversity and
community control.

—

These statements of principle could be embodied in a model constitutional provision on equal educational opportunity and
Indian education. ^5 Although no other state has such a provision
with respect to Indians, a precedent does exist in a provision
for another minority group in the New Mexico Constitution, as
cited above.
The major arguments in favor of the inclusion of such a constitutional provision are:
1.
A constitutional commitment to equal educational opportunity should be made in light of the fundamental character
of both education and the rights of equal protection; explicit
reference to the Indian people is warranted by their special
legal status and long history of deprivation.
2.
The confused status of federal and state authority with
respect to Indian education demands constitutional clarification.

3.
The historic culture of the Indian, threatened by the
modern state, requires specific constitutional protection.

4.
Education, as a specifically state responsibility, should
have the major conditions of its provision established in the
state constitution.

Major arguments against inclusion of such a provision include:
1.
For the sake of brevity, the state constitution should
not give specific reference to the topic of equal educational
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opportunity. Equal protection provisions of the federal
Constitution extend to the state.
The special relationship of the Indian to the federal
2.
government (i.e., as a "ward") precludes state action in this
area.

The principle of generality militates against the
3.
mention of particular groups in a constitution.
4.

No other state has a similar provision.
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A provision in the Enabling Act for the Montana Constitutional
Convention of 1889 might have some bearing on such a provision;
"The constitution [s] shall be republican in form, and make
no distinction in civil or political rights on account of
race or color, except as to Indians not taxed, and not be
repugnant to the constitution of the United States and the
principles of the Declaration of Independence.
[Section 4]"

There is some doubt as to the interpretation of this provision.
The ambiguity of the language leaves unclear what is meant
by "no distinction
except as to Indians untaxed."
Moreover the confused status of the legal relationships
among Indians, the federal government and the state, as
discussed earlier, compounds the difficulty of specifying
Presumably, however, this language in the
Indian rights.
Enabling Act would pose no obstacle to a new constitutional
provision relating to Indian equal educational opportunity.

....
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CHAPTER V

PUBLIC AND NONPUBLIC EDUCATION
One of the most emotionally discussed issues in the field of
education is the relationship between public and nonpublic
The matters involved are so basic individual
education.
rights, state powers, religious and moral beliefs, selfdetermination, public welfare, the shaping of children's
lives, taxation that any treatment of the issue is bound to
stir fundamental moral and political beliefs.
The problems
centered around education, religion and the state form an
essential part of the political heritage of the democratic
polity, from the classical formulations in Socratic dialogues
to the arguments of contemporary schools of political thought.
The public-nonpublic education issue has become an intrinsic
part of social life in the Western world.

—

—

Although the issue is often referred to as the "church -state"
controversy, it is really a triangular affair comprising separate public, private and religious issues. The questions
of the parental right to educate, the state obligation to provide education, and religious freedom are separate dimensions
of the central problem surrounding the relationship between
public and nonpublic schools. Each aspect must be kept separately in mind in examining the general issue.
This debate has ancient origins.
Socrates allegedly was condemned to death for subverting the sanctioned state religion
and morality by introducing Athenian youths to new notions of
education.^ Jesus, confronted with a similar dilemma between
religious and moral principle and political sovereignty,
uttered the feunous dictum, "Render therefore unto Caesar the
things which are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are
God's. "2 The "two cities" doctrine of Augustine and the
hierarchies of laws of Thomas Aquinas provided a modus vivendi
between the competing allegiances of church and state in the
Western world during the Middle Ages. With the post-Renaissance
emergence of the secular state and the gradual growth of
religious tolerance, the affairs of the state and those of the
church became increasingly insulated from one another. Education, however, remained an area of vital concern which defied
division. The mind of the child was too crucial a subject for
state, church and parent to relinquish rival claims to influence over it.

This controversy between public and private claimants to the
right to educate was inherited by the new American nation and
became a part of its political culture. America the democratic
The incipient conflict
state and America the pluralist society:
between these two national principles has been recognized since
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Toqueville's brilliant analysis in Democracy in America
As
Toqueville pointed out, America has been unprecedentedly
successful in combining pluralistic diversity with
democratic equality yet, as he also warned, there lurked
behind this compromise the opposing dangers of sectarian
fragmentation and majority tyranny.^ In the field of education
these two principles have met head on, and each era has had
to work out its own compromise.
.

>

—

In the contemporary era, the issue remains much the saime:
What should be the proper relationship between public and nonpublic education in order both to promote the public welfare
and to safeguard freedom of conscience and diversity? How does
state aid to private education relate to both public welfare
and freedom of conscience?

Although general principles embodied in these questions have
been articulated in federal and state constitutions, judicial
and constitutional processes are required to resolve recurrent
conflicts among them. A good deal of attention has been given
by the courts in recent years to the problem of striking a
balance cunong the principles of public welfare, individual
rights and religious liberty.
The judicial and constitutional controversy has focused primarily on two points:
regulation and state aid. The issue of
state regulation of nonpublic schools is considered in Chapter
III of this study, but the crux of the problem is summed up by
Erickson:
How can nonpublic education be both responsible and
free? Responsible to serve the public interest;
free to experiment and disagree.
Without regulation,
some schools may victimize patrons and endanger the
general welfare. With regulation, dissent is jeopWhere should the balance be struck?^
ardized.

Erickson recommends that courts and policy-makers, in weighing
piiblic welfare and diversity in decisions on school regulation,
encouragement
should keep two paramount objectives in mind:
of the pursuit of pluralistic goals and encouragement of
(For further
diverse approaches to achievement of these goals. ^
discussion of the issue of regulation, see Chapter III.)
The question of state aid to nonpublic education poses even
In
thornier problems than those associated with regulation.
addition to being immersed in the difficulty of balancing
public welfare and diversity, the state aid issue is entangled
with the problems of control of state funds and interpretation
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of the establishment of religion clause of the First Amendment
The basic argument goes something
to the federal Constitution.
On the one hand, public funds should not be used
like this:
for religious or other nonpioblic purposes.
But, on the other
hand, education is by its very nature a public purpose.
The
result is a precarious balancing act between relative injustices:
the injustice of requiring a cultural minority to pay for schools
for the public as well as for their own children versus the
injustice of requiring the public to pay for doctrinaire schools
Clearly there is no simple legal solution.
for a minority.
Law professor Philip Kurland comments on the state-aid issue:

[Ajnyone suggesting that the answer, as a matter of
constitutional law, is clear one way or the other
is either deluding or deluded.^

The following sections discuss the evolution of the current
legal situation with respect to state aid to nonpublic schools
and suggest the major alternatives for state constitutional
provisions on the subject. The evolution is discussed primarily
in national terms because the U.S. Supreme Court, in interpret- Ing
the supreme law of the land, sets the legal framework for subsequent state action. Existing provisions in other state constitutions together with other alternatives are to be treated in
connection with Montana's provisions on the issue.

FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION;
FROM THE WALL TO THE TIGHTROPE
In spite of the massive attention given the state-aid issue,
only two U.S. Supreme Court decisions before 19 71 dealt directly
with the question of state aid to parochial schools. This was
due primarily to the traditional state jurisdiction over the
disposal of funds in educational matters. However, with increasing amounts of federal aid to education in more recent years
the issue has been elevated to the purview of federal concern.

The first of these two cases, Everson v. Board of Education ,
quickly became a landmark decision on the interpretation of the
First Amendment. The relevant part of the First Amendment,
extended to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, reads:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
."
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof
.

.

.

In Everson the Court upheld public payment for bus transportation for students attending parochial and other nonpublic schools.
Although the Court ruled by a 5 to 4 majority in favor of this
,
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particular aid program. Justice Black delivered an opinion
for the Court which carefully delineated the meaning of the
"establishment clause" of the First Amendment:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor
the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another
No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied
to support any religious activities or institutions,
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they
may adopt to teach or practice religion.
Neither a
state nor the Federal Government can, openly or
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious
organizations or groups and vice versa
In the words
of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of
religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of
separation between church and state. "^

....

.

Yet despite its own elaborately drawn line beyond which state
aid was not to pass, the Court ruled in favor of certain forms
of aid, in this case for transportation.
The reason is in the
other part of the First Amendment, known as the "free exercise
clause." The Court stated:
[We] must be careful, in protecting the citizens of
New Jersey against state-established churches, to
be sure that we do not inadvertently prohibit New
Jersey from extending its general state law benefits
to all its citizens without regard to their religious
belief
[The first amendment] requires the
state to be neutral in its relations with groups of
religious believers and non-believers; it does not
require the state to be their adversary.^

....

The Ever son case provided a clear exposition of the two countervailing principles embodied in the First Amendment. On the
one hand, the establishment clause was held to create a "wall"
between the affairs of the state and those of religion; on the
other hand, the free exercise clause was held to dictate a
policy of non-antagonistic "neutrality" in the state's relations
with religious groups. The Court did not gc so far as to maintain that the free exercise clt.use required the state to provide
equal transportation aid to parochial students, but the majority
opinion did hold that once the state legislature chose such a
method to promote the public welfare, then it was constitutionally
acceptable under both clauses.^
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However, this was only the beginning of controversy.
There
was much disagreement in the Everson case on the constitutional
In a dissenting opinion. Justice Jackson
questions involved.
pointed to the incongruity of the concept of a wall which was
not really a wall and which had a precedent only in the
literary figure Julia "who, according to Byron's reports,
'whispering "I will ne'er consent," consented. "^0 ^^^^ ^he
subsequent history of the "wall" doctrine has been no more
Robert Hutchins points out that the phrase "the
felicitous.
between
church and state" was first used by the Court as
wall
from
Jefferson in a completely different context.
borrowed
referred
Although
to in one case as "impregnable," the "wall"
has been more recently abandoned as a metaphor in favor of such
terms as "tightrope" and "entanglement. "^2 Another commentator
remarks, "Certainly there is something anomalous about a wall
that will admit a school bus without the 'slightest breach,' but
is impermeable to a prayer. "13

—

'

Problems with the concept of a "wall" arose soon after the
Everson case in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education
a case dealing not with state aid to nonpublic schools hue
with the teaching of religious subjects in public schools.
Again, Justice Black's opinion for the Court declared the
existence of "a wall between Church and State which must be
kept high and impregnable" and ruled against a "released time"
program whereby children received religious instruction on a
voluntary basis on public school premises. ^^ Justice Jackson,
in a concurring opinion, agreed with the verdict but questioned
whether the notion of a "wall" served any useful purpose:
I think it remains to be demonstrated whether it is
possible, even if desirable,
completely to
isolate and cast out of secular education all that
some people may reasonably regard as religious instruction
The fact is, that for good or for
ill, nearly everything in our culture worth transmitting, everything which gives meaning to life, is
saturated with religious influences
Music
without sacred music, architecture minus the
cathedral, or painting without the scriptural themes
would be eccentric and incomplete, even from a
secular point of view
And I suppose it is a
proper if not an indispensible, part of preparation
for a worldly life to know the roles that religion
and religions have played in the tragic story of
mankind.
The fact is, that for good or for ill,
nearly everything in our culture worth transmitting,
everything which gives meaning to life, is saturated
with religious influences
derived from paganism,
Judaism, Christianity both Catholic and Protestant
.

.

.

....

....

....

—

.
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and other faiths accepted by a large part of the
world's peoples

....

It is idle to pretend that this task is one for which
we can find in the Constitution one word to help us
as judges to decide where the secular ends and the
sectarian begins in education. Nor can we find guidance in any other legal source.
It is a matter on
which we can find no law but our own prepossessions.
If with no surer legal guidance we are to take up
and decide every variation of this controversy
we are likely to have much business of this sort.
And, more importantly, we are likely to make the
legal "wall of separation between church and state"
as winding as the famous serpentine wall designed by
Mr. Jefferson for the University he founded. ^^

....

A subsequent decision which severely limited McCollum and
further weakened the "wall" was Zorach v. Clauson
Implicit
in the Everson and McCollum majority opinions had been the
notion of religious liberty as a byproduct of church-state
separation.
In Zorach however, the Court upheld a public
school "dismissed time" program which facilitated attendance
at religion classes held off the school premises, and thus
gave support to the position of religious liberty as an independent right, guaranteed by the free exercise clause, which
could be protected by the cooperation and concert of public
schools and religious institutions. 1^
.

,

The next U.S. Supreme Court case to deal directly with state
aid to parochial schools came in 19 68, twenty-one years after
Everson
In Board of Education v. Allen 17 the Court reviewed the constitutionality of a New York state law which
required local school districts to lend textbooks to students,
including parochial students. Justice White, in delivering
the majority opinion, ruled that the statute, which had the
stated purpose of furthering the educational opportunities
available to the young, was constitutionally acceptable under
In drawing this conclusion. Justice White
the First Amendment.
invoked in place of the "wall" metaphor a test first employed
in Abington School District v. Schemp-^, a case dealing with
school prayer:
.

,

[W]hat are the purpose and the primary effect of the
enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition
of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of
legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution.
That is to say that to withstand the strictures of the
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Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion. 18
The case which put the finishing touches on the weakening
concept of the "wall" was the Court's 19 70 decision in Walz v.
Clearly if the no-aid dictum of Everson were
Tax Commission
can be levied to support any
to be upheld r"no tax
religious activities or institutions"), then all forms of tax
support for religious institutions, including tax exemptions,
were called into question. This was the point at issue in
Walz specifically whether church exemptions from state real
property taxes were constitutional. Chief Justice Burger,
in holding for the Court that such exemptions were allowable
under the First Amendment, noted the difficulty of wending a
neutral course between the two religion clauses. Both, he
observed, are cast in absolute terms, and either, if followed
to its logical extreme, would clash with the other:
.

.

.

.

:

No perfect or absolute separation [of church and
state] is really possible; the very existence of
the Religion Clauses is an involvement of sorts
one which seeks to mark boundaries to avoid excessive entanglement.
The general principle deducible from the First
Amendment and all that has been said by the Court
that we will not tolerate either govis this:
ernmentally established religion or governmental
interference with religion.
Short of those expressly proscribed governmental acts there is
room for play in the joints productive of a
benevolent neutrality which will permit religious
exercise to exist without sponsorship and without
.1^
interference
.

.

.

Burger sought support in Everson and Allen for this emphasis
on "benevolent neutrality:"
Surely bus transportation and police protection
to pupils who receive religious instruction "aid"
that particular religion to maintain schools that
plainly tend to assure future adherents to a
particular faith by having control of their total
education at an early age
Similarly making
textbooks available to pupils in parochial schools
in common with public schools was surely an "aid"
to the sponsoring churches because it relieved those
churches of an enormous aggregate cost for those
books. 20

....
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The Court proposed a new test for the constitutionality of a
given act which differed somewhat from that used in Allen
:

Each value judgment under the Religion Clauses
must
turn on whether the particular acts in
question are intended to establish or interfere with
religious beliefs and practices or have the effect of
doing so [emphasis added]. 21
.

.

.

The significant difference here is that the word "establish"
rather than "advance" (as in Allen is used, thus narrowing
the class of acts clearly prohibited.
This allows more room
for the "play in the joints" suggested earlier by the Chief
Justice, and it makes the issue a question of degree:
)

[T]he questions are whether the involvement is
excessive, and whether it is a continuing one
calling for official and continuing surveillance
leading to an impermissible degree of entanglement. 22

The cumulative effect of Zorach (released time) , Walz (tax
exemption) and Allen (provisions of textbooks) was to displace
the doctrinal approach of Everson with more pragmatic tests as
a guide on educational aid issues.
This meant that judicial
decisions had to take into account the particular purposes and
effects of a legislative program and to evaluate whether its
primary effect was to benefit the child or to establish religion. The result was a broadening of the "child benefit"
theory already articulated in Everson under which a law
which had the primary effect of benefiting the secular education of the child and only incidentally aided a religious
institution was not considered unconstitutional.
In Allen the
test became the more general one of whether a law had "a
secular legislative purpose and a primary effect which neither
advances nor inhibits religion; "23 in Welz the test became
whether a law "establishes" religion or to what degree it
"entangles" the state with religion. 24
,

,

The emphasis upon "entanglement" was renewed in two recent
cases on the state-aid issue.
Lemon v. Kurt2man 2^ and Tilton
26
V. Richardson
have delved further into the intracacies of
entanglement and, in Joing so, have shed a little more light in
some areas and a little more darkness in others. The Court in
Lemon overturned recently passed laws in Rhode Island and
Pennsylvania which directed the states to reimburse parochial
schools for "secular services" in the form of teachers salaries
and (in Pennsylvania) for textbooks and instructional materials.
Chief Justice Burger, in delivering the majority opinion,
admitted:
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Candor compels acknowledgement
that we can only
dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law.
.

-

.

The language of the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment is at best opaque, particularly when
compared with other portions of the Amendment.
Its
authors did not simply prohibit the establishment
of a state church or a state religion, an area
history shows they regarded as very important and
fraught with great dangers.
Instead they commanded
that there should be "no law respecting an establishment of religion." A law may be one "respecting"
the forbidden objective while falling short of its
total realization. 27
In ruling that the state laws created excessive entanglement,
the Court invoked the "three main evils" against which the
Establishment Clause was to provide protection, as they were
demarcated in Walz
"sponsorship, financial support, and
active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity. "28
At the same time, Burger pronounced the demise of the "wall"
and expanded the notion of empirical considerations:
:

Our prior holdings do not call for total separation
between church and state; total separation is not
possible in an absolute sens
Judicial caveates
against entanglement must recognize that the line of
separation, far from being a "wall," is a blurred,
indistinct and variable barrier depending on all the
circumstances of a particular relationship

....

....

In order to determine whether the government entanglement with religion is excessive, we must examine the
character and purposes of the institutions which are
benefited, the nature of the aid that the State
provides, and the resulting relationship between the
government and the religious authority. 29
In this case, the Court simply determined that the degree of
entanglement was excessive, due primarily to the factors of
teaching and administrative requirements.

In another ruling handed down at the same time, the Court
found the balance tipped in the opposite direction. The Court
upheld in Tilton v. Richardson a series of federal building
grants to church-related colleges. This sort of aid. Burger's
opinion stated, did not violate the religion clauses because,
in contrast to the sort of aid envisioned in Lemon building
,
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grants (1) go to church-related colleges where "religious
indoctrination is not a substantial purpose or activity," (2)
have a "nonideological" character, and (3) require only a "onetime, single-purpose" administrative act rather than continuing
surveillance. -^^
No one of these three factors standing alone is
necessarily controlling; cumulatively all of them
shape a narrow and limited relationship with government which involves fewer and less significant contacts
than the two state schemes before us in Lemon and
Dicenso [companion case to Lemon
The relationship
therefore has less potential for realizing the substantive evils against which the Religion Clauses
were intended to protect. ^-^
]

.

As to the possibility of inequitable taxation, as charged by
the appellants, the Court argued the public "share of the cost
of the grants under the Act is not fundamentally distinguishable
from the impact of the tax exemption sustained in Walz or the
provision of textbooks upheld in Allen. "32

The over-all doctrine of the Court as it now stands appears to
be that state aid to religiously affiliated institutions is
permissible if (1) the primary benefit is a secular one, (2) the
aid does not involve the state in excessive entanglement with
religion, and (3) the effect of the aid is neutral with respect
Burger's opinion in Til ton sketches this policy:
to religion.

Our cases from Everson to Allen have permitted churchrelated schools to receive government aid in the form
of secular, neutral, or nonideological services, facilities, or materials that are supplied to all students
regardless of the affiliation of the school which they
attend. 33
The principle of "neutrality" as articulated in the recent
cases brings up once again the wider issues suggested earlier
with respect to the state and education. To require the state
to be neutral with respect to religion is to prohibit state
partiality to one religious group over another or to religious
But in the
groups over non-religious groups or vice versa
modern state which presides over massive institutions and
exercises enormous economic control, decisions about the allocation of funds have the effect of directing people into one
activity or another; in the case of schools, this means that
decisions on state support effectively keep open or close
For the state to observe
schools, both public and nonpublic.
strict neutrality, then, might require it to insure that education of all forms received approximately equal support from the
state.
.
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Complete neutrality in this sense, however, is fraught with
In addition to problems of entanglea number of difficulties.
ment, there is difficulty in deciding what sorts of nonreligious
groups might be eligible for equal support.
In Walz Justice
Harlan suggested in a concurring opinion that groups eligible
for equal treatment would be a set of educational, cultural and
religious institutions so broadly defined as to include "groups
whose avowed tenets may be antitheological, atheistic, or
Harlan observed that neutrality "in its application
agnostic."^'*
requires an equal protection mode of analysis. "^^ Justice
Douglas in his dissenting opinion in the same case argued that
strict neutrality requires that such groups be included. ^^
,

The general problem of state aid to nonpublic schools, then,
is not simply one of religious freedom:
It also is a question
of equal educational opportunity and freedom of conscience in
general. One commentator warns that preoccupation with the
religious aspects of the issue may undermine attempts 1.0 improve
the quality of the educational system as a whole.
She emphasizes
that "there are important educational, as well as religious,
issues at stake. "2'
Areen,-^^ Valente^S and others suggest that the most feasible
test for the neutrality of aid is on the basis of "voluntarism"
the principle of "protection of individual choice in matters

of belief from governmental pressure:"

A genuinely neutral funding plan will enhance
voluntarism, not distort it. Moreover, by focusing
on which feunilies are going to benefit from an aid
program, it is often easier to determine the likely
educational as well as religious effects. Programs
which aid the religious choices of only the white
middle class for example, are likely to continue if
not increase the present racial and economic segregation in public education, which is a major cause
of the present shortcomings of that system. ^^
The problems associated with maximizing voluntarism and
minimizing entanglement are being dealt with now in the
administration of the statutes of some states and of the
federal aid programs to elementary, secondary and higher
education.
Whatever the particular means decided upon, however, it is clear that the U.S. Supreme Court has abolished
the notion of a "wall" and has replaced it with pragmatic
tests for the constitutionality of individual aid programs
to nonpublic schools.
Because of the conflicting principles
involved, the Court has rejected doctrinaire approaches and
continues to wend a difficult path between educational rights
and sectarian entanglements.
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STATE PROVISIONS
The situation in the states with respect to state aid to nonpublic schools is quite different from that at the federal
There is a great deal of variation among state constilevel.
tutional and statutory provisions on the subject. While some
states have no constitutional provisions governing the use of
state funds for nonpublic schools and thereby implicitly adopt
the federal standards, others have provisions of varying
degrees of strength, some of which far exceed the federal
criteria in prohibiting state aid to nonpublic education. Some
states, for instance, forbid indirect aid such as busing and
textbooks, which are permissible under the U.S. Supreme Court's
interpretation of the First Amendment.

Classification of state constitutional provisions is difficult
and may be done only in rough terms. The following general
discussion of categories of state-aid provisions appeared in
a 1970 study:"*-^

Thirteen states have very stringently worded restrictions, all created between 1870 and 1917.
The earliest
of these is found in the Illinois constitution of 1870
(Article VII) and repeated verbatim [sic] in four
constitutions written later Missouri (1875)
Colorado
(1876), Montana [not verbatim] (1889) , and Idaho (1899):

—

,

"Neither the general assembly nor any county, city,
town, township, school district, or other public corporation, shall ever make any appropriation or pay from
any public fund whatsoever, anything in aid of any
church or sectarian purpose, or to help support or
sustain any school, academy, seminary, college,
university, or other literary or scientific institution,
controlled by any church or sectarian denomination
whatsoever, nor shall any grant or donation of land,
money, or other personal property ever be made by the
state or any such public corporation, to ?.ny church,
or for any sectarian purpose."

The period during which strictures of this severe type
were created was characterized by rapid immigration,
strong nativistic movement, and widespread disparagement of an attempt in New York, a few years earlier,
to obtain public funds for Catholic schools on the
ground that the public schools were blatantly Protestant
as indeed they were.'*^ There is much evidence to suggest
that the prohibitions against aid were prompted in
important measure by fear of the Catholic church and its
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foreign- language schools by Protestant citizens and
lawmakers and by failure to recognize the religious
bias in public schools against which Catholics were
Not a single Catholic was represented at
reacting.
the Illinois convention when the above-quoted measure
Numerous attempts were made during the
was adopted.
period to halt instruction in foreign languages in
nonpublic schools at various grade levels and even to
outlaw the nonpublic schools themselves. ^^
New York's "Blaine Amendment" is perhaps the best
known of the rigorous interdictions against assistance
to religiously affiliated schools:

"Neither the state nor any subdivision thereof shall
use its property or credit or any public money, or
authorize or permit either to be used, directly, or
indirectly, in aid or maintenance, other than for
examination or inspection, of any school or institution of learning wholly or in part under the control
or direction of any religious denomination, or in
which any denominational tenet or doctrine is taught."

Other states with overtly severe prohibitions of this
Massachusetts
type are Georgia (1877 Constitution)
Nebraska (1875 Constitution)
(1917 Constitution)
Nevada (1880 Constitution), Oklahoma (1907 Constitution),
South Carolina (1895 Constiution) , South Dakota (1889
Prohibitions that seem somewhat less
Constitution)
severe in wording are found in the constitutions of
Arizona (1910), California (1879), Hawaii (1950),
and Utah (1895). Maryland (1867 Constitution) and
Vermont (1793) have no explicit ban against aid to
In verbal terms, relatively mild
nonpublic schools.
restrictions are found in the following constitutions:
,

,

.

Alabama-1875
Alaska-1956
Arkansas-1836, 1874
Connecticut- 181
Delaware-1897
Florida-1885, 1968
Indiana-1851
Iowa- 18 57
Kansas-1859, 1966
Kentucky-1891
Louisiana-1864,79,9 8,1913
Maine-1819
Michigan-1835, 50, 190 8, 1963
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Minnesota-1877
Mississippi- 186
New Hampshire-1877
New Jersey-1875, 1947
New Mexico-1911
North Carolina-1868
North Dakota-1889
Ohio-1851
Oregon-1859
Pennsylvania-1874
PJiode Is land- 184 3

Tennessee- 1870
Texas-1876
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Wisconsin-1848
Wyoming-1889

Virginia-1902
Washington-1889
West Virginia-1872

Examples of provisions of various stringency include :^^

Overtly Severe Provisions

—

Nebraska [Art. VII, Sec. 11] No sectarian instruction
shall be allowed in any school or institution supported
in whole or in part by the public funds set apart for
educational purposes, nor shall the state accept any
grant, conveyance, or bequest of money, lands or other
property to be used for sectarian purposes. Neither
the State Legislature nor any county, city or other
public corporation, shall ever make any appropriation
from any public fund, or grant any public land in aid
of any sectarian or denominational school or college, or any educational institution which is not
exclusively owned and controlled by the state or a
governmental subdivision thereof. No religious test
or qualification shall be required of teacher or
student, for admission to or continuance in any pxoblic
school or educational institution supported in whole
or in part by public taxation.

—

No money or property
South Dakota [Art. VI, Sec. 3]
of the state shall be given or appropriated for the
benefit of any sectarian or religious society or
institution.

—

No appropriation
South Dakota [Art. VIII, Sec. 16]
or lands, money o^other property or credits to aid
any sectarian SchTOl shall ever be made by the state,
or any county or municipality within the state, nor
shall the state or any county or m.unicipality within
the state accept any grant, conveyance, gift or bequest of lands, money or other property to be used
for sectarian purposes, and no sectarian instruction
shall be allowed in any school or institution aided
or supported by the state.

Less Severe Provisions

—

The State shall provide for
Hawaii [Art. IX, Seel]
the establishment, support and control of a statewide
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system of public schools free from sectarian control
a state university, public libraries and such other
educational institutions as may be deemed desirable,

including physical facilities therefor. There shall
be no segregation in public educational institutions
because of race, religion or ancestry; nor shall
public funds be appropriated for the support or benefit
of any sectarian or private educational institution.

—

Neither the Legislature nor
Utah [Art. X, Sec. 13]
any county, city, town, school district or other
public corporation, shall make any appropriation to
aid in the support of any school, seminary, academy,
college, university or other institution, controlled
in whole, or in part, by any church, sect or denomination whatever.

Mild Provisions

—

Oregon [Art. I, Sec. 5] No money to be appropriated
No money shall be drawn from the
for religion.
or
Treasury for the benefit of any religeous [sic]
theological institution, nor shall any money be
appropriated for the payment of any religeous [sic]
services in either house of the Legislative Assembly.
,

—

Wyoming [Art. I, Sec. 19] Appropriations for sectarian
or religious societies or institutions prohibited. --No
money of the state shall ever be given or appropriated
to any sectarian or religious society or institution.

—

Wyoming [Art. VII, Sec. 8]
[N]or shall any portion of
any public school fund ever be used to support or
assist any private school, or any school, academy,
seminary, college or other institution of learning
controlled by any church or sectarian organization or
religious denomination whatsoever.
State Court Interpretations
State court interpretation of the nonpublic school aid provisions
in state constitutions has been summarized as follows :4B
It is impossible to determine from the phraseology of
the relevant constitutional clauses, however, how
balefully the state courts will view efforts to give
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funds (variously described) for any purpose other
than support of the public schools.
In an effort
to circumvent a taboo of this kind, Connecticut's
recent "purchase of secular services law" (Public
Act No. 791) declares that "No portion of the
•school fund' shall be used to make any payment uader
this act."
In its earlier but similar legislation,
Pennsylvania was more cautious, avoiding usual appropriation mechanisms. It drew funds for assistance
to nonpublic schools directly from horse racing reveIn a tuition grant bill introduced into the
nues.
Florida legislature in March, 19 70 (unidentified by
number on my copy)
the following provision is found:
,

"There is hereby established a non-public school
tuition fund to be known as the 'tuition fund,'
which will be used to defray part of the tuition
charges for the secular education of children who
are residents of the state and who attend non-public
schools in the state in grades kindergarten through
This fund shall be administered by the
twelve.
Department of Education. No monies appropriated to
this fund shall be derived directly or indirectly
from the state's school fund as defined in
the
.
.
Florida Constitution."
.

It is too early to predict whether most of the relevant
state courts will regard these methods as a transparent
subterfuge or will accept them as valid.

In a basic sense, however, despite their often emphatic
phraseology, the state constitutions raise the same
central issue as does the First Amendment to the Federal
Constitution:
In what ways, if any, can aid to nonpublic
schools be squared with the church-state separation that
is essential to religious liberty and domestic tranquility?
Constitutional lawyers differ as to the best approach
to separation of church and state, and the courts have
been far from consistent on the issue.

MONTANA PROVISIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS
The provision in the Montana Constitution, as previously noted,
is among the most severe of state prohibitions against state aid
to church-related schools:

Neither the legislative assembly, nor any county,
city, town, or school district, or other public
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corporations, shall ever make directly or indirectly,
any appropriation, or pay from any public fund or
moneys whatever, or make any grant of lands or other
property in aid of any church, or for any sectarian
purpose, or to aid in the support of any school,
academy, seminary, college, university, or other
literary, scientific institution, controlled in whole
or in part by any church, sect or denomination whatever.
[Art. XI, Sec. 8]
As suggested above, this provision appears to have been copied
almost verbatim from the Illinois Constitution.
However, there
is an important difference:
In addition to the Illinois language,
the Montana provision includes the phrase "directly or indirectly.
This is crucial to judicial interpretation, as will be seen below.

Other provisions in the Montana Constitution which have bearing
on the issues of public and nonpublic education, religious
freedom and church-state separation are the following:
Art. Ill, Sec. 3.
The free exercise and enjoyment
of religious profession and worship, without discrimination, shall forever hereafter be guaranteed,
and no person shall be denied any civil or political
right or privilege on account of his opinions concerning religion, but the liberty of conscience hereby
secured shall not be construed to
justify
practices inconsistent with the good order, peace, or
safety of the state, or opposed to the civil authority
thereof, or of the United States.
No person shall be
required to attend any place of worship or support any
ministry, religious sect, or denomination, against his
consent; nor shall any preference be given by law to
any religious denomination or mode of worship.
.

.

.

Art. v.. Sec. 35.
No appropriation shall be made for
charitable, industrial, educational or benevolent
purposes to any person, corporation or community not
under the absolute control of the state, nor to any
denominational or sectarian institution or association.
Art. XII, Sec. 11.
Taxes shall be levied and collected
by general laws and for public purposes only.
They
shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within
the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax.

Art. XIII, Sec. 1.
Neither the state, nor any county,
city, town, municipality, nor other subdivision of the
state shall ever give or loan its credit in aid of,
or make any donation or grant, by subsidy or otherwise.
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to any individual, association or corporation, or
become a subscriber to, or a shareholder in, any
company or corporation, or a joint owner with any
person, company or corporation, except as to such
ownership as may accrue to the state by operation
or provision of law.
In addition to these constitutional provisions, two provisions
of the Montana State Enabling Act, adopted as Ordinances by
Congress and the Montana Constitutional Convention of 1889,
have a bearing on the relationship between public and sectarian
education in Montana:

First.
That perfect toleration of religious sentiment
shall be secured and that no inhedsitant of the state
of Montana shall ever be molested in person or property, on account of his or her mode of religious
worship.
[Ordinance No. 1]

Fourth. That Provision shall be made for the
establishment and maintenance of systems of public
schools, which shall be open to all the children of
said state of Montana and free from sectarian control.
[Ordinance No. 1]

There is little to aid in analyzing judicial interpretations of
these provisions by Montana courts. What appears to be the only
case on state aid to nonpublic schools to be decided by the
Montana Supreme Court is State ex rel. Chambers v. School No. 10
(1970). ^0
In this case the court struck down a tax levy approved
by the. voters of the Anaconda School District for the specific
purpose of supporting teachers to teach secular subjects in
parochial schools.
The case is important as a classic confrontation between the
"establishment" and "free exercise" principles. The school
board argued that the "free exercise" clauses of the federal
and Montana [Art. Ill, Sec. 3] bills of rights required that
the state not discriminate on religious grounds against the
implementation of voted tax levies for schools. The state, on
the other hand, argued that the levy violated the "establishment" clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitutior
and Article XI, Section 8 of the Montana Constitution. The
court recognized the primary importance of these provisions
by listing all the related provisions in the Montana Constitution,
Enabling Act and Ordinances noted cibove, but then declared: ^^
[I]t is apparent that the primary question raised in
this appeal is whether the contemplated use of public
funds would contravene the provisions of the First and

-100-

PUBLIC AND NONPUBLIC EDUCATION

Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States and the provisions of Article XI,
Sec. 8 of the Montana Constitution. 52
The court then cited Walz^^ at length to support its interpretation that the U.S. Supreme Court opposed this sort of financial
aid to parochial schools (although Walz can be used both ways,
as noted above)
In the eyes of the court, however. Article XI, Section
the Montana Constitution was the crux of the matter:

8

of

Returning to Section 8 of Art. XI, it cannot be
asserted that this section is ambiguous or indefinite and thereby open to interpretation since it
clearly states in no uncertain terms that no school
district can directly or indirectly appropriate or
pay from public funds to aid the support of any
school controlled in whole or in part by any church,
sect or denomination. While it was argued to the
contrary by the appellants, that such section could
be interpreted to support their theory of this case,
we cannot accept such argument. ^^^
By holding that the school board's action was illegal under this
provision and corresponding state statutes Revised Codes of
Montana, 75-4609 and 75-3801], the court escaped having to deal
directly with the "free exercise" clause.
[

The U.S. Supreme Court approximately a year later reached a
similar verdict on a similar state-aid plan for teachers' salaries in the Lemon case discussed above, ^^ albeit for somewhat
different reasons. The Supreme Court emphasized the problem
of "excessive entanglement," rather than a general prohibition
of state aid to nonpublic schools, but the issue of teacher
support was very much the same as that involved in the Montana
In this sense, the Chambers decision is not more restriccase.
tive than the rulings of the federal court.
However, other aspects of the Chambers opinion do indicate that
the Montana Court interprets the state Constitution to be more
restrictive than the federal Constitution in prohibiting state
aid to nonpublic schools. Early in the opinion the court
admonishes:
We do not intend to discuss all the cases which have
been urged upon us as authorities since it is the
constitutional provisions of our state where not in
conflict with the provisions of the Constitution of
the United States that should and will govern our
decision. 56
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Later, the court refers to an Attorney General's Opinion^?
which seems to establish more rigid requirements for Montana
than are set down in the federal Constitution. That opinion
rilled that transportation aid to parochial school children was
permissible under the Montana Constitution only if the parochial
child rode in a public school bus and his parents reimbursed the
state for the cost. This is a much more limited view than the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Everson ^^ which held that the
state could reimburse the parochial students' parents for
transportation costs. The Attorney General's Opinion seems to
imply that the Everson type of aid progrcun would be unconstituIf that is a correct interpretation, then
tional in Montana.
Montana's constitutional provision is, indeed, more restrictive
than the federal Constitution. The Attorney General's Opinion
states
It is my opinion public school moneys may not be
expended to pay transportation to a student attending a private or parochial school
no
public school money is to be spent for private
school pupils either directly or indirectly. ^^

....

The appearance of the phrase "directly or indirectly" in the
decisive passages of both the Supreme Court and Attorney General's
opinions suggests it may be crucial in distinguishing between
the state and federal limitations. Whereas some state laws
which admittedly provide a sort of indirect aid to parochial
schools through provision of textbooks, transportation, and
released-time progreuns have been held acceptable under the U.S.
Constitution, such programs would seem unlikely to be permissible
(as a form of indirect aid) under the Montana Constitution.
In its ruling in Chambers the Montana Supreme Court noted that
arguments concerning the general purpose and wording of Article
XI, Section 8 were better directed to other bodies:

As a guide to our discussion we recall the words
of this court in State ex rel. Mills v. Dixon et al ,
66 Mont. 76, 213 P. 227:
"This case, like others comprehending constitutional
questions of great magnitude, develops much by way
of argument which is properly addressed to the people
at large, or to a constituional convention, or,
within conceivable limits, to the legislative assembly. "60
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NONPUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION
The relationship between the state and nonpublic higher education
differs in general from that between the state and elementary
and secondary education. Colleges serve a wider constituency,
operate under different controls and have different systems of
finance than do locally controlled elementary schools. Moreover,
nonpublic four-year colleges constitute a much larger portion of
the nation's higher educational system (approximately one-third) ^1
than nonpublic elementary and secondary schools do of the
corresponding school system (approximately one-eighth) .^2

Higher education in the United States had its origin in nonpublic
institutions, beginning with the founding of Harvard University
in 1636; in fact, there was no public university in America until
In 1900 62
the founding of the University of Georgia in 1785.
percent of college and university students were enrolled in
nonpublic institutions. This figure remained fairly constant
until the mid-1950s, then began a rather steep decline to the
current figure of approximately 28 percent.
(See Table 3)

A major reason for the relative decline in the share of college
students enrolled in nonpublic institutions is the dramatic
increase in costs of education since World War II. Private
institutions have been forced to raise tuition levels steeply
or face the prospect of closing their doors.
The effect has
been to lower enrollments. Several studies have shown economic
pressure is greater on nonpublic than on public universities and
that the differential will increase in the future. ^3
The federal government and the governments of some states have
come to the assistance of nonpublic higher education through
a system of categorical grants (i.e., grants for specific
programs, for buildings or to students rather than flat grants
Some states have provided such aid under
to an institution) .°^
constitutional
provisions; some have amended their
existing
constitutions for this purpose. Maine, for example, added a
constitutional amendment in 1967 [now Art. VIII, Sec. 2] providing for student loans for higher education, unrestricted to the
type of institution the student attended.
The Carnegie Commission Report on Higher Education describes the
present constitutional situation in the states:
Some 900 of all [1400] private colleges and universities are church-related.
In many states, direct
aid to the remaining 500 private independent colleges
would also raise constitutional questions. Fourteen
states have constitutional provisions explicitly
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3

PERCENT OF UNIVERSITY AND COLLEGE STUDENTS ENROLLED
IN PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS, 1636-1785 and 1899-1969
(Includes Enrollment at Two-Year Institutions)
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1971)
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prohibiting appropriations of money or property to
privately controlled schools or institutions. Twentyfour states have constitutional provisions prohibiting
the state and/or its political subdivisions from appropriating money or property to private individuals or
organizations. Thirty-six states have constitutional
provisions prohibiting the state and/or its political
subdivisions from lending credit to or assuming the
liabilities of private individuals or organizations.
Twenty-eight states have constitutional provisions
prohibiting the state and/or its political svibdivisions
from becoming joint owners or stockholders in private
endeavors. On the other hand, eight states have
constitutional provisions specifically authorizing
public aid to private schools or for educational purposes under certain conditions.
In the last decade several sectarian colleges have
lessened their church connections through a variety
College management has been separated
of techniques.
from the church. Lay members have been appointed to
the governing boards. And nonsectarian members have
been recruited for the faculty. While many of these
moves were undoubtedly undertaken for other policy
reasons, an additional impetus for some was the desire
to become eligible for public aid.
By making categorical grants, the federal government
has provided aid to private institutions without incurring major constitutional obst-.cles. Both research
and construction grants have been made to sectarian
colleges on the assumption that the specific purposes
There have been some
of the grants were nonsectarian.
attacks on the constitutionality of these categorical
grants, but to date the grants have been upheld.

The most common form of grant which has avoided constitutional barriers is a grant for the benefit of the
individual rather than the institution. The student
benefit approach has been used for years throughout the
educational system without incurring serious constitutional attacks. ^^
The separate issues of educational opportunity and religious
establishment and freedom, discussed earlier, are even more
clearly differentiated in questions involving higher education.
Since the vast majority of nonpublic elementary and secondary
schools are clearly sectarian, most questions of state aid to
them involve the First Amendment to the federal Constitution.
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However, a large portion of nonpublic colleges and universities
are clearly nonsectarian and many more have only a quasi-sectarian
The Maryland Supreme Court, for example, ruled in
status.
Horace Mann v. the Board of Public Works (19 66) that one churchrelated college was eligible for state grants because of its
weak sectarian connections, while others were not. The United
States Supreme Court provided a more definitive statement on
this subject in Tilton:

There are generally significant differences between the
religious aspects of church-related insitutions of higher
learning and parochial elementary and secondary schools.
The "affirmative, if not dominant, policy" of the instruction in pre-college church-schools is "to assure future
adherents to a particular faith by having control of
their total education at an early age." Walz v. Tax Commission p. 671. There is substance to the contention
that college students are less impressionable and less
susceptible to religious indoctrination. Common observation would seem to support that view, and Congress may
well have entertained it. The skepticism of the college
student is not an inconsiderable barrier to any attempt
or tendency to subvert the congressional objectives and
limitations.
Furthermore, by their very nature, college
and postgraduate courses tend to limit the opportunities
for sectarian influence by virtue of their own internal
disciplines. Finally, many church- related colleges and
universities seek to evoke free and critical responses
from their students and are characterized by a high
degree of academic freedom.
,

The record here would not support a conclusion that any
of these four institutions departed from this general
pattern. All four schools are governed by Catholic
religious organizations, and the faculties and student
Nevertheless,
bodies at each are predominantly Catholic.
the evidence shows that non-Catholics were admitted as
students and given faculty appointments. Not one of
these four institutions requires its students to attend
religious services. Although all four schools require
their students to take theology courses, the parties
stipulated that these courses are taught according to
the acaJemic requirements of the subject
'^.ter and the
teacher's concept of professional standard? . Th*? parties
also stipulated that the courses covered a range of human
religious experiences and are not limited to courses about
the Roman Catholic religion.
The schools introduced evidence that they made no attempt to indoctrinate students
Indeed, some of the required theology
or to proselytize.
r.i"-
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courses at Albertus Magnus and Sacred Heart are taught
by rabbis. Finally, as we have noted, these four
schools subscribe to a well-established set of principles
of academic freedom, and nothing in this record shows
that these principles are not in fact followed.
In
short, the evidence shows institutions with admittedly
religious functions but whose predominant higher education
mission is to provide their students with a secular
education.

Since religious indoctrination is not a substantial
purpose or activity of these church-related colleges
and universities, there is less likelihood than in
primary and secondary schools that religion will permeate the area of secular education. This reduces the
risk that government aid will in fact serve to support
religious activities. Correspondingly the necessity
for intensive government surveillance is diminished
and the resulting entanglements between government
and religion lessened.
Such inspection as may be
necessary to ascertain that the facilities are devoted
to secular education is minimal and indeed hardly
more than the inspections that States impose over all
private schools within the reach of compulsory education
laws [citations omitted]. 66
Clearly, then, some forms of state aid to church-related nonpviblic institutions of higher education or to students enrolled
in them is permissible under the federal Constitution.
The
question for the Montana Constitutiona Convention becomes
whether the present provisions in the Montana Constitution, which
seem to prohibit such aid, should be retained or should be
modified to allow it. The pros and cons of this issue are
considered below.
.

STATISTICS
The following information indicates the scope of nonpublic
education in the United States and in Montana.

Estimated enrollment in the United States in nonpublic schools
for 1969-70 was 6.5 million students, or approximately 11 percent
of the total enrollment of 51.8 million students. 67 Enrollment
in nonpublic elementary and secondary schools in Montana for
the same period was 11,6 45 students, or 6.3 percent of the total
enrollment of 186,177.68

Enrollment in four-year nonpublic institutions of higher education
in the United States in 1970 was estimated at 2.135 million,
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approximately 35 percent of the total of 6.1 million students
in four-year colleges nationally ^^
Enrollment in the three
nonpublic four-year colleges in Montana for the fall of 19 70
was 2,775, or about 10 percent of the total Montana student
population of 26,887 in 1970. "^0
.

POLICY ARGUMENTS
Because of the deep-set beliefs surrounding issues involving
the state, nonpublic education and religion, rational arguments
are unlikely to sway public positions.
However, in the course
of judicial and political controversies on this issue, substantial bodies of argument have been developed.
The major points
made for and against allowing state aid to nonpublic, parochial
schools are as follows: ''
Pro
In the absence of state aid, many nonpublic schools
1.
are likely to fail, placing a much greater economic burden on
the state than would be the case under any form of aid program.
2.
Nonpublic schools provide a vital form of educational
and cultural diversity, which would be lost should such schools
be forced to bow financially to a monolithic state school system.
The framers of the national Constitution did not anticipate the
growth of a vast twelve- or sixteen-year institutional system
of state education, which, with the aid of the First Amendment,
would submerge educational pluralism.
3.
Parents with children in private schools have to pay
tuition to private schools and taxes to support public schools,
a double burden.

4.
Public welfare benefits surely include secular education,
and by the rulings in Cochran and Everson the benefits
extended by the state to all citizens may not be denied
to anyone because of his religious faith or lack of it.
In cht distribution of these benef '.s no Supreme
Court opinion has he'id that the only constitutional
formula is one which prevents even some incic.jntal aid to
religion. ^^

....

••

Parents should enjoy freedom of choice in education of
5.
their children; such freedom of choice should not become a
burden because of the non-action of the state:
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In view of clear Supreme Court rulings precluding
sectarian teaching and religious practices in public
schools it can be persuasively argued that the granting of funds only to the public school is a violation
of the establishment clause because such a policy
endorses and prefers one educational and philosophical
orthodoxy over all others.'^

The fully accredited private school has important
6.
public dimensions in that it carries out the secular
goals of the state; because of this semi-public status
conferred on the private school this institution has
some claim to share in the public funds set aside by
the state for the education of all of its future
citizens. ^^
More than half the states already have some kind of
7.
aid program which benefits students in parochial schools, providing services like free busing, textbooks, hot lunches and
health care.
Con
It is impossible to separate the secular from the
1.
sectarian in parochial education; advancement of a particular
religious philosophy and tenet is the fundamental purpose of
parochial education.

The education services of church schools are not
rendered at the instance of the state, nor is a
saving to the state the purpose or objective of
Religious instruction is calcusuch instruction.
lated to strengthen religious faith and convictions,
and the state may not constitutionally support such
a project, even if incidental savings to the state
can be shown. ^^
The principle of separation and freedom was conceived
2.
Notwithstanding occasional
as a unitary principle.
instances of apparent conflict, separation guarantees

The experiences
freedom, and freedom requires separation.
in other countries indicate clearly that religious freedom
is most secure where church and state are separated, and
least secure where church and state are united
The separation aspect was conceived to be as absolute
as could be achieved, predicated as it was on the concept
that religion is outside the jurisdiction of government. '°

....
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The public school system is still the backbone of the
3.
education system of the United States and should be the
primary concern of the state. State aid to nonpiiblic schools
would divert funds from public schools and might weaken or
fragment the system.
4.
If Quakers may constituionally be taxed to support
armies and weapons which violate their religious beliefs,
taxpayers whose religious sensibilities are offended by
religious neutrality in public school instruction may
be constitutionally taxed to support secular public
schools. ^^

5.
State aid could mean excessive state controls over
private and parochial schools.

6.
State aid might unfairly favor one religion over another
or favor religious over secular nonpublic schools.
State aid
under some existing programs tends to assist established, wellto-do schools more than experimental, poor ones.

State aid to parochial schools could "polarize" politics
where it is applied, threatening the integrity and quality of
the public school system.
7.

CONCLUSION
Although the present effect of Montana's constitutional provisions
on the relationships among the state, nonpublic education and
religion is not fully understood, the general interpretation is
that they are much more restrictive than provisions in the
federal Constitution. The Constitutional Convention therefore
has four main alternatives:
1.
Retain the present provisions or similar ones which
prevent all state aid to denominational schools.
2.
Modify Article XI, Section 8 (and possibly Article V,
Section 35) to allow some forms of state aid, but not necessarily
all that permissible londer the federal Constitution.
An example
of this would be to delete the words "direct or indirect" from
Article XI, Section 8.

Substitute a provision similar to the First Amendment
3.
to the U.S. Constitution which would be subject to the same sort
of interpretation, thus permitting all aid which is allowed
under the federal document.
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.......;

4.

the

saitie

C AMD NONPUBLIC EDUCATION

incluue no provision on the subject, which would have
effect as alternative 3.

riodify solely Article V, Section 35, to allow for
state aid to nonpublic but nonreligious alternative forms of
5.

educaticn
Include a provision, in addition to any or none of
6.
the above, that education be noncompulsory allowing independence
to the education of cultural minorities.
,

•Ill-
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CHAPTER VI
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS
WHO GOVERNS EDUCATION?

Although the central authority for public education lies
with the state, in practice the powers and responsibilities
On
are distributed throughout all levels of government.
the one hand, the strong tradition of local control still
exercises a powerful influence on the educational system; on
the other hand, the growing reliance on federal funds and
leadership produces increasing influence from the national
This fluidity of operation results both in harmonilevel.
ous cooperation and in the pulling and tugging of intergovernmental power struggles. Local, state and federal
units of government all have a claim to a piece of che action
in the educational field.
Fundamental to this system of shared power is the issue of
centralization versus decentralization. As part of the
general question of the locus of power in government, the
issue of where to place primary control of the schools is
caught between two fundamental principles: universality and
direct control. On the one hand, the need to provide general
standards of quality as well as efficient operations impels
central state and national agencies to assume increasing
control over education. This is particularly true in an era of
high population mobility and rapid technological change. On
the other hand, the crucial democratic principle of direct
popular control over social institutions takes on an even
greater significance in mass society. Education is one of
the few remaining areas where local control is still a
reality, and it continues to provide a paramount example of
the successful practice of decentralization in government.
The conflict between these two principles and the resulting
fusion between centralization and decentralization is the
central issue in the constitutional establishment of powers
on the local, state and national level.
POWERS OF THE STATE
In American government the state has a primary claim to
authority in educational matters:

No principle is more firmly established in American
legal theory than the one which holds that each of
the several states, within the sphere of its jurisdiction, is vested with plenary control over its
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educational policy. The courts agree that education
is essentially and intrinsically a state function.
The very existence of a democratic state demands that
it be such.
The power to maintain a system of public
schools is an attribute of government in much the same
sense as is the police power, the power to tax, to
administer justice, or to maintain military forces.
The concept of the supremacy of the state with respect
to all educational matters over which it may exercise
any control at all is a concept more than any other which
governs our courts in resolving the practical issues
involved in the maintenance and administration of our
public schools; it is a concept that dominates legal
thinking at almost every point.
Thus, both historically and in legal theory, the state has
acquired a preeminent role in governing education.

The most obvious manifestation of the state's authority is
in the structure of the public school system, which is
organized in terms of districts as subdivisions of the state
rather than as autonomous local units. Although school
districts in many cases may be coterminous with municipalities, the two units of government perform entirely different
functions the former as an instrument of state policy and
the latter as a separate corporation for the purpose of local
government. The courts have long held that municipal
officials have only such powers with respect to education as
are specifically delegated to them by the state. Thus, in
several cases the courts have ruled, for example, that a city
may not be involved in school financing beyond what is
explicitly allowed by the state legislature,-^ that school
board members are state officers and not officers of the
municipality and that school districts are part of the state
school system and not an institution of the municipality.^
,

This distinction between state and local authority is crucial
in the case, for instance, of altering the structure of
districts. Approximately one quarter of the state constitutions provide for the creation of school districts by the
state legislature. 5 One source states that "few would doubt
that the state legislature has the ultimate power to dissolve
or create school districts as part of its authority to enact
any legislation not prohibited by federal or state constitutions. "6 When challenged in the courts, this principle has
been consistently upheld. Thus, in 1890 the Indiana Supreme
Court held that school boards derive all their authority
from state statues and therefore can exercise only those
powers expressly granted or necessarily resulting from those
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expressly granted. ^ In 1963 the Pennsylvania legislature
passed the Pennsylvania School District Reorganization Act,
which gave the state education agency power to establish
standards for administrative units, thus essentially delegaIn the face of a
ting to it the power of redistricting.
challenge to this act, the Pennsylvania court upheld both
the legislature's general authority to redistrict and its
ability to "confer authority and discretion in connection
with the execution of the law" upon a state agency. The
court reasoned that the "true purpose and effect" of the
constitutional provision was to empower the legislature to
provide a thorough and efficient system of public schools
and that this law was directed to that end:
We have repeatedly held that a School District is a
creature or agency of the Legislature and has only
Tl^at
the powers that are granted by statute
the Legislature reserves its powers to alter the
Surely, these school
school districts
districts may not act in such a way as to forever
bind the Commonwealth to a form of existence upon
The
which they agree at one point of time
continued ability to alter the organization of the
school system throughout the Commonwealth is a prerequisite to the fulfillment of the Legislature's
constitutional duty to provide for the maintenance
of a thorough and efficient system of public schools."

....

....

Consistent with these judicial decisions is the strong
twentieth-century movement by state legislatures to reduce
the number of school districts.
Between 1931 and 1967,
the number of districts fell from 127,531 to 20,388.9 The
reason for this vast reduction is obvious: greater economies
and better education programs generally can be offered in
districts of larger size. Several states have made exceptionally large reductions in the number of districts, such
as Idaho (1,500 to 117), Illinois (11,955 to 1,309), and
Wisconsin (6,385 to 487). West Virginia has abolished all
districts and installed in their place counties as the unit
of school government 1^
.

In Montana the legislature has chosen to delegate authority
for organization and reorganization to the local units themselves, making redistricting a purely voluntary matter.
Changes may be made in various ways. An elementary district
may be created by decision of the county superintendent,
subject to appeal to the county commissioners and it may be consolidated with or annexed to another district by means of a
popular election [Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, Sections
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75-6506, 75-6507 aid 75-6518], A high school district may be
subject to approval by the superintendent of public instruction and may be consolidated by the county commissioners, but
may be unified with an elementary school district only through
an election Revised Codes of Montana
1947, Sections 75-6521,
75-6522, 75-6523, 75-6527 and 75-6528].
,

[

The Montana Supreme Court has ruled that a school district
is a body corporate but does not possess the powers of local
legislation and control that are the distinguishing characteristics of a municipal corporation. ^^ It also has ruled
that, although a school district is a public corporation, it
may exercise only such authority as is expressly or necessarily
conferred by law.-'-^ In Read v. Stephens the court held that,
aside from statutory restrictions, the legislature has delegated to the county superintendent of schools and to the board
of county commissioners a full measure of discretionary power
in creating and changing school district boundaries.
Where
the administrative official exercises this statutory power
neither arbitrarily nor fraudulently but within his sound
discretion, the courts may not interfere ^-^ Likewise, a new
elementary school district can be created only by a county
superintendent of schools in compliance with statute, and not
by the judgment of a district court. ^^
However, the court
also has ruled that the legislature has not granted the county
superintendent or board of county commissioners arbitrary
power to change boundaries in disregard of statutory requirements. 15 School district reorganization has made substantial
progress in Montana in the past twenty-five years.
In 1947,
Montana had 1,499 school districts. By May of 1970, this
number had been reduced to 701. The saving in such consolidations is estimated by the Office of Superintendent of
Public Instruction to be in some cases as much as six times
the amount previously spent on schools.!^ Still, the process
is often difficult and expensive, as carried out under the
present statutes. Specific constitutional provisions on the
organization of school districts could facilitate district
reorganization. On the other hand, the state retains in any
event the ultimate authority to organize districts and could
proceed if the legislature so desired--to carry out statewide district reorganization under present constitutional
provisions
.

—

Other State Powers

Constitutions in forty-six states specifically provide for
establishment of a system of public schools. The four which
do not are Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and South
Carolina. 17 Eight state constitutions both establish a public
-122-

DISTRIBUTION OK ['OWERS

school system and define what this means (Arizona, California,
Connecticut, Kansas, North Dakota, Utah, Washington and
Wyoming). 18 The definitions range in specificity from that of
Utah (kindergarten, primary, grammar, high school, agricultural college, a university and other educational institutions
as the legislature may provide) to Connecticut (free elementary
and secondary schools)

The Montana Constitution provides for a public school system
but does not further define the term:
It shall be the duty of the legislative assembly of
Montana to establish and maintain a general, uniform
and thorough system of public, free, common schools
[Art. XI, Seel]
.

The major arguments for including a definition of pub.lic
school system in a constitution are that it offers a
minimum guarantee that the state will continue to provide a
thorough school system and that it spells out the state's
responsibilities in specific areas, such as in higher or
vocational education. The primary arguments against such a
definition are that the minimal definition might be interpreted as maximal and that the nature and needs of education
are changing so rapidly that such definitions become outdated very quickly.
James B. Conant in his definitive work. The Comprehensive
High School supports the latter viewpoint in his prediction
that attendence at two-year colleges will increase to the point
the "public education" will include grades thirteen and
fourteen as well as one through twelve.-'-^ That is in accord
with the present European system in which secondary education
generally includes education up to the level of our freshman
or sophomore college years (although for a smaller percentage of students than in our comprehensive high schools)
This is just one of a vast number of possible changes in the
basic structure and character of the educational system which
might prove difficult to reconcile with specific constitutional definitions.
,

A variety of other state powers enumerated in constitutions,
including provisions for higher education, eaual educational
opportunity, administration through boards of education and
chief state school officers and financial support of education, are discussed in the appropriate chapters in this
study.
More specific provisions, such as those concerned
with textbooks, curricula and teachers, are included in some
constitutions, but most states regard these as either
,
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statutory or local matters:
Such specific requirements in state constitutions often
prove to be unfortunate, especially in states having
cumbersome procedures for their amendment.
States without specific constitutional limitations permit local
boards of education to adopt rules and regulations that
hasten the advance of knowledge and the selection of
textbooks. The Constitution of Iowa illustrates the
grant of broad authority to local boards of education
to make the necessary rules and regulations with the
force and effect of law without def ranchising the plenary
power of the Legislature. Under Article 9, Section 8,
the local board of education has full authority to make
all needful rules and regulations, of course always subject to the power of the Legislature to decide
differently. ^0

The state's power over education is limited by the constitutional reservation of certain powers to localities. Approximately half the states, including Montana, 21 constitutionally
prohibit their legislatures from enacting special laws on the
management of school districts. ^2 p^^i additional quarter of the
states do the same thing statutorily.
On the other hand,
Massachusetts, for instance, specifically grants the state legislature the power to dissolve or establish school districts.
Thus, education finds itself caught exactly in the legal and
administrative gulf between local autonomy and state
sovereignty.

POWERS OF LOCALITIES

Although the ultimate, formal authority for education lies
clearly with the state, both traditional practices and other
legal principles place a large amount of control in the hands
of local bodies.
As indicated in Chapter I, the educational
system in America has evolved from the local level upward,
rather than from the state downward. Therefore, the tradition of local autonomy is very strong, and legal and governmental practices across the country tend to reinforce this
structure. Only comparatively recently, for a variety of
financial and administrative reasons, have state and national
governments begun to extract significant measures of control
from the local units.
Newton Edwards, an expert on legal matters related to education, describes the de facto independence of local education
boards as follows:
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In any analysis of the anatomy of authority with respect
to the American educational system it is easy to overstress the actual powers of both the federal and state
governments. As a matter of fact, the conviction that
education is essentially a community affair lies deep in
The American people have long
the American tradition.
insisted, regardless of the theoretical locus of naked
authority, that the local school corporation be regarded
as the responsible operating agency and that it be vested
with whatever power this responsibility entails. The
result has been that during most of our history the
federal government, regardless of the power it might have
exercised, has not in fact exercised any extensive
control over local policy decisions. And the several
state governments, instead of exercising directly the
vast powers vested in them, have chosen to delegate to
the local school districts such powers as were necessary
And the
to make them responsible operating agencies.
powers
the
jealously
guarded
American state courts have
local
upon
conferred
which state legislatures have
school boards. They insist, to be sure, that a local
school board have authority to act, but once that authority has been bestowed they will not control the school
board's discretion in the exercise of it unless that
discretion has been unreasonably and arbitrarily abused.
The courts have refused to exercise their power of
judicial review of administrative discretion in such a
In actual
way as to make themselves super school boards.
powers
delegating
practice, then, the states' policy of
perof
practice
to local school boards and the courts
disof
mitting school boards any reasonable exercise
cretion, acting together, have made the local school
board the vital center of American education. ^3
'

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, about half the states
constitutionally anchor this traditional local autonomy in
provisions which prohibit their legislatures from enacting
specific laws on the management of school districts. Accordingly, a clear distinction has been made by the courts
between legislative and administrative authority over schools.
The former is reserved to the state legislature and the
latter to the discretionary power of the local boards. Once
the authority has been delegated and adequate standards have
been provided to control the exercise of discretion, the
courts have ruled that the local boards must be left alone
Likewise, a state legislature may
to exercise this power. 24
not act arbitrarily or without any reasonable basis for so
doing. 25
Hawaii is the only state with a completely centralized school
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system (i.e., where all administrative, policy-making and
fiscal decisions are made in the state department of education)
All other states vest varying degrees of autonomy in
the local units.
This may include any or all of the following:
Governmental autonomy, including establishing and
(1)
changing district boundaries, election of officials, number
and qualifications of board members, etc.; (2) fiscal autonomy,
including complete independence in the power to determine
budgets and to levy taxes or cause them to be levied; 26 (3) property ownership and management autonomy, including bonding
authority, title to real estate and authority over building
maintenance, location of schools and features of school
building plans; (4) educational autonomy, including school
curricula, teacher qualification requirements above those of
the state, selection of teachers, teachers' salaries and
provision of textbooks.
.

The autonomy possessed by the local boards provides in most
cases independence both from interference by the legislature
and from control by municipal governments.
Where such powers
have come into dispute, however, the vast majority of courts
have distinguished between municipal interference, which has
been overwhelmingly rejected, and state interference, which has
been upheld in matters properly legislative and rejected in
matters of administrative discretion. ^"7
The combination of constitutional, statutory and judicial
determinations have created for the local school district
and its board a status of what might best be termed a
"quasi-corporation." For example, an Illinois court held:

Trustees of schools are a corporation, or more strictly
a quasi-corporation, for the purpose and with the sole
and only power of acting on matters pertaining to the
public schools
and all other business is foreign
to the object for which they were created a body
corporate. 28
.

.

.

A California court provided a slightly different definition:
"A city school district ... is a distinct corporate entity
of quasi-municipal character, which is not lost or merged in
that of the city. "29 a Pennsylvania court employed still
another term for the school district and board:
"municipal
quasi-corporation. "30 The Kansas Supreme Cojr-_ L;upplied a
somewhat more lucid distinction between quasx -corporations
and municipalities:

The school district is, it is true, a public corporation,
but the mere fact that it is a public corporation does
not make it a municipal corporation, or, in other words,
a municipality
A municipality, properly speaking,

....
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is a corporation that has the right to administer local
But a
government, as a city or incorporated town.
school district is only an agency of the State with
limited corporate powers belonging to a class of corporThese are not
ate bodies known as quasi corporations.
municipalities within the meaning of the constitutional
provisions referred to.^1
.

The repeated use of the modifying term "quasi" reflects the
rather uncertain status of the school district and board, but
in general it may be interpreted to mean a local agency
In
created to carry out state rather than local functions.
practice, this quasi-corporate status grants school districts
a large measure of independence from municipal control, and,
to the degree allowed by the state constitution and statutes,
a substantial amount of independence from direct state control
as well.
Thus, it is left to constitutional and legislative determination to specify what powers and limits on powers are to be
In the absence
assigned to the state and local school units.
of constitutional specification (as in Indiana, for example)
the presumption is that all powers in education are reserved
to the state:

Essentially and intrinsically, the schools in which
are educated and trained the children who are to become
the rulers of the commonwealth are matters of state,
In such matters, the
and not of local jurisdiction.
state is the unit and the legislature the source of
powers. The authority over schools and school affairs
is not necessarily a distributory one to be exercised
by local instrumentalities; but, on the contrary, it is
a central power residing in the legislature of the state.
It is for the lawmaking power to determine if the
authority shall be exercised by a state board of education, or distributed to county, township, or city
organizations throughout the state ... .32
On the other hand, several states, including California,
Colorado, Florida, Kansas, Ohio, Texas and Utah, provide
constitutionally for the existence and powers of local
school districts. For example, Article IX, Section 4 of the
Florida Constitution states:

Each county shall constitute a school district;
provided, two or more contiguous counties, upon vote of
the electors of each county pursuant to law, may be
(a)
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combined into one school district.
In each school
district there shall be a school board composed of
five or more members chosen by vote of the electors,
for appropriately staggered terms of four years, as
provided by law.
(b)
The school board shall operate, control and
supervise all free public schools within the school
district and determine the rate of school district
taxes within the limits prescribed herein.
Two or
more school districts may operate and finance joint
educational programs.

The central constitutional issue of local control, then, is
whether to enumerate in the constitution specific limits on
state powers and grants of particular powers to local
districts. A strong commitment to local control would seem
to dictate inclusion of such provisions, whereas a position
more in favor of full state authority aid control would imply
their omission.
In Montana, the status of local control appears to lie somewhere between the extremes. Although there are no present
constitutional guarantees either of the existence or of the
powers of local school districts, the Montana Constitution
does imply in Article XI
Section 6 a general constitutional
commitment to the support of districts:
,

It shall be the duty of the legislative assembly to
provide by taxation, or otherwise, sufficient means,
in connection with the amount received from the general
school fund, to maintain a public, free common school
in each organized district in the state, for at least
three months in each year [emphasis added!

Mention is also made of "school districts" in connection with
other educational provisions in sections 3, 8, and 10 of
Article XI
School districts also are referred to in Article XIII,
Section 6, concerning the limitations on debts which can be
contracted by various governmental units.
school district in Montana is statutorily established
and defined Revised Codes o..^ Montana 3.947, Section 75-6501];
the Montana Supreme Court has interpreted its status
accordingly.
In Box v. Duncan
"Obviously,
the court stated:
the only purpose of a school district is to designate a
certain territory within which a public school or schools may
be established and maintained ." 33 The court also has held that

Th'^

,

[

,
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the powers of the Montana school district are limited to
those specifically granted by the legislature:

A school district is a public corporation, but with
It may, through its board,
very limited powers.
exercise only such authority as is conferred by law,
either expressly or by necessary implication.-^^
A further clarification of the status of the school district
was made by the Montana court in Hersey v. Neilson in which
a school district is clearly distinguished from a municipal
corporation. The court cited John F. Dillon, a nineteenth
century Iowa Supreme Court justice and noted authority on
municipal corporations:
,

We may therefore define a municipal corporation in its
historical and strict sense to be the incorporation by
the authority of the government of the inhabitants of
a particular place or district, and authorizing them in
their corporate capacity to exercise subordinate,
specified powers of legislation and regulation with
respect to their local and internal concerns. This
power of local government is the distinctive purpose
and the distinguishing feature of a municipal corporaThus an incorporated school district,
tion proper
or county, as well as a city, is a public corporation;
but the school district or county, properly speaking,
is not, while the city is, a municipal corporation.^^

....

Thus a school district is held to be a body corporate, but
not one which has the powers of local legislation and control
characteristic of a municipal corporation.

A somewhat less clear distinction was made by the court in
State ex rel. v. McGraw in which it was held that, just as
the county was a body politic and corporate, each school
district within the county
,

is no less a corporation with definite and limited
It has all the necessary and proper
powers and duties.
authority for its own government, independent of the
county; its executive head is its board of trustees,
acting in the manner prescribed by law.-^"

Here the school district appears in a somewhat indeterminate
status between a county, which is solely a political subdivision of the state, and the city, which is autonomous in
certain of its functions.
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The central issue at stake which distinguishes the school
In many states, the
district is the power of the purse.
ability to incur debt and to tax makes the school district
In Montana, however, an early
almost fully autonomous.
decision (1900) of the Supreme Court strictly limited
In Jay v. School
local district powers in these matters.
Dist. No. 1 the court held that since the school-district
officers were not given the power to levy taxes, they likewise could not use their bonding power as a taxing device:
,

School districts are public corporations but their
powers are very limited. They can exercise none except
such as are conferred by the law creating them, whether
expressly or by fair implication. Not having the power,
under the statute, either with or without a vote of the
electors, to levy taxes for current purposes, they may
not extend the term of school beyond the time for which
there are funds provided. ^7
However, the laws since have been changed to allow both bonding and permissive taxes initiated by the school district
trustees and approved by the electorate. Thus, the Montana
school system falls generally into the category of a system
with strong local control (particularly with respect to
but the local
questions of districting and financing)
control is statutorily, rather than constitutionally,
guaranteed.
,

FEDERAL POWERS
For the greater part of American history, the federal government assumed relatively little responsibility in the field of
However, with the advent of great population
education.
mobility and the mass educational needs of contemporary
society, the federal government is taking an increasing role
Likewise, as decisions have
in the educational system.
arisen in education which were of consequence to the basic
rights of all Americans, the national government has been
impelled to assume leadership in securing these rights.
The source of this increased federal activity in education
is not a specific U.S. constitutional provision but rather
various other powers granted the federal government to provide for the general welfare and to protect individual rights.
Thus, the primary federal constitutional sections which have
had a major influence on T^erican education are Article I,
the First Amendment
Section 8 (the -general welfare clause)
(religious freedom and separation of church and state) and
,
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the Fourteenth Amendment (due process and equal protection
The general questions concerning educational
of the law)
rights are discussed elsewhere in this study; the major topic
of concern here is the increasing federal involvement in the
support and administration of education.
.

Although the federal role in education has a long history
(beginning with the land grants by the Ordinance of 1785
approved by the Continental Congress and continued in the
Morrill Act of 1862)
the great expansion of this involvement came during the past half century. The vocational
education acts of 1917, 1936, 1946, 1956 and 1963, the GI
Bill providing assistance to veterans, extension of the landgrant support of colleges in 1914, Lanham Act of 1941 for
school construction, the federally impacted aid acts of 1950,
vocational rehabilitation acts of 1943 and 1954, surplus
property acts of 1919 and 1944, school lunch acts of 1944
and 1954, Fulbright Act of 1946, library assistance acts of
1956 and 1960, National Science Foundation Act of 1950,
National Defense Education Act of 1958, special education
acts of 1958 and 1961 and the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 196 5 are but a few of the more than 200
major acts passed by Congress which have had a strong influence on education in the United States.
,

In 1948, the federal government reported that it operated
more than 200 separate educational programs funded at the
By 1968, the
level of approximately $3.7 billion a year.
level of federal support had risen to more than $6.8 billion
with a corresponding increase in number of programs and in
the size of the federal department (the Office of Education)
which administers most of them.38

As Tables 1 and 2 show, in the period 1955-1968 alone the
proportion of federal support of education in the United
It is signifiStates grew from 5.9 percent to 13 percent.
cant that the percentage of local support dropped by
approximately the same amount as the federal share gained,
while the state's share remained nearly constant. This gives
further credence to the contention that the educational system
is undergoing increased centralization.
The substantial federal involvement in creating and supporting educational programs has inevitably transferred part of
the responsibility for education to the federal level. While
constitutional authority on both state and federal levels is
somewhat obscure on this point, the practical needs for financing, expertise and other forms of assistance have established
the trend toward increasing federal involvement in education
.
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TABLE

1

ESTIMATED EXPENDITURES IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS BY REGULAR
AND OTHER EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS BY SOURCE OF FUNDS

Source of funds, by control

and

1955-56

1957-58

1959-60

1961-62

1963-64

1964-65

1965-66

1966-67

1967-68

(2)

(3)

(4)

(6)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(»)

(tO)

$48.8

$52.2

6.1

level

(1)

*'

AMOUNT
All levels:

Total, public and non-

public

Federal
State

Local

AUother
Total, public

Federal
State

Local

AUother
Total,

nonpubUc

Federal

$16.8

$21.1

$24.7

$29.6

$36.0

$39.9

$44.8

1.0
4.8
7.2
3.8

1.4
6.2
8.5
5.0

1.8
7.3
9.6
6.0

2.4
8.9
11.2

3.2
10.7

7.1

9.2

3.7
11.8
14.1
10.3

5.4
13.2
14.9
11.3

15.8
12.2

6.8
15.5
16.6
13.3

13.6

17.0

19.7

23.4

28.0

31.0

35.0

38.2

40.6

1.6
8.8
11.2

2.3
11.7

3.7
13.1

14.1

14.9

4.1
14.6
15.8

1.8

2.1
10.6
12.9
2.4

2.9

3.3

3.7

4.6
16.4
16.6
4.1

6.2

8.0

8.9

9.8

10.6

11.6

1.1

1.3

8

6.2
8.5
1.2

7.3
9.6
1.5

3.2

4.1

5.0

2

.3

.6

8
4.8
7.2

State

12.9

14.7

.8

1.1

1.4

1.7

2.0

2.3

A

.1

1

.1

.1

.1

6.3

6.8

7.4

8.0

8.5

9.2

Local

AUother

3.0

3.8

4.5

U.S., Office of Education, Projections of Educational
Source:
Statistics to 1976-77 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1967), p. 62
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ESTIMATED EXPENDITURES IN PERCENTAGE BY REGULAR AND OTHER
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS BY SOURCE OF FUNDS

Source of funda. by control

and

U86-S8 1957-58

1950-60

1991-62

1963-64

1964-65

1965-66

1906-67

19S7-8S

level

(1)

(3)

(3)

(4)

(6)

(5)

(7)

(8)

{«)

(10)

PERCENT
AU

levels:

Total, public and nonpublic

Federal
State

Local

Another
Total, public

Federal
Stat«

Local
Allother
Total, nonpublic

Federal

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

6.9
28.8
42.9
22.4

6.6
29.4
40.2
23.8

7.5
29.5
39.0
24.0

8.3
30.0
37.3
24.4

8.9
29.9
35.7
25.5

9.3
29.6
35.3
25.8

12.0
29.5
33.3
25.2

12.5

30.1
32.4

25.0

13.0
29.7
31.8
26.6

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

6.8
35.2
52.5
6.5

6.4
36.6
50.0
7.0

6.9
36.9
48.8
7.4

7.1
37.7
47.3
7.9

7.6

8.6

7.4
37.7
45.5
9.4

10.6
37.4
42.6
9.4

10.7
38.2
41.4
9.7

11.1
37.9
40.0
10.1

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

6.5

7.1

9.8

!2.5

13.8

15.7

17.4

18.9

19.8

1.6

1.2

1.1

1.0

.9

.9

State

38.1

45.9

Local

AU

93.5

92.9

90.2

85.9

85.0

83.2

81.6

80.2

79.3

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

3.9
30.5
53.5

12.1

4.0
32.7
50.8
12.5

3.7
32.5
51.5

12.1

4.3
31.4
62.4
11.9

4.2
31.8
61.9

Allother

3.9
29.7
56.2
10.2

12.3

7.0
32.6
48.5
12.0

7.2
33.4
47.8
11.6

7.2
33.4
47.8
11.6

Total, public

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

4.3

4.3
34.8
60.9

4.9
35.6
59.5

4.8
36.2
59.0

4.6
37.3
58.1

4.3
37.0
58.7

8.0
36.9
55.1

8.1
37.8
54.1

8.1
37.8
64.1

other

Elementary and secondary
schools
Total, public and non-

public

Federal
State

Local

Federal
State

33.1

Local

62.6

All other

Total, nonpublic

_

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Federal..
State

Local

Allother

Source: U.S. Office of Education, Projections of
Educational Statistics to 1976-77 (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1967
p. 64.
)
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Montana Situation

Because of its peculiar needs as a sparsely populated state
and a variety of special federal interests, Montana has witnessed a greater than average growth in federal assistance
to education.
The proportion of federal assistance to education in Montana grew from 3.5 percent in 1950-51 to 8.4
percent in 1966-67.^^ Excluding the distribution of state
school foundation program monies, federally funded programs
accounted for 86 percent of the budget of the Office of the
Superintendent of Public Instruction in the 1967-69 biennium,
including the following:

Elementary and Secondary Education Act Titles I, II, III, V
and VI -A, Educational Media, Surplus Property, School Food
Services, Federal Impact Aid, Pupil Transportation, NDEA
Title III, Agriculture Education, Fire Fighters Training,
Guidance and Counseling, Health Occupations, Manpower
Training, Vocational Education, Adult Basic Education,
Indian Education, Education Professions Development, General
Education Development Testing, Career Opportunities Program,
Research, Evaluation and Veterans' Education and Training. '^0
In other words, the vast majority of programs carried on by
the state in education are either products of or heavily
reliant upon federal support.

University education in Montana also is substantially
assisted by federal funds and programs. On the average,
about 7 to 10 percent of the operating revenues of the
university system are derived from federal sources.^-'- National
projections of funding for higher education in the United
States envision an even greater role for the federal
government. 42
The trend toward increasing federal participation in supporting and administering educational programs has little direct
effect on state constitutions. However, the trend must be
recognized as a powerful force shaping the structure of
education and thus having a strong influence on the changing
distribution of powers among the various levels of government.
The federal relationship must be a significant consideration
in the determination of the roles and powers of state and
local boards of education, guarantees of educational equality,
provisions relating t
Indian education and provisions for
financing education.
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CENTRALIZATION VERSUS DECENTRALIZATION
The fundamental constitutional question emerging from consideration of the distribution of powers in education is the
There
issue of centralization versus decentralization.
appears to be a distinct trend toward centralizing certain
educational functions together with an increasing reliance
on higher levels of government for financial support. The
consequences of this trend are so far-reaching for the
future of American education, and the decisions concerning
them so basic, that they properly can be considered questions
The primary question is:
Should
of a constitutional nature.
control over and responsibility for education be vested in
more centralized or in less centralized units of government?
It is not inevitable that this question be answered aL the
constitutional level; in fact, most state constitutions are
Whether a given state's
not very specific on this point.
educational system is of a more centralized or more decentralized nature is the product of a combination of constitutional provisions, state statutes, local ordinances, judicial
interpretations and local traditions.
However, a constitution
can indicate the desired direction of development of a state's
educational system better than any other single vehicle.
It
provides a means for making explicit, conscious decisions
about the fundamental character of the system.

Arguments For Centralized Educational System

Assuming that constitutional specification is desired on this
point, there are several major arguments for centralization:
1.
Efficiency
The savings which can be realized from
economies of scale are as applicable to education as to other
large endeavors.
The provision of administration and facilifor
ties
education generally can be done better and more
cheaply on a centralized basis. Financial and personnel
requirements can be better met in a system in which policy
decisions common to all schools can be made at one focal
point and then applied uniformly. More qualified teachers,
better equipment and more modern buildings per dollar can be
obtained in large units with centralized purchasing procedures and integrated personnel management. This has been
the fundamental reason for the major reduction in the number
of school districts across the United States.
.

Robert Dentler, in describing the increased efficiency
resulting from school consolidation in New York, states:
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The virtual elimination of the impoverished, isolated,
understaffed and therefore disadvantaged little red
schoolhouse, and the substitution of substantial,
resourseful, consolidated rural schools in New York
State testify to the fact that state policies, carried
out across a broad front, can have enormously beneficial
consequences for the education of youth. ^^
2.
Financial Need
Apart from the question of
efficiency, there is the simple problem of the insufficiency
of funds raised at the local level.
As shown above, the
seemingly inevitable trend in educational financing is
toward reliance on state and national sources of support:
.

A generation or two ago, in the !:hen 48 states with a
decentralized system, the financing of the local
schools was largely dependent on real estate taxes.
In the last thirty or forty years, local school districts have become more and more dependent on the
allocation of state funds. As the inadequacy of the
local real estate tax for the support of adequate
public schools has become more and more apparent, the
importance of state educational officials and a state
board has become increasingly clear. As a consequence,
members of state legislatures have concerned themselves
increasingly with appropriations of state funds for
elementary and secondary public schools. This growing
concern of state officials with public school financing
naturally requires these same officials to direct their
attention to such matters as teachers' salaries, pension
.^4
rights, conditions of employment
.

.

.

Some critics, such as Myron Lieberman, advocate a national
system of federally supported schools. '^^
3.
Equality
The need to provide an equitable education for all persons calls for the elimination of inequalities of educational resources among local districts '^^
In general this has meant the transfer of authority for
school financing to increasingly higher levels of government
in order to provide for uniform distribution of funds.
The
Book of t h e States notes that "most states have made attempts
to provide a uniform, minimum le\e1 of education?! op|0.. canity by distributing fands on an equalizing basis -co local
school districts. "^^ Harvey Mansfield notes the consequence
of this trend:
.

.

Seeking new money, whether to be furnished by direct
state subsidy or by the relaxation of local taxing.
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borrowing or debt limits, or by larger federal grants,
brings school problems into a broader political forum.
Rapid Growth and Increased Complexity of Education
4
The pace of change and development in education has been
increasingly rapid during the past several decades. Centralized systems generally are more able to keep up with educational innovation because of their greater resources and
administrative capability. Mansfield argues the viewpoint
of the professional on this issue:
.

.

[T]he magnitude and technology of school operations
in our age and public attention to the quality of their

performance inevitably put their conduct and planning
mainly in the hands of professionals. Lay officials
the day is
cannot cope with their complexities
past or passing when the school systems were a huiiting
ground for patronage, when school superintendents,
board members or state legislators connived with textbook publishers on the adoption of texts and when
nepotism prevailed in the appointment of teachers.
Furthermore, professional organizations particularly
the teachers associations federated in the National
Education Association have become major influences on
^^
legislative and administrative policy
.

.

.

—

'

—

.

.

.

.

Arguments For Decentralized Educational System
It is precisely with some of the advantages claimed for
centralization that proponents of decentralization take
issue.
For example, one observer, describing the emergence
of "mini-schools" in New York and other areas, perceives a
reversal in thought among some educators:

Late in the 1960 's pedagogical planners dreaming about
"educational parks" for 10,000 students and a wonderland of technology to serve them discovered a funny
Behind them a grass roots movement was going
thing.
The rise of the free
in the opposite direction.
school, the community school, the school-within-aschool--whatever the individual intent or style was
a reaction to the increasing anonymity and assemblyline treatment that had become the staple of public
education, particularly in the cities. ^*^

—

These are among several major arguments given by those who
favor a decentralized school system:
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1.
Public Control
The danger of over-prof essionalization
exists when education becomes solely the domain of the
expert.
Education is such an all-pervasive activity that
democratic control is a necessary check on possible domination
under the guise of expertise. Traditionally, education has
meant the cultivation of civilized human society; this task
cannot be handed over to any single group, no matter how
technically qualified.
Statements such as the one from
Mansfield (see point 4, above) betray a lack of confidence
in the ability of the layman to deal with his own education
system, adjerents of decentralization claim.
.

Community control advocates see in locally controlled
schools one aspect of the larger issue of local selfdetermination
:

A claim of political authority emanates from lengthy
community consideration of the many public issues that
can cause people distress until they realize that local
problems are caused by bad laws, and can be solved only
when the community is empowered to make its own laws 51
.

2.
Local Involvement
The idea of public participation
and interest in the education system is a prime tenet of the
American democratic tradition. One study notes that:
.

Education is considered to be a subject of primary
interest to the citizenry, and therefore consideration
of educational objectives and directions should be made
most available to them. Such a system sustains the
interest of the people in the education of their
children and makes them more willing to provide the
financial resources required to maintain an adequate
school program. As a result, people's interest in
education and their expectation of schools tend to
rise.

-^^

Such public involvement at the local level becomes increasingly valuable as more and more functions of local government
are transferred to higher levels of organization.
The
ability to determine one's own fate in any important arena
becomes an increasingly rare phenomenon in the mass society:

Despite state and federal influenc'- in local control,
citizens for the most pc :-c appear to value the school
district and the opportunity to participate in education decisions which have significance for the welfare
of the people of their community.
This is one of the
few remaining opportunities for the citizen or taxpayer
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to affect directly the expenditure of public funds and
thus control the tax rate.^-^

Despite having fewer resources,
Flexibility
3.
decentralized systems have an increased ability to provide
a variety of school types and organization to meet local
Local control has encouraged experimentation and
needs.
flexibility, which would be difficult in a more monolithic
.

system:

One of the great strengths of American education is
diversity, a great variety of indigenous educational
systems uniquely responsive to needs that vary in time
This flexibility of
and differ from place to place.
educational policy derived from decentralized control
also encourages creativity and experimentation, the
handmaidens of educational progress. ^^

Local control over the
Financial Independence
4.
school budget means more responsibility and less competition
with other state departments or with other municipal
functions for funds
.

Proponents
Removal From Politics and Bureaucracy
5.
of decentralization argue that education can be kept more
nearly free of politics by making it a local rather than a
state issue:
.

Concern that schools be independent of political
control has resulted in school districts that, in most
communities except large cities, are virtually
autonomous government units, existing separate and
independent of municipal government. There are presently nearly 35,000 local boards of education. As
long as much of the control of schools rests with them,
it will be impossible for vested interests to gain
control of any large sector of public instruction as
a means of disseminating their particular doctrines. ^^
This holds true as well for bureaucratic control. Campbell
maintains that although centralized bureaucracies are
supposed to be neutrally efficient administrators of policy,
there is little to indicate that they are better than local
units in this respect:

must rest upon the
Centralization of control
control
is able to manage conassumption that central
maximum intelligence
utilize
or
flict and to impose
to
moment there is little
At
the
making
....
in decision
.
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evidence that our political system produces more
rational, or better decisions about education at the
state or federal level than at the local level
Decisions at all levels of government depend upon
the capacities, the values, and the interests of
the decision makers involved.
Therefore, it serves
little purpose to debate the quality of decisions at
different levels. ^^
.
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CHAPTER VII

HIGHER EDUCATION
Higher education occupies a distinctly separate position in
The structures and functions of
the educational system.
higher education have developed in a way fundamentally
different from those of primary and secondary schools.
The
public school system,! as has been seen, is organized around
the local school and school district and is designed to proInstitutions of higher eduvide universal basic education.
cation, on the other hand, serve a much broader constituency
(usually statewide) and provide specialized avenues of training.
The character of higher education is changing rapidly, a fact
which makes it difficult to summarize its central functions.
The traditional activities of providing professional education
and conducting research certainly remain an important ^;art of
In addition, however, other
the work of higher education.
more recent functions have been integrated into the framework
of higher education, such as adult education, cultural acciviL._\e3
which enhance community life, extension of the public educational
system through community and junior colleges, vocational education and provision of public discussion forums.

Apart from the proliferation of courses of study and community
services, however, discussion has arisen among educators and
the public concerning the function of higher education at a
more fundamental level. This discussion revolves around the
question of the relationship between institutions of higher
education and society as a whole.
One school of thought holds
that colleges and universities (leaving aside for the moment
other forms of post-secondary education) should perform solely
the role of a service unit to society, that is, provide whatever skills and knowledge are necessary to the smooth running
of the state.
Others maintain, to the contrary, that the
most important task of a university is to provide intellectual
leadership from a relatively free and objective standpoint.
The former argue that the main function of a university, like
the public school, is to serve the society which supports it.
In the case of the university, this means teaching the professional skills and conducting the research commissioned and
paid for by the state or private industry.
The university,
they reason, should contribute its part to the efficient
operation of the social system in a manner directed by the
officials of that system.
The latter reply that it is not in society's own interest to
reduce higher education to the position of simply servicing
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the other parts of the social system.
While the state may
gain some efficiency from a tightly controlled educational
system, it will lose the flexibility and far-sightedness
provided by an independent academic community. Only if univer.sities act as equal and independent advisers, rather than
as tools, of the state, they argue, can a society maintain
its openness to change and the freedom of thought necessary
to the survival of the democratic state.
The difficulty
with the "service" concept of higher education, one noted
educator observes, is that it takes society as given and
asks the university to supply the materials for its own
uncritical reproduction:
This is really the old service station, refurbished with plush lounges, fluorescent lights,
and gaudier signs in bigger words.
Whatever the
society wants, the university will do, provided
it gets the money to pay for it.
And it is not
even what the society wants.
It is what the most
vocal pressure groups demand.
Of course the positions for and against the "service" concept of the university are exaggerated purposely in the
debate, and the real form of any university system has
elements of both service and independence.
However, the
question of emphasis is important, and decisions made at
the constitutional level on the definition and structuring
of higher education can have a powerful influence on weighting the scales in favor of one or the other position.

ESTABLISHING HIGHER EDUCATION

Constitutional establishment of higher education is not
universal among the states. While every state includes some
provision for a public school system in its constitution, eight
state constitutions are silent on the subject of higher education (Delaware, Indiana, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Vermont and Washington)
In addition, five
others (Arkansas, Illinois, Tennessee, Ohio and West Virginia)
mention higher education only incidentally. The Model State
Constitution reflects this lack of uniformity in its
education article and in the accompanying commentary:
.
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Article IX, Section 9.01. Free Public Schools
The legislature
Support of Higher Education
establish, organize and support.
shall.
public educational institutions, including public
institutions of higher learning, as may be desirable.
;

.

.

.

.

.

Comment
A system of free public schools is considered of such pre-eminent importance that a special
mandate to the legislature is warranted. The largely
hortatory direction to the legislature to establish
public institutions of higher learning need not have
been included as a matter of constitutional necessity.
Its inclusion can do no harm, however, and may advance
There can be
the cause of public higher education.
no doubt, of course, that no special constitutional
authorization is needed for the establishment of
state universities, since the state government has
plenary powers, except as constitutionally limited,
to govern the state and to provide services necessary
for the general welfare.-^
.

It is difficult to discern on what basis the National Municipal
League makes the sharp distinction between the constitutional
needs of public schools and those of institutions of higher
The argument advanced for the "largely hortatory"
learning.
character of the provision on higher education that the
state government has plenary powers to govern and to provide
for the general welfare--of course would apply also to public
schools.
The claim that "a system of free public schools
is considered of such pre-eminent importance that a special
mandate to the legislature is warranted" is not self-evident.
As pointed out in the beginning of this study, there is no
absolutely compelling reason why education must be included
However, to the degree that
in a constitution at all.
educational provisions are included, the "pre-eminent importance" of public schools would not seem to exceed that of
institutions of higher education.

—

Aside from the question of relative importance of higher
education in the educational system, there are several arguments for inclusion of provisions on higher education in a
constitution:

Constitutional establishment gives recognition to the
special status of higher education and its particular relationship to the state.
1.

2.
Constitutional establishment provides a fundamental
protection of educational institutions from politically
motivated interference in the educational process. This is
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essential both to the development of high quality institutions
and to the preservation of academic freedom.

^

3.
Constitutional provisions on the financing of higher
education provide an important safeguard for the maintenance
of 'that part of the educational system which is almost totally
dependent on the state for support.

The primary arguments offered against constitutional establishment of higher education are as follows:
1.
A constitution need only contain a minimal provision
on general education.
The state retains power to provide for
specific parts of the system in any event (cited above in
reference to the Model Constitution
)

2.
The legislature should exercise direct control over
education, unimpeded by constitutional limitations.

3.
Flexibility in the constitution may be hindered by
specifying the establishment of particular institutions.

Since most of these arguments relate more directly to questions
of definition, governance and operation of the higher educational
system, they are discussed further in the appropriate sections
below.
Of the thirty-seven states which have significant constitutional
reference to higher education, twenty-four constitutionally
establish all or part of a state university system or its
governing board. 4 Nine states, in addition, direct the legislature
to establish and/or provide for all or part of a system of higher
education. 5 Two states provide that the legislature may establish
or provide for higher educational institutions. 6 one state
constitutionally establishes a private university and one state
creates a board to deal with school and university property.
"7

Seven of the twenty-four states which constitutionally establish
a system of higher education have strong provisions granting corporate
status to the system.
Four of these states (Alaska, California,
Hawaii and Louisiana) establish the state university as a legal
corporation, and three (Colorado, Michigan and New York) establish the governing board of the state university as a legal
corporation. The arguments relating to this method of establishing higher education are discussed below under "governance."
The Montana Constitution does not specifically establish a
state university, but it does vest control in the hands of "a
state board of education:"
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Article XI, Section 11: The general control
and supervision of the state university and
the various other state educational institutions shall be vested in a state board of
education, whose powers and duties shall be
prescribed and regulated by law.
.

.

.

Article XI, Section 12: The funds of the
state university and of all other state
educational institutions, from whatever
source accruing, shall forever remain inviolate and sacred to the purpose for which
they were dedicated.
.

.

.

Of the states which constitutionally establish a state university or its governing board, Montana's provisions are
The establishment of a governing
among the least clear.
an
inviolate
board and
source of support provide a general
interpreted
authority
by some as equivalent to constitutional
of
establishment
the state university.^ However, the constitutional status of the university remains in question.
Alternative formulations which have been suggested are discussed in the following sections.

DEFINITION OF HIGHER EDUCATION
Part of the difficulty which arises in consideration of constitutional provisions on higher education is caused by the
lack of a clear definition of what higher education in fact
comprises.
There exists a hazy area between secondary
education, which clearly falls under the rubric of public
education, and four-year colleges and universities, which
unquestionably belong to the higher educational framework.
In this ill-defined area lie community colleges, junior
colleges, vocational schools, technical schools, adult
education enterprises and other forms of post-secondary
education.
The trend in the United States is clearly toward proliferation
of such non-university post-secondary types of education.
These institutions have arisen in response to needs for transitional and alternative modes of education beyond high school.
Such needs, encouraged by increasingly rapid social and technological change, very likely will multiply demands for new
forms of post-secondary education in the future.
In addition
to vocational schools and junior colleges, there is a growing
interest in such educational institutions as those for the
arts, environmental and consumer education, crafts, the
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communications media and philosophy and culture, as well as
in summer workshops, professional refresher courses and
numerous other forms of education which take place outside
of normal institutional channels.
A major problem arises in attempting to deal with such
institutions or programs within the existing legal framework.
Of course many of them have grown up precisely as an alternative
to existing forms of education and consequently have no desire
to relinquish their independence by being subsumed under some
bureaucratic framework. But to the degree that the state
must include them in terms of relationships to the existing
educational system, it must provide them with some form of
legal recognition.
Moreover, in the case of community colleges
and vocational schools, new extensions are made to the existing state system which require constitutional or statutory
definition.

The pro and con arguments concerning constitutional definition
of a higher educational system are essentially the same as
those for constitutional definition of an education system
in general.
Basically, the argument is between supplying
adequate guarantees on the one hand, and retaining constitutional flexibility on the other.
In addition, however, if
provision is made in a constitution for the governance and
financing of higher education, it is almost essential that
the constitution specify what is to be governed and financed.
The Michigan Constitution, for example, clearly specifies
what the higher educational system consists of and what boards
shall govern its various parts.
The Constitution provides
for separate boards of education to govern (1) public education (one board)
(2) the units of the state university
(three boards), (3) all other four-year colleges (one board),
and (4) community and junior colleges (one board subordinate
to the state public school board) [Art. VIII, Sees. 3, 5, 6,
All institutions of higher education are named in the
7].
article providing for their maintenance [Art. VIII, Sec. 4].
,

The Montana Constitution, by contrast, mentions only "the
state university and the various other state educational
institutions" [Art. XI, Sec. 11] and "the state university
and.
all other state institutions of learning" [Art. XI,
Sec. 12].
In State v. Rice, the Montana Supreme Court, after
citing the provision in the Montana Enabling Act of 1889 for
the support of "State Normal Schools" [Sec. 17]
declared:
.

.

,

Beyond question the State Normal School is
one of the institutions of learning to which
.9
reference is here made.
[Art. XI, Sec.
12 of the Constitution]
.

.
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Statutory definition of the Montana university system occurs
in Sections 75-8402 and 75-8403 of the Revised Codes of Montana
Community college districts are defined in Section
1947.
75-8101 as corporate entities in the form of other school districts, but under the control of the regents of the Montana
university system.
Post-secondary vocational education centers,
on the other hand, are defined as statewide institutions under
the control of the State Board of Education and administered
by local boards of trustees [Sees. 75-7701, 7702, 7707].

,

GOVERNANCE OF HIGHER EDUCATION
As has been indicated, state constitutions vary widely in their
provisions for governing higher education. Of the thirtyseven states with substantive constitutional provisions on
higher education, twenty-one constitutionally establish separate boards for the control, supervision or management of
higher education. 10 These twenty-one states establish a total
of thirty-four boards, some states providing a separate board
for each institution or group of institutions.
Montana and
Florida are the only two states which constitutionally provide
only one state board of education for both public and higher
education.

The status of the higher educational system in relation to
the state legislature varies accordingly, from the weakest
position in which the state university and its governing board
are completely the creatures of the state legislature, to the
strongest position in which the university and its board attain
a relatively autonomous corporate status.
Delaware and New
Jersey, with no constitutional mention of higher education,
are examples of the former; Alaska and Michigan, which constitutionally grant the university or its board corporate
status, are examples of the latter.

The central issue which arises with respect to governance of
higher education decidedly is not one of public accountability.
Neither side of the debate bases its argument on whether a
system of higher education should be responsible to the people;
clearly, in a democratic state it must be.
Rather, the basic
question is what degree of direct control a legislature and/or
executive should exercise over higher education.
Those on one
side are concerned about unnecessary political and administrative interference in the education and research process,
while those on the other side are concerned with maintaining
full legislative oversight of the higher educational system.
The primary arguments used by those for strong legislative or

153-

HIGHER EDUCATION
executive control of higher education include:
The higher educational system, like other units of
1.
the state administrative system, is part of the executive and
mus.t be controlled as such.
This argument was used, for instance, by the Montana Supreme Court in State v. Brannon
:

The board of education is a part of the executive
department, and is but an agency of the state
government.
The Legislature may prescribe the
extent of the powers and duties to be exercised
by the board in the general control and supervision of the University of Montana.
It may require research and experimental work to
a greater extent than is now being carried on,
In other words, the state may extend,
and add power to its developmental arm.U.

.

.

.

.

.

.

In this case, the court upheld an act requiring a chemistry
professor at a Montana college to carry out spceial compensation work submitted to him by the Public Service Commission.
2.
Central administration techniques increase the efficiency of state government and therefore should be applied to
all agencies and institutions, including those of higher education.

3.
The large amounts of public money spent on state
institutions of higher education require close control by
state government have been impelled to tighten supervision of
expenditures
4.
The legislature reflects a diversity of interests
which should be transmitted to the governing of higher education.

Those whose concern is with strengthening the governance of
higher education argue for constitutional control of the system.
The major points are as follows:
The maintenance of a high quality university system
1.
depends on its ability to carry on objective inquiry free from
political or bureaucratic control. One source declares:
We believe it significant that the two universities of the United States which probably
have the most complete autonomy by Constitutional
provision, the University of California and the
University of Michigan, are among our outstanding state universities 12
.
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Another study of the system of governance of higher education
states
[I]t is interesting to note that no state university is included in the usual lists of institutions distinguished by the quality of their
scholarship, research, and professional work,
which is not vested by the constitution of its
state with authority which gives it considerable
independence of the fluctuating political
influences of current legislative direction. 13

The university, in its special position of operating
2.
on the frontiers of knowledge, requires a greater degree of
independence from the whims of daily governmental activity.

Intellectual freedom and institutional independence can hardly be separated. The climate
of freedom in which teaching and learning
flourish is dependent upon attitudes and
conditions within a free institution which
encourage rather than limit the intellectual
activity of those within the university
community. When either bureaucracy or partisanship infringes upon the authority of the governing board, it thereby threatens both the
intellectual and institutional independence of
Intellectual freedom may
the institution.
suffer seriously if public colleges and
universities are subjected to the same controls
Conversely, protecting
as other state activities.
the authority of boards of lay trustees from
interference by the state is every bit as vital
to the freedom of the university as is the
preservation of freedom for teaching and
research. 14

Another source puts it this way:
Intellectual freedom originally sprouted in an
environment of institutional autonomy.
It may
well lose its vitality altogether if public
colleges and universities are ever brought
within the harness of conventional state
administration. 15
3.
Placing higher education too closely under the control
of state legislative and executive bodies subjects it to the
threat of political manipulation.
Education in general should
be relatively immune from political battles; higher education
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because of its primarily state rather than local character,
has to be even more vigilantly defended from unnecessary
interference.
The long history of institutional autonomy in
Michigan, for instance, dates from the establishment of the
state university as autonomous in 1850 in reaction to what
were described as the "shifting fortunes" of the university
as it had previously been operated under direct legislative
control. 16 a later decision by the Michigan Supreme Court
reaffirmed the need for this autonomy:
No more forcible argument could well be made
than is found in that report for placing the
entire control of the university in the hands
of a permanent board, and taking it away from
the legislature.
I quote from that
report (by a legislative committee in 1840)
as follows:
"No state institution in America
has prospered as well as independent colleges,
with equal, and often with less, means.
.
State institutions.
have fallen into the
hands of the several legislatures, fluctuating
bodies of men, chosen with reference to their
supposed qualifications for other duties than

...

.

.

.

.

cherishing literary institutions. When
legislatures have legislated directly for colleges
their measures have been as fluctuating as the
changing materials of which the legislatures
^^
were composed.
.

.

.

4.
The long-range planning necessary for the operation
of institutions of higher education requires independence in

policy-making
The necessity of providing for the status and
control of the state system of higher education
within the constitution cannot be over-emphasized.
Inherent in the nature of institutions of higher
education is the need for long-range planning
and policy level decision making.
Unlike state
administrative agencies and departments, a
system of higher education cannot function
effectively within the narrow limitations of
excessive control by external agencies.
The
long-range public function of higher education
demands a permanence of legal status which only
constitutional delineation can provide. 18

Centralized administrative control is not appropriate
in fact, less efficient
than decentralized control.
This argument is directed more
5.

to the needs of universities and is,
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against exocutive control of oxponditures than against
legislative authority in the appropriations process:
it appears that those representing the concerns of higher education agree
that the governor (via the budget office)
and the legislature have clear authority to
decide the initial question of what portion
of a state's economic resources should
be committed to higher education.
Such a
decision is deemed a political one, and under
a democratic system it must be made by elected
representatives in response to public will.
However, these individuals maintain that the
second phase of fiscal control the expenditure
and internal allocation of state funds once
In summary,

—

they have been appropriated--is another matter.
Here educators are convinced that once the
legislature has spoken, fiscal control thereafter should be the responsibility of the
college or university itself. Once the
appropriation is made, the management of
expenditures should be the responsibility
of the university and thereby it can be held
accountable for the use of these public funds
in meeting the academic goals of the institution. 19

Another study emphasizes the greater efficiencies of decentralized budgeting and administration:
Economy and efficiency of administration are
not well served if some distant administrative
office or legislative committee must approve
even the most minute details of planning and
decision making.
If purchasing, budgeting, and
hiring must be channelled through a central
state bureaucracy of pre-audits, and contract
approval, the result is paralysis of operation. 20

METHODS OF GOVERNANCE
Decisions about the relative status of higher education in
the state governmental framework are manifested in the
governing forms of the higher educational system. There are
six general categories of constitutional provisions on the
governance of higher education:
1.
No provision for the governance of higher education
(twenty-one states). 21
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2.
Constitutional establishment of
only (five states). -^^
3.

university

Constitutional establishment of a single state board

for public and higher education only
4.

a state

(three states) .23

Constitutional establishment of a separate state board

or boards for higher education only

(four states). 24

5.
Constitutional establishment of both a state university
and a governing board, but without explicit corporate status
(ten states) 25
.

6.
Constitutional establishment of both a state university
and its governing board, with corporate status granted either
to the university or the board (seven states). 2o

This list graduates from the weakest form of governance from
the point of view of higher education to the strongest.
For
example, the absence of a constitutional provision on higher
education means the university and its governing body are
wholly the creatures of the legislature and can be modified
or abolished simply by passage of a statute.
Conversely,
the establishment of a university and governing body with
corporate status grants the university system a relatively
high degree of autonomy in the supervision and control of its
own affairs.
One commentator observes:

Many would interpret the granting of corporate
status to a university as the highest achievement and fullest acknowledgment of the independence
of higher education.
It is an acknowledgment of
the freedom for objective inquiry necessary for
an institution of higher education. 27
On the whole, states are about equally divided in their provisions on the governance of higher education, with twentyone having no constitutionally named governing body, twentyone having constitutionally established separate boards for
higher education and eight having some other provisions on
governance. The constitutional provisions, however, do
not always fully reflect the actual status of higher education in a state. All twenty-one states which lack
constitutional provisions for governance of higher
education, for example, have separate boards for
higher education created by statute.
Of these, several boards,
such as those of Arkansas and Indiana, have evolved a kind of
independent status through customs of the legislatures and
judicial interpretations.
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The practical operation of state governments in educational
systems also can have the opposite effect, that of significantly
Of the six states with
limiting constitutional grants of power.
provisions for the constitutional establishment of the university but not of the board, for example, only Minnesota's
board has gained a substantial degree of autonomy through
judicial interpretation. 28

Moreover, a number of constitutionally established boards of
higher education have had their powers limited by legislatures
and restrictive judicial interpretations.
Even boards with a
relatively strong constitutional basis, such as those in
New York, Louisiana and California, have been intermittently
subjected to substantial control in certain areas by state
central authorities, such as through minute itemization of
appropriations, executive withholding of appropriated funds
and control of building and land programs by state public
works officials. 29

Chambers lists a number of practices he considers to be
"unnecessary and self-defeating infringements of institutional autonomy by state central authorities
:

1.

riders and conditions attached to appropriations;

2.

statehouse pre-auditing of disbursements; state
auditors often exceeding their statutory authority;

3.

inclusion of some or all employees within the jurisdiction
of a state civil service commission or state personnel
board

4.

compulsory purchasing through a statehouse office;

5.

requiring a system of accounting and financial
reporting so different from that used nationally
by colleges and universities as to double the work
involved

6.

requiring that printing and publication be contracted
by a state printer or state editor;

7.

prohibiting colleges or universities from using legal
counsel except from the staff of the attorney general;

8.

requiring student fees and other institutional receipts
to be deposited in the state treasury, resulting, in
some instances, in their being permanently lost to the
institution. ^^
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Some of these practices occur, of course, in all states, but
the preponderance of them are found in states without constitutional establishment of university governance.

Constitutional provisions themselves can be weak or strong;
as interpreted by the courts, they can provide varying degrees
of independence for the governing board of the higher educational system. Although twenty-nine states have constitutional
provisions relating to governance, one study observes that "only
nine have offered a constitutional context in which the institutions have been able to exercise freedom in administrative
and fiscal affairs. "31 This study classifies three states
as having "quasi-independent" systems and thirty-eight
(including seventeen of those with constitutional provisions
on university governance) as having systems which are "totally
dependent upon legislative and administrative authority "32
.

The primary ways a state can include constitutional provisions
on the governance of higher education, yet retain its subordinance to the legislature, are through (1) mandate
directing the legislature to provide for a system and its
governance; (2) express reservation of power to the legislature
providing that the legislature shall retain the power to regulate and manage the system, and (3) qualifying phrases
including phrases such as that the governance of the system
shall be "as provided by law." All these methods have the
effect of retaining the absolute power of the legislature over
the governing board of a system of higher education.
Their
result in terms of university governance is very nearly the
same as having no constitutional provision at all for the
control of higher education.
On the other hand, the primary ways for constitutional
provisions to establish relatively independent powers for the
governing board of higher education are through (1) a broad
grant of power vesting a general power for the supervision
and control of a university system in its governing body;
(2) specif ication--itemi2ing specific powers granted to a
governing body, and (3) conf irmation--conf irming rights and
powers granted to a university or its governing body prior
to the writing of the constitution.
Although the latter two
methods leave some latitude for limitation of powers through
restrictive court interpretations, all three provide a
relatively high degree of independence for the governing body
for higher education. 33

—
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Montana Situation
Provisions for the governance of higher education in Montana
are somewhat unusual in that Montana is one of only two
states which have a single state board of education to
govern both public and higher education. The relevant
constitutional provision reads:
The general control and supervision of the
state university and the various other state
educational institutions shall be vested in
a state board of education, whose powers
and duties shall be prescribed and regulated
[Montana Const. Art. XI, Sec. 11]
by law.

The provision does not in fact specify that the board shall
serve also as the governing board of the public school system,
but the Montana Supreme Court ruled in State ex rel. School
District No. 29 v. Cooney that this section intended for the
board to serve in both capacities. 34

A report on The Administration of Higher Education in Montana
prepared by G. Homer Durham for the Montana Legislative Council
in 1958 recommended that the existing State Board of Education
should sit separately as the "Regents of the University of
Montana" when acting on higher educational matters.
The
Durham report also recommended consideration of a constitutional
amendment to provide greater autonomy for the university system
by creating a separate Board of Regents:
The general control and supervision of the
University of Montana shall be vested in a Board
of eight Regents appointed by the Governor subject to the confirmation of the Senate, for
eight year terms each to commence the first day
of July in successive years, according to law.
The University is hereby constituted a body
corporate and politic and its establishment,
with all the rights, immunities, franchises
and endowments heretofore granted or conferred are hereby perpetuated unto it under
the control of said Regents. 3 5
,

,

In 1959, the legislature adopted the statutory change and
declared the State Board of Education to be the "regents of
the Montana university system" when acting on the affairs
of the university units
Revised Codes of Montana 1947,
Sec. 75-8501].
The proposed constitutional amendment also
was passed by the 1959 Legislature but was kept off the
,

[
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ballot for ratification because of the governor's failure to
sign it coupled with a subsequent court ruling that the
governor's signature was required on constitutional amendments. 35
Thus, the original constitutional language of Article XI,
Section 11 remains unchanged.
The phrase, "whose powers and
duties shall be prescribed and regulated by law," referring
to the State Board of Education consistently has been interpreted by the Montana Supreme Court in a restrictive sense.
In State v. Brannon the Court declared that the phrase deserved
particular emphasis:

Observe the care employed in the construction
of this sentence.
The general control and supervision of the State University and the various
other educational institutions are vested in
the state board of education whose powers and
duties shall be prescribed and regulated by law.
A law may be enacted by the people exercising
the initiative or by the people acting through
the Legislature.
In either case the power to
enact a law is illimitable, except as restrained by the Constitution [emphasis by the
court] 36
.

Moreover, the court went on to place an interpretation of even
greater dependency on the governing board:
The board of education is a part of the executive
department, and is but an agency of the state
government.
The Legislature may prescribe
the extent of the powers and duties to be exercised by the board in the general control and
supervision of the University of Montana. The
Legislature may broaden the functions of the
University, or any of its units.
It may require
research and experimental work to a greater
extent than is now being carried on, and for
the public benefit may require the discharge
of functions in new fields.
In other words,
the state may extend, and add power to, its
developmental arm. 38

Similarly, the court had ruled in State ex rel. Koch v.
Barret that "the state board of education was created by
the legislature under the authority of the constitution
(Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 11). "j9 And in State ex rel
Vccder v. State Board of Education, the court maintained:
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This constitutional provision [Art. XI, Sec.
11] merely vests control over the state
educational institutions in the board, and
authorizes the legislature to define and
circumscribe the powers and duties of the
board. 4

This language was repeated in a 1936 decision concerning the
board's authority to construct a university building. 41 Most
recently, the court in 1963 held that the legislature has
restricted by statute the ability of the board to delegate its
power and that this precludes college officials from contracting
with teachers on behalf of the board. The court did not question
the ability of the legislature to intervene in such a matter of
internal supervision as the selection of faculty. 42 The
cumulative effect of these decisions appears to grant the
legislature virtually unlimited authority to control and supervise the university system. 43
Some possible alternatives to present Montana provisions alTwo recent studies of the Montana
ready have been discussed.
situation "Constitutional Authority for Higher Education"
by Charles Cashmore et al and "Constitutional Control of
the Montana University System: A Proposed Revision" by
Laurence Waldoch provide further analysis of the existing
situation and possible alternatives 44 The Cashmore study
suggests the following as an alternative to the present
provision on governance:

—

.

—

.

There
Board of Regents of Higher Education
shall be a Board of Regents of Higher Education,
a body corporate which shall have exclusive
management and control of the Montana University
System and of all other public institutions
of post-secondary education.'*^
.

Waldoch proposes a somewhat different provision to accomplish
the same general goal.
The government and control of the academic,
financial and administrative affairs of the
Montana university system shall be vested in
a board of regents, who shall be selected as
provided herein.
The regents shall have the
power, and it shall be their duty, to govern
the university system as a public trust, in
a manner consistent with the general laws of
Montana.
The legislature shall pass no law
which infringes upon, diminishes or transfers
to another body any of the authority provided
by this section.^"

-163-

HIGHER EDUCATION
These proposals would provide a stronger system of selfgovernment for the university system. There are, of course,
many other alternatives, depending on the goal one has in
mind for the status and governance of higher education.
Provisions relating to the membership and selection of the
board are discussed in Part II of this study.

ELIGIBILITY
The question of who should be allowed to attend public
institutions of higher education does not present great
constitutional difficulty.
Under federally guaranteed
rights, it is clear that aside from questions of merit,
public educational institutions must be open to all.
The
Montana Constitution makes this principle explicit:
No religious or partisan test or qualification shall ever be required of any person
as a condition of admission into any public
educational institution of the state, either
as a teacher or student.
nor shall any
person be debarred admission to any of the
collegiate departments of the university
on account of sex.
[Art. XI, Sec. 9]
.

.

However, two other potential restrictions on eligibility
age and financial status are less clearly dealt with in
the Montana Constitution.
Section 7 of Article XI states:
"The public free schools of the state shall be open to all
children and youth between the ages of six and twenty-one
years." This might appear at first to refer only to the
public school system.
However, the Montana Supreme Court
made explicit reference to this section in connection with
university education in its ruling in State ex rel. Henderson
V. Dawson County

—

;

The policy of this state has always been to
provide free and liberal education for the
children and youths residing within its
borders, from the lowest elementary branches
of instruction up to and including a full
university course
To this end our Con stitution declares that educational insti tutions shall be established and supported
by the state (sec. 1, Art. X, Constitution
of Montana)
and imposes upon the legislature
a positive duty to "establish and maintain a
general, uniform and thorough system of
.

,
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public free, common schools" which "shall be
open to all children and youth between the
ages of six and twenty-one years " (sees. 1
and 7, Art. XI) [emphasis added]. 4'
In a later case, however, the court defined the term "public
school" (the term used in Art. XI, Sec. 7) as "a school
established and maintained at public expense and comprising
the elementary grades, and when established, the grades of
high school work. "48 Under this interpretation, provisions
on age and freedom from cost in Section 7 would not apply to

higher education.
In practice, there has been no distinction made with respect
to age in Montana institutions of higher education.
The
question of free tuition is another matter.
In Henderson v.
Dawson County, cited above, the court clearly held that
collegiate education, as well as elementary and secondary,
was guaranteed to be free under the constitution.
In
addition, until 1971, a state law read as follows:

Except in the law and medicine departments
and for extra studies, tuition shall ever be
free to all students who shall have been
residents of the state for not less than one
year preceding their admission to any unit
of the University of Montana.
Revised Codes
of Montana 1947, Sec. 75-8601, repealed
[

,

1971]

Under this statute the Montana Supreme Court held in Veeder
State Board of Education that the State Board of Education
could not authorize university fees for "tuition" proper
that is, "the act or business of teaching the various branches
of learning"
but could sanction the collection of fees for
other purposes such
as extra-curricular activities, campus4°
upkeep and so on.

vs.

—

But in 1971 the legislature repealed the ban on tuition charges,
Section 75-8601, Revised Codes of Montana 1947, now provides:
,

Charges for tuition
(1)

— waiver

of nonresident fees .

The regents may:

(a)
prescribe tuition rates, matriculation charges,
and incidental fees for students in institutions
under their jurisdiction.
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(b)
waive at their discretion, nonresident
tuition for selected and approved nonresident
students.
.

.

.

Thus, the state has eliminated by law the principle of tuitionfree attendance at institutions of higher education.

The constitutional issue is now clarified on the subject of
free tuition for the Montana university system.
A new constitutional provision would be required if one desired to
reestablish the principle of free public education from
elementary through university level. That raises the question
of the desirability of such a provision.
One study considers
this issue in relation to the general problem of financial
aid and equal educational opportunity:

Free tuition is only one part of a larger
problem, that of determining the precise form
which increased aids to college and university
students ought to take.
The general idea of
providing financial aid to college students
rests on the assumption that financial inability constitutes one of the major
obstacles to higher education for many
students.
.

.

.

Many authorities who advocate free tuition
also call for making higher education available to all who would desire to attend.
Therefore, the problem of free tuition is
closely related to the concept of equal
educational opportunity as it applies to
higher education. ... It is argued that
the American educational system is opposed
to the idea of excluding certain students
from exposure to higher education students
whose talents may otherwise never be
discovered. 50

—

A regent of the University of Michigan, Eugene B. Power, advocates the maximum extension of educational opportunity in
higher education:
[If] a democratic society is to preserve itself, it
must educate itself. Therefore, education is a
social responsibility, not a private privilege.
It
follows from the nature of this responsibility that
the economic support of education at all levels is
not a matter of personal desire but of social need.
For this reason wc have established in this country.
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»
the principle that the wealth of all the people
may be used to educate the children of the state
and of the nation, regardless of where their
wealth may be located or where the children may
reside. ^'-

On the other hand, some contend higher education should be
selective and should deal with financial matters on an
For example. Dr. James A. Perkins, President
individual basis.
of Cornell, has argued:

Before the academic bar, all students are
The Academy is in the business of
not equal.
making discriminating judgments about human
performance and because it differentiates by
it inits own standards and regulations
creasingly seems in defiance of egalitarian
social customs. ^2
,

Another writer emphasizes the need for individual choice among
a variety of potential paths of life:
[T]hose who campaign for tuition-free higher
education like to refer to the "great
American tradition of free and universal
education." Yet they ignore another
more fundamental tradition, which emphasizes
individual choice and individual risk-taking
against the irreversible shaping of individual
careers by socially appointed experts. 53

—

The major arguments in favor of tuition-free higher education
can be summarized as follows 54
:

Every reason advanced for free ele1.
mentary education during the nineteenth century
now may be applied to free tuition for higher
education.
Citizenship demands and economic
considerations both require that higher education be available to all who are qualified
to undertake it.
Equality of educational
opportunity is meaningless in the twentieth
century unless economic and social barriers
to higher education are removed.

Modern society functions through a
2.
wide variety of highly specialized and developed
talents.
Most scientific advances call for more
brain power and less manpower. A free tuition
policy enables a state to discover and develop
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unusual talent wherever it is found.
It enables
the state to prepare enough leaders and technicians for a balanced society.
3.
What has made the United States a great
nation is its fluid class distinctions.
Its
leadership in all human endeavors is strengthened by ability regardless of birth and class.
Free education has been a major source of social
mobility.
4.
A state may find itself exporting some
of its most able residents if other states have
greater opportunities for low-cost public higher

education.
The primary arguments against tuition-free higher education
are
1.
Free tuition means that the public generally and persons who are unable to satisfy
academic admission requirements (assuming nonuniversal college education) must contribute to
the cost of educating persons who could afford
to pay for their college education. ^^
2.
Free tuition will not solve the problem,
since other economic barriers might still keep
many students out of college. Their earnings
may be needed at home.
Or they might be unable to qualify for college because, growing
up in a poor environment, they lack both adequate preparation and motivation for further
learning.
No doubt, students would be added,
but the proposal would not appear to solve the
basic problem of the education of the greatest
numbers of those otherwise capable but financially unable.
It cannot be shown whether free
tuition would actually accomplish its aims for
a democracy to educate itself to any materially
greater extent than is true under current
practices at state-supported institutions. 56

3.
The cost to the state of providing free
schooling through college to all qualified students
would be prohibitive. Furthermore, tuition payments provide funds used to expand and improve
public education programs and facilities ^^
.
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I
4.
Specific reference to free tuition would
still permit the legislature
to impose substantial
5°
fees in lieu of tuition.
5.
Obtaining a smaller proportion of its total
budget from the state will increase diversity of
funding for the institution, making possible greater
assurance of institutional independence. 59
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PART II

STRUCTURE

This is the symbolic scheme.
In reality the number
of drawings is infinite
No decision is final, all
branch into others.
.

Jorge Luis Borges
Labyrinths
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CHAPTER VIII

THE STRUCTURE OF EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION^
In addition to the general constitutional questions discussed
in previous chapters, particular issues arise concerning the
administrative structure of education in a state. This is
an issue area which need not be answered in the form of
constitutional provisions; indeed, thirteen states have no
constitutional provision relating to the administration of
education.

However, to the degree that administration is considered a
constitutional issue, decisions must be made regarding the
status and functions of at least four major parts of a state's
organizational structure in education:

—

State board of education number of boards, x.umber
1.
and selection of members, powers and responsibilities, terms
of office;

—

2.
Chief state school officer relationship to state
board, selection, powers and responsibilities, term of office,
relationship to state department of education;

Local boards of education
3.
miscellaneous specifications;

— status,

selection, other

—

4.
Local superintendents of education status, area of
jurisdiction, selection, other miscellaneous specifications.

Any, all or none of these items may be specified in a constitution, depending upon the desired brevity or specificity and
upon special considerations. Provisions may depend on decisions
made on broader constitutional questions, such as centralizationdecentralization, the status of higher education and the
relationship between education and other state governmental
functions.

One study suggests the most fundamental question regarding
constitutional provisions on education is whether education is
seen as a typical or an atypical governmental function. ^ If
it is seen as a normal part of government activities, the study
observes that the logical administrative form is an appointed
officer to head the educational agency, similar to other state
administrative agencies. On the other hand, if education is
seen as an atypical government activity, it is argued that the
logical form of administration is an elected board or boards.
The trend among the states has clearly been in the direction
of an elected board with an appointed chief state school officer
as Table 1 shows.
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TABLE

1

STATE BOARDS OF EDUCATION AND CHIEF SCHOOL OFFICERS
FOR THE COMMON SCHOOL SYSTEMS, 1947-1970

Chief method of selecting
itate board

III47

1969

chief itate ich^tol officer

A ^pointed

Elected by
people
Slate

Chief melh\\l of setretint

by Governor

1947

1969

Other

1947

1969

Elected by
people

1947

*
*

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona

1969

by state board

A p feinted
by Governor

1947

1947

Appointed

*

1969

1(69

*

*

Arkansas

*
*

California

Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware

*

•

*
•
*

Florida

Ceorela

*
*

Hawaii
Idaho

*

*

•

*

Illinois

*

Indiana
lowa(c)

*

Kansas

*

Kentucky
Louisiana
Malne(c)

Maryland

*

Massachusetts

*

*
*

*

*
*
*

*
*

Mlchlftan

Minnesota

*

Mississippi

*

Missouri

Montana

•

NebraskaCc)

Nevada

New Ilafnpshlrc.
New Jersey
New Mexico.
New York

.

•
*

.

•

•
*

•

North Carolina
North Dakota(c).

.

*

.

Ohlo(c)

•
•

*
*

•

•

•

*

Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania

Rhode

IslandCc)

South Carolina.

.

South nakota(c).
Tennessee
Texas
Utah

.

*
*

.

*
•

•

*

Vermont

*

Vlrftlnla

Washington
West Virginia

No

Wlaconalii

Wyoming

*

*
*

state board

Total

*

*
11

25

*By its 1970 Constitution, Illinois now has a state
board of education which may either be appointed or
elected and which appoints the state superintendent.

Source: The Council of State Governments, The Book of
the States, 1970-1971 Vol. XVIII (Lexington, Ky.,
,

1970)

,

p.

305.
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OVERVIEW
State boards of education in general are responsible for
directing the educational activities of a state, determining
minimum standards for instruction, personnel, physical operation
of schools and financial support, and advising political and
educational bodies on school matters. The chief state school
officer generally acts as the administrative officer of the
board and executes the board's educational programs and
policies. The educational department normally operates as the
chief state school officer's staff and acts as the administrative
agency in education for the state. Local school boards and
administrators exercise varying degrees of control over the
operation and financing of school districts at the local level.
State Boards of Education

Twenty-four state constitutions establish state boards of
education: Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia
and West Virginia. These boards have varying powers and
responsibilities, as described below.
Chief State School Officers

Thirty-three state constitutions call for a chief state school
officer: Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Caroline, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. Table 1
provides a summary of how these officers and the state boards
are selected.
In addition, two states provide constitutionally
for a state department of education as the agency under control
of the chief state school officer:
Nebraska and New Mexico.
Local School Boards and Administrators
Eight state constitutions have provisions on local boards of
education:
California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana,
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In addition, twelve state constitutions
Ohio, Utah and Virginia.
call for local school officers:
Arizona, California, Colorado,
Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana,
North Dakota, South Dakota and West Virginia. The two most
recently passed state constitutions, Illinois (1970) and
Virginia (1971), omit previously mentioned county school superintendents.

STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION
If it is decided that a state board of education should exist
and that it should have constitutional status, several important
questions remain:
Should there be one, two or even three boards?
What powers should the board (s) have? Who should compose its
membership, how should members be selected and what terms should
they have?

Number of Boards
Arguments concerning establishment of a separate board for
higher education are dealt with in Chapter VII and therefore
will not be repeated here. Only three states do not have
separate boards for higher education (Idaho, Iowa and Montana);
in these three states, a single board has been created to act
In all other states except Wisconsin (which
in both areas.
has no state board for public education)
two or more state
boards are established by a wide variety of constitutional
and statutory means.
,

Powers and Responsibilities
The determination of a board's powers and responsibilities
depends upon the broader fraonework envisaged for education in
a state; the more independent the educational framework from
the rest of state government, the stronger the powers of the
board, and, conversely, the more education is seen as an integral
part of the executive branch, the weaker its powers. In
addition, if two boards are established, their powers may differ
greatly; for example, a higher education board generally exercises
more direct control over a university system than does a state
board over a public school system characterized by strong local
However, it is difficult to generalize from state
autonomy.
to state, and the following list of major functions of a state
board of education only suggests a summary of state board activities applying to some but not all state boards:
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—

Complying and Executing carrying out provisions of
constitutional and statutory law, including such matters as
school elections, taxation, purchasing; adopting a budget for
educational activities directly under its jurisdiction;
1.

—

Policy-Making establishing goals, formal rules and
2.
and regulations; providing directives to the chief state school
officer, school adiriinistrators and teachers; setting minimum
standards;
,

—

Supervising and Evaluating inspecting physical plants
3.
and reviewing program activities in curriculum and instruction;

Advising and Interpreting--reporting on the condition
4.
of education in the state; submitting to the governor and
legislature recommendations regarding the improvement of
education;

—

Judging hearing appeals from action taken by the
5.
chief school officer or by other administrators relating to
regulations, employment, teacher certification and so forth;

—

Coordinating cooperating with federal, state and
6.
local agencies and with educational organizations to further
the cause of education and facilitate the operation of public
schools;

—

Appointing appointing and establishing the compensation
of the chief state school officer (twenty-five states) ; alternatively, the board may act primarily as an advisory body to
the chief state school officer.
7.

This list is neither universal nor exhaustive but suggests
the broad areas of activity of state boards of education.
A notion of existing and desired powers and responsibilities
of the boards is important in constitution-writing because
the structure of the state education system depends to a
significant degree on the role envisaged for the state board.
However, only two state constitutions actually delineate such
powers beyond a broad mandate such as "control and supervision."
Such specification generally is thought to be a statutory
matter.

Membership:

Method of Selection

Approximately half of the state constitutions provide the method
of selecting the state board of education or the board of higher
education; almost all of those constitutions which establish
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boards of education also specify how their members are to be
selected (exceptions are California, Idaho, Illinois, Ohio
and Texas). Among all the states (including those which establish the board by statute) , the primary means of selection are
direct election (eleven states) or gubernatorial appointment
Two states allow for election of the
(thirty-three states).
board by the legislature, and three states have boards composed
entirely of ex officio members. One state has no state board.
As Table 1 indicates, there has been a distinct trend in recent
years toward election of the state board; the number of elected
boards has increased from three in 1947 to eleven in 1969.
Hawaii, for example, established an appointed board in its
constitution of 1959 and changed this to an elective board in
the new constitution of 1969.

Two general limitations apply to consideration of the method
First, to the
of selection of the state board of education.
degree that the state board is seen to fall under the executive
arm of state government and the "short ballot" is the desired
form of state elections, then the appointive method becomes a
consequence of these considerations. Secondly, a practical
incompatibility of both an elected board and an elected chief
state school officer is suggested by the fact that only one
state (Louisiana) has such an arrangement. The ambiguity in
power relationships resulting from having two chief administrative entities, both responsible to the people, seems to
preclude an elective board if the chief school officer is
Beyond these two conditions, however,
elected, and vice versa.
the merits of an elective versus appointive state board remains
debatable. The following section presents the fundamental
arguments on both sides.
The Case for an Elective Board^
In view of the desire to keep education wholly accountable to and directly responsive to the will of the
people, the structural arrangement which best satisfies
this is an elected board of education which appoints
its own administrative officer.
It also reflects the
idea of separating policy making and administrative
functions. Additionally, staggered terms are often
recommended on the basis of educational policy being
distinctive enough to transcend the term of any governor,
and to achieve continuity in educational policy making.
Commentators in the field contend that there must be a
body which bridges the gap from one state executive to
another and from one legislature to the next. These
proponents also argue that partisan political considerations should not be permitted to influence the
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educational well-being of our youth, and therefore
if board members
reconunend nonpartisan elections. 5
are elected on a nonpartisan basis, then this arrangement further reflects the desire to separate education
from partisan politics.
Members of school boards are constitutionally elected
directly by the people at the polls, or indirectly
either by the legislature or by electing other government officials, such as the governor, superintendent
of education, attorney general, treasurer, etc., who
then serve in an ex officio capacity as the state school
board. There is no state constitution which establishes
a nonpartisan elected state board of education.
Of
seven state constitutions which provide for an elected
board (Colorado, Hawaii, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska,
New Mexico, and Utah)
only one indicates whether the
members are to be elected on a partisan or nonpartisan
basis.
In Michigan's document, candidates for the
school board are nominated by party convention. The
remaining six states only designate that board members
Two other states. New York and South
shall be elected.
Carolina, have constitutions which provide for an
indirect election of board members.
South Carolina's
document provides for a delegation of counties within
each judicial circuit to nominate members who are then
elected by the legislature. New York's board of regents
are constitutionally elected by the legislature also on
the basis of judicial districts.
,

Three other state constitutions establish an ex officio
board of education. Florida's document lists the
board's membership as:
the governor, superintendent of
education, secretary of state, attorney general and the
treasurer. Mississippi's document lists the board
membership as:
the attorney general, secretary of
state, and the superintendent of education.
Oklahoma's
constitution designates the governor, secretary of
state, attorney general, and superintendent of education
as the state board.
In all three states, these state
officials are elected, including the superintendent of
education.
Of the seven state constitutions with directly elected
boards, six allow the board to appoint its superintendent
of education.
Louisiana's document provides for the
election of this official. Of the two states (New York
and South Carolina) with an indirectly elected board.
South Carolina's document provides that the superintendent
of education be elected on a partisan basis whereas New
York's document is silent on this matter.
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It appears that the only consistent feature of a
structural arrangement which reflects education as an
atypical function is an elected board. The mechanics
of how this should be achieved, i.e., direct or indirect
election, partisan or nonpartisan election, and the role
of the administrative officer to the board varies from
state to state.

Nonpartisanship. Most students of school administration
call for a removal of education from partisan politics.
These individuals agree that school board members should
be elected by popular vote at nonpartisan elections.
The reasons given are that board members should feel no
allegiance to any political organization or interest
group and party members should not be rewarded with
positions on the professional or other staff of the
school system. 6 one study has stated that:
the principles of nonpartisanship
can
likely be better served by an elected school board
than an appointed one .
Under an appointive
system, it would be difficult indeed for any
governor to resist the forces of partisan pressure
to make political gain on his appointments.
Under
the elective system the public itself becomes the
guardian of nonpartisanship to protect its own best
interests; recognizing that no one group or party
can lay exclusive claim to children and their
education.
In the long run, the tradition of nonpartisanship can best be further developed and
protected by a continuous education of the
electorate to think of educational matters as
separate both from routine administration concerns
and from partisan politics.^
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Another writer has stated:
It is generally held by persons interested in
public education that school boards should be nonpartisan rather than partisan or bipartisan. The
schools have their own peculiar problems which are
not in any sense related to the issues defined as
Republican or Democratic. Political considerations
should have no weight in the selection of members
of school boards.
The schools are maintained for
the education of children whose parents are of
all political affiliations.
Whether a person is a
Republican or a Democrat has not the slightest
bearing on his ability to be a good member of a
school board. Political considerations should not
enter into its decisions.
.

.

.
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The proponents of nonpartisanship also argue on the
basis of candidate availability. The contention is
that many excellent professional and businessmen are
unwilling to make a campaign for office on a political
party ticket because they have patients, clients, or
customers in all parties.
In discussing the advantages of an elected
Patronage.
board in terms of separating education from political
obligation and patronage. Reeves has stated:

Election, more often than appointment, protects
the schools from local politics.
If appointed,
members are sometimes selected for the purpose of
using the schools for patronage or for the award
of purchase contracts to supporters of local
politicians. The use of schools for patronage
purposes results in the selection of teachers and
other employees for political reasons and not on
the basis of their qualifications.
Such selection
results in less efficient teachers than would be
secured if qualifications alone were the criterion
of choice. Furthermore, the use of the schools for
political purposes results in the misuse of
school funds to the disadvantage of both the schools
and the taxpayers. Any sense of obligation
.
.
by the members of a school board may result in the
use of the schools to help to maintain the political
power of the existing
authorities.
Such
misuse of the public schools demoralizes a school
system.
.

.

.

.

The proposition that an elective method produces a more
independent acting body free from political pressure is
elaborated upon by Dykes:

Elected school board members have greater
.
independence and freedom to act in the best interests
of the school system than do appointed board members.
Appointed board members owe allegiance to the
appointing person or body and may not be free to
decide school issues solely on educational considerations.
Appointed board members are susceptible to
pressure by the appointing agency, which can use
threat of removal from office to make its wishes
prevail.
.

.

Frequently, the members of the appointing agency
receive office on non-educational issues and may
not be sufficiently concerned about the schools and
their program.
Through coercion, the school board
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may find itself forced to act in the interest of
these other issues, even if they are contrary to
the best interests of the schools.

Elected school members can steer clear of the
undesirable features of local politics. A board
responsible only to the people can resist political patronage ... 10
Students of school administration also point out the
effects that political pressure and obligation have on
staff relations:

An elected board is in a better position to
work closely and effectively with its superintendent
and professional staff than is an appointed board.
The superintendent and staff are frustrated and
demoralized when important educational decisions
are unduly influenced by persons or groups not
directly connected with the schools. Further,
such decisions are usually made without the benefit
of professional advice.
.

.

.

When any group is permitted to come between the
board and its staff, lowered morale, insecurity,
and staff ineffectiveness result. The entire
staff needs to feel a loyalty to the board and to
look to it as the final authority in school matters
at the local level.
This is difficult to do when
board members hold office at the pleasure of some
other governmental authority.
Public Participation. Many proponents of an elective
system contend that people take more interest in their
schools and in local educational issues when these issues
are popularized as the result of an election campaign.
Elected members are directly responsible to the people
for their actions in maintaining the kind of schools the
people want at a cost they are willing to pay. Under an
appointive system, voters feel frustrated in securing
changes in school policies and school administration. ^^
An elected board draws members from more segments of the
community and thereby achieves the involvement of a
As one
greater number of neighborhoods and individuals
writer has stated:
.

Elected board members tend to be more representative
of the total community than do appointed board
Appointed board members tend to come from
members
the business and professional elements in the community, and other segments of the community's
.
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»
population may not have representation. 13
The Case for an Appointed Board^^

An appointed executive board as head of an educational
agency reflects the idea that education is nonseparable
from other governmental functions with the governor being
the chief administrative officer of the state, responsible
Therefore, most of
for and accountable for education.
the arguments advanced for an appointed board are the
For example, on
same as for an appointed individual.
accountability, Charles E. Reeves states:
If school board members are appointed, the appointing authority can be held fully responsible to the
people for the actions of the school board, for the
integrity of the members appointed, and for any
misuse of the schools by the appointing authority
or by the school board, for its members' political
or selfish purposes. 15

However, the difference in philosophy lies primarily in
the nonseparateness of policy making and administrative
functions. An appointed board, in this case, is an
additional element inserted between the governor and the
It
departmental executive officer (the superintendent)
is viewed by some as a preventive device, to provide some
measure of insurance against a one-man control over
It is viewed by others simply as a hindrance.
education.
In either case, it means a division of what was one
function under a single appointed officer into two
functions that of policy making and administrative
Not only must this be done in order for a
functions.
board to operate effectively as a departmental head,
rather than as an ineffective body whose specific
function is not clearly understood, but also the board
must be able to appoint its administrative officer whose
responsibility it is to carry out programs and policies
determined by [board members].
It would seem futile
board [members] to formulate educational policy
for
.
.
if its administrative officer were not directly
If he were selected by some other
responsible to them.
authority, he would be under no obligation to carry out
the board's programs.
The instance of a board functioning
as a department head also differs from a single appointed
officer in one further respect. When boards are used in
this capacity, the reasons usually advanced are that more
minds are better than one, and more importantly, that
the subject matter is somewhat distinct and important
enough that a representative body in the decision-making
.

—

.
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seat will better serve public needs.

There are further arguments for an appointed board which
are not couched in terms of a board vs. a single individual,
but in terms of an appointed vs. an elected board.
Those
arguments for an appointed board vis-a-vis an elected
body concentrate on the issue of the caliber of individuals
selected by one method over the other, and the effects
upon departmental policy making and administrative
functions.

Proponents of an appointed board argue that this system
places men and women of highest caliber and qualification
on the board.
By exercising due care in selection,
capable board members can be found. It is argued that
many citizens hesitate to become involved in a race for
public office, even if it is on a nonpartisan basis.
Professional and business people, such as physicians,
bankers, manufacturers, and merchants, shrink from subjecting their names and reputations to the misrepresentations that are sometimes made in political campaigns.
Desiring to avoid the necessity of spending a great deal
of time and sometimes money in a campaign for election,
they refuse to run.
These same people, however, are
often willing to serve on the school board if asked to
do so as a matter of civic responsibility.
Appointment
is considered more of an honor and such persons may be
quite willing to give time necessary for effective school
board service but be unwilling to take time out from
their business and professional duties to seek office. 1^
It is felt then that appointment for long, overlapping
terms of persons deeply interested in the welfare of the
public schools, from nominees selected by representatives
of civic and other organizations of the city, will
secure better members than a competition for school
board membership via a popular election. ^^

These individuals further feel that the popular election:
invites participation by politically-minded
(1)
persons or individuals with grievances against
the school system who are merely interested in
furthering their own ambitions and settling personal
grudges, whereas, the appointive method is felt to
be a safeguard against this; 18 and

encourages candidates for board office to
(2)
develop issues having only public appeal or to
make charges against the incumbent board members
which have little relevance to good school programs
and tend not only to discredit the schools in the
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eyes of the public but also create serious problems
from the standpoint of public support, public trust
and public confidence.!^

Advocates of an appointive system argue that elected
members often feel they have a mandate from the people
These changes may be those the new
to make changes.
member has himself raised without fully understanding
whether the proposed changes detract from sound educational theory and practice. One authority maintains
that the desire to make changes by newly elected members
is likely to result in three pernicious practices or
conditions. First, the school board may be led to
assume certain administrative functions that should be
performed by the superintendent of schools and his
staff.
Second, with frequent changes in school board
personnel, the superintendent of schools may find it
difficult to work with new board members and be forced
out, resulting in too frequent changes in the chief
executive school official. Third, with continual
changes in board membership, educational policies and
practices may be kept in a state of flux, and consistent
development of the school system may be retarded. 20
In addition to internal difficulties, an elective system
may present problems in the relationship between the
school board and the executive and legislative branches
of government.
The executive and the legislature are
elected on a partisan basis.
In each election, the
candidates for these offices may be committed to a certain
position on issues of policy. Opponents to an elected
board argue that there is no guarantee that there will
be any consistency among the policy commitments regarding
education of elected board members, elected legislators
and an elected governor.

There will be an even greater lack of coordination within
the executive branch of government if school board members
are elected on a nonpartisan basis and are thereby
uncommitted to any particular policy. The partisan
political process is considered to be the most effective
way of implementing public policy and only by making
education a part of the larger party program can educational goals be realized through legislative implementation. 21 A partisan board, then, best reflects this view
of coordination between the school board, the executive
and the legislature.
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An appointed board is constitutionally established in
5 of the 23 states which establish a state board of
education. These are: Arizona, Georgia, Missouri,
Virginia and West Virginia. All five states also
require senate confirmation on board appointments.
Two other state constitutions establish boards, the
membership of which consists of appointed individuals
plus other state officials.
In Montana's document,
an 11-member board is established consisting of the
governor, attorney general, superintendent of education,
and eight others to be appointed by the governor with
the consent of the senate.
In North Carolina's
constitution, a 13-member board is provided, consisting
of the governor, the treasurer, the superintendent of
education, and ten others to be appointed by the governor
and approved by the legislature in joint session.
Eight are to be from school districts and two at large.
It is difficult to determine from the constitutional
data whether these appointed boards function as heads
of the state education agency.
It may be assumed that
those boards which select the superintendent of education may be acting as policy-making heads of the educational agency. Only the appointed boards of Missouri
and West Virginia constitutionally select their
administrative officer. The rest of the states mentioned
above have the chief state school officer constitutionally elected at large, except for Virginia where the
governor not only appoints board members but appoints
the chief state school officer as well.

The constitutions of Missouri and West Virginia provide
that the board shall have duties and powers as determined
by the legislature and, in general, shall supervise the
public school system. The constitutions of Arizona,
Georgia and Montana are silent regarding [detail of] the
board's powers and duties. Only North Carolina and
Virginia have documents which contain any degree of
detail regarding duties and functions of the state board,
none of which, however, includes the selection of or
relationship to the board of an administrative officer.
Summary;

Pros and Cons

The arguments for an elected state board of education can be
summarized as follows:
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An elective board is stronger because it is more free
1.
An
to act and determine policy than an appointive board is.
elective board which appoints its own superintendent is in
the strongest position to implement its policies separately
from the executive arm of the government. 22

An elective state board, as a unique body in state
2.
government, highlights the distinct character and needs of
the educational system.

Election of a state board on a nonpartisan basis
3.
removes education to a large degree from politics, whereas
a board appointed by the governor becomes part of the gubernatorial political Ccimpaign and the ensuing political patronage.
4.
People take more interest in educational matters when
issues are publicized and board members elected. 23

Election, as the more democratic method, allows diverse
5.
interests to be reflected in educational policy-making.

An elective board is more responsive to the will of
6.
the people than an appointive board because the members are
elected to represent particular policy positions. 24

The primary arguements for an appointive state board of
education include:
1.
It is often possible to secure better school board
members by appointment. Many qualified people who would refuse
to become a candidate for election will accept the honor of
an appointment. 2 5

If members are appointed, the appointing authority
2.
can be held fully responsible to the people for actions of
the board. 26

The board is a body politic with certain established
3.
policies.
It is desirable that the members be appointed for
long, overlapping terms to provide some continuity of policy.
Such long-term members will be more interested in educational
matters and less involved in partisan politics. 27
4.
A board appointed by a governor is in a better position
to press for needed educational improvements and support than
a board constituted by other means.
5.
Elected board members feel they have a mandate from
the people to act on a particular issue (if the issue is one
on which they ran) .
There are undesirable results from action
of this sort:
(1) Members oftentimes usurp administrative
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duties of the superintendent in accomplishing the desired
policy change;
(2) Educational policies are kept in a state
of constant flux, retarding the growth of the educational
system. 28

Appointment of the board leads to more efficient
6.
administration of education and state government in general.
In considering alternative methods of selecting a state
school board, the final remarks of one study are worthy of
note:
In conclusion, it should be noted that no particular
method of selecting heads of educational agencies will guarantee
effective educational leadership. Of interest is a study of
school boards and superintendents conducted by Neal Gross.
He found that many school boards indulged in ineffective and
even irresponsible behavior, whether these bodies were appointed
or elected partisan or nonpartisan.
It was found that many
school board spend a good deal of their time considering petty
details rather than fundamental school problems, and that such
inadequacies result only in depriving children of a first-rate
education. Gross concludes that the cause of such a situation
does not lie in methods of selecting board members or superintendents, but with the citizens of the community.
It is the
people who ultimately will decide how effectively their
educational system29 shall function.
[Citations omitted]

—

Membership:

Ex Officio Status

The other major contention regarding selection of the state
board of education is whether ex officio members should sit on
the board.
Only five of the twenty-five states which create
a state board in their constitutions provide for ex officio
board membership.
In three of these states, it is the ex
officio membership alone which constitutes the board:

Florida
Governor (president of the board) ; superintendent
of education, (secretary of the board); secretary of state,
attorney general, treasurer.
;

Mississippi
Attorney general, secretary of state, superintendent of education.
:

Oklahoma
Governor, secretary of state, attorney general,
superintendent of education.
:
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Arguments for Ex Officio Membership
Those who propose a state board of education constituted of
partial or total ex officio membership maintain:
Ex officio membership of government officials should
1.
promote harmonious relations in educational administration.

Coordination of state education activities with other
2.
state activities is facilitated.
Arguments Against Ex Officio Membership
Those who maintain that a state board of education is bast
served without ex officio membership of executive constitutional
officials argue:

Administrative and policy-making functions should be

1.

separate.
2.
Ex officio membership of the governor, the chief state
school officer and the attorney general may tend to confuse the
legislative-executive functions of policy-making and administration and may introduce unnecessary conflicts, especially for
the chief state school officer.
3.
Ex officio membership of people holding certain
educational and/or governmental administrative positions may
allow them to pursue their own narrowly vested interests.

Membership:

Size, Terms and Representation

Three other characteristics of a state board of education which
may be specified in a constitution are the size of the board,
length of terms of office and representative character. To the
degree that the second factor (terms) is included in constitutions,
there seems to be general agreement on from four to eight years
overlapping terms.
The size of board membership varies greatly from three members
in Mississippi to twenty-three in Ohio.
Seven-member boards are
mentioned in twelve states. But a general trend shows a larger
board emerging—one composed of from nine to thirteen members.
Examples of typical constitutionally stipulated sizes for state
boards of education are the following:
Montana (eleven).
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North Carolina (thirteen)
Michigan (eight) New York (fifteen)
Oklahoma (four) and Mississippi (three)
Florida (five)
,

,

,

Arguments for a Large Board
Those who believe that a state board should consist of from
nine to thirteen members argue:
More representation is desirable.
1.
Small boards become
narrow in outlook and more subject to vested interests. -^^

Diverse opinion on educational policy should be expressed.
2.
There is a greater chance for a larger cross-section of opinion
on a larger board.

Arguments for a Small Board
Proponents of a state board with a membership of less than nine
contend:
1.

Large boards are unwieldy. 31

2.

No internal cliques can be formed in small boards.

3.

Sraall

boards are more efficient. ^^

Representative Character
Some constitutions specify the constituencies which board members
are to represent judicial or congressional districts for example.
Because the aim of such provisions is to attain equal geographic
or demographic representation on the board, it also has been
argued that one of the most important constituencies in education,
that of students, should be guaranteed representation in the
form of voting membership on the board. Whether any or all of
these matters are constitutional or statutory depends on the
character of the board envisioned by its creators.

—

Montana Situation
Article XI, Section 11 of the Montana constitution provides:

-194-

THE STRUCTURE OF EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION

The general control and supervision of the state
university and various other state educational institutions shall be vested in a state board of education,
whose powers and duties shall be prescribed and
regulated by law. The said board shall consist of
eleven members, the governor, state superintendent of
public instruction, and attorney general, being members
ex-officio; the other eight members thereof shall be
appointed by the governor; subject to the confirmation
of the senate, under the regulations and restrictions
to be provided by law."
The Montana Supreme Court has ruled that the Constitution "vests
in the state board general control over and supervision of all
state educational matters, including district and high schools. "33
The board receives its numerous statutory powers and duties in
Title 75, Chapter 56 of the Revised Codes of Montana 1947.
,

The board is one of two constitutionally created offices for
supervision of education in Montana. The other office, the
superintendent of public instruction, is created in Article
VII, Section 1 and assigned "such duties as are prescribed in
this constitution and by the laws of the state."
The assigned
statutory duties are contained mainly in Title 75, Chapter 57
of the Revised Codes of Montana 1947.
The Montana Supreme
Court has ruled that the superintendent, by statute, "has
supervision of all public schools of the state, subject go
general supervision of the state board [of education] ." ^4
,

The Commission on Executive Reorganization found:
In actual practice the State Board of Education exercises supervision over some educational programs and
in other cases gives routine approval to actions or
recommendations of the Superintendent of Public Instruction. ^5

The commission said the board devotes most of its time to the
university system, a duty legislatively assigned in Title 755606, Revised Codes of Montana
1947 (enacted in 1959)
which
designates board members as ex officio regents of the Montana
University system. The board, the commission said, generally
leaves most public school matters to the discretion of the
superintendent of public instruction. The commission further
noted that "lines of authority and control between the superintendent of public instruction and the state board of education]
in regard to elementary and secondary schools are presently
very unclear. "36
,

,

The 1971 executive reorganization [Title 82A, Revised Codes of
Montana 1947] did little to clarify the authority relationships
,
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in education.

The commission noted:

Because there are two constitutional agencies involved in education, the opportunity for change by
statutory means is limited.
However, it is believed
that, the two constitutional agencies notwithstanding
efforts should be made to clarify and centralize the
educational functions of the state in a single department. -^^

Although executive reorganization under Title 82A subsequently
transferred the board to, and made it head of the department
of education, very little actually changed. The department
which the board heads includes only the Historical Society,
State Library Commission and Montana Arts Council, while the
public school system remains under the control of the Office
of the Superintendent of Public Instruction, renamed as such
in the executive reorganization act.
Several previous attempts have been made to clarify and/or
modify the relationship between the state board and the office
of the superintendent.
In the Montana Constitution of 1884,
both the state board and the superintendent were elective [Art.
IX, Sec. 12 and Art. V, Sec. 2, respectively].
One of the
significant alterations made in the education article of the
Constitution of 1889, however, was the change from an elected
to an appointed board.
[Art. XI, Sec. 11].
In 1935 a constitutional amendment was proposed which also would have made the
board elective, but it did not reach the ballot.

Other efforts to establish clear lines of authority in education
have centered around the ex officio membership of the board.
In 1949, the legislature rejected a proposed amendment which
would have provided for a seven-member state board of education
appointed by the governor and excluding ex officio members.

Recent studies conducted by the Peabody Commission, ^8 the Durham
Commission, 39 and the Legislative Council^^ all have recommended
that if the present structure of the board is retained, the
three ex officio members (governor, attorney general and superintendent of public instruction) be removed in order to separate
policy-making from executive functions. The Peabody Report
made the following statement:
[t]he Superintendent sits as a voting member and
secretary of the board, and in effect, sits in judgment of himself when the discharge of board responsibilities by the superintendent or his staff is
This is neither sound or defensible
evaluated.
practice. ^^
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In 1958, a report by the Legislative council recommended a
constitutional amendment to Article XI, Section 11, to remove
the ex officio members from the state board of education.
The
report stated that the ex officio members (at that time) all
agreed with the Council that they should be relieved of their
duties in order to allow them more time to operate their
specific offices. '*2

Another 19 58 study. The Administration of Higher Education in
Montana by G. Homer Durham, removal of all ex officio members
from the state board of education.''-^ In 1959, an amendment
following the recommendations suggested by the previous reports
was passed by the legislature.
The amendment, however, was
kept off the ballot for procedural reasons, and thus was never
submitted to the people for a vote. Part of the amendment
passed by the legislature was as follows:
,

The general control and supervision of the public
free common schools shall be vested in a state
board of education. The said board shall consist
of eight members appointed by the governor.
[1959
Laws of Montana Ch. 191]
,

Again in 1965, another amendment proposed the removal of all
ex officio members from the state board of education by the
legislature.
The Durham Report, as noted in Chapter VII of this study, also
recommended consideration of a separate board of regents for
This proposal was adopted
the governance of higher education.
by the legislature as a part of the 1959 proposed constitutional
amendment mentioned above, but was never placed on the ballot.
There has been little attention paid in the studies of the
structure of Montana education to the questions of board size
and terms of office, suggesting that the existing provisions
are deemed satisfactory.

Alternatives Facing the Convention
With respect to the structure and powers of the state board of
education, the primary alternatives facing the Constitutional
Convention can be phrased in terms of the following questions:
1.

Should there be a constitutional provision establishing
(s) of education?

the state board

2.
If there is to be such a provision, should it create
one or two (or more) state boards of education?
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3.

Should such board or boards be elective or appointive

(or selected by some other means)?
4.
Should the powers of the board or boards be specified
If so, what should they be?
in the constitution?
5.

If so,

Should ex officio members sit on the board or boards?
in what capacity?

How many members should the board
6.
should be their terms of office?

(s)

have?

What

CHIEF STATE SCHOOL OFFICER
The other major component of a state educational administrative
framework is the chief state school officer, variously referred
to in state constitutions and statutes as the superintendent of
education, superintendent of public instruction or commissioner
of education.
The Montana title, superintendent of public
instruction, will be used in this discussion. Every state provides for the position of state superintendent either by
constitution or statute. New York established the first such
position in 1812. By the beginning of the twentieth century,
all states had either constitutional or statutory provision
for a state superintendent.

Beginning with modest responsibilities, the position of state
superintendent has evolved until today it has considerable
power and responsibility in many states.
However, other states
have given the position little responsibility or status, and
the position seems to vary in accordance with the strength of
the state board of education and the functions of the executive
branch in each particular state.
In most if not all states,
the superintendent heads the largest state agency, the education
department, which employs more personnel and spends more money
than any other single state administrative agency.

Thirty-three state constitutions establish the office of state
superintendent of schools, but almost none mentions the functions
of such an official.
The powers, functions and duties of the
superintendent generally are found in the statutes; they deserve
mention here because their scope gives a clearer idea of the
superintendent's role in public education and the nature of his
working relationship with the state board of education.
Activities of the chief state school officer may vary from
serving as administrative assistant to the policy-making board
and chief executor of the board's policy to functions in a much
broader capacity, sometimes involving discretionary authority.
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policy-making functions and service as chairman (rather than
administrative assistant) of the state board of education.
Generally, though, it might be said that the superintendent
acts as the chief administrative agent to the policy-making
board.
As the employer of a large, professionally trained
staff, the chief state school officer is the agent responsible
for general supervision of all public school matters, and is
In addition to carrying out those
accountable to the board.
administrative functions specifically delegated by the board or
provided for in legislation, the superintendent serves as
coordinator between the public educational system and the state
board of education. Charles Reeves points out:
As a trained expert in school administration, the
superintendent should fulfill the important function
of rendering his informed opinion, and furnishincj
professional advice to the board on matters of policy
that he believes need to be considered by it for
adoption, modification or repeal. ^^

Usually the superintendent's functions are greater in number
and broader in scope than those of the state board of education
with respect to the administration of public education. Truman
M. Pierce has outlined many of the areas in which the chief
state school officer may function:
1.

Executive officer of the state board of education;

Executive administrator of the state department of
education;
2.

3.

Overall supervisor of the public school system;

4.
Coordinator of the state department of education with
policy formulated by the state board of education;
5.
Administrator responsible for preparation of curriculum
guides, courses of study, issuance of teacher certificates,
enforcement of standards, direction of budgets;
6.
Distributor of state funds
and statutes)

(according to the constitution

7.

Interpreter of school law;

8.

Adjudicator in appealed controversies of local school

boards
9.
Spokesman in matters concerned with school policy,
educational aims and media. ^

-1
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In view of these myriad responsibilities, three major questions
arise with respect to the constitutional status of the superintendent. First, should the office of the superintendent be
included in a constitution at all? Secondly, if it is included,
what relationship should it have to the state board of education
and what corresponding powers should be constitutionally
specified? Thirdly, in connection with the second question, how
should the superintendent be selected?

Constitutional Establishment
A similar limitation applies to the constitutional establishment
of the office of a state superintendent as that described
earlier with respect to the state board of education namely
that specification of a particular office in the executive
branch depends to a significant degree upon how the executive
as a whole is structured.
Thus, the office of the superintendent
might well be treated, in terms of, for instance, the "long"
or "short" ballot, in a similar fashion to other major executive
officers, such as the attorney general and secretary of state.
For further discussion of this issue, see the study. The Executive
in this series of reports for the Montana Constitutional Convention.

—

,

However, as noted above, the unique character of education as
a state function and the particular relationship envisaged between
the superintendent and the state board of education also exercise
an important influence on the constitutional status of the
superintendent. Therefore, further considerations are warranted.

Relationship to State Board of Education
Neither the office of the state superintendent nor the state board
of education can be considered adequately without reference to
the other.
The general framework for education in a state must
include specified roles for both bodies which have governing
functions in education.
If the state board exercises strong
directive and policy-formulating functions, then the superintendent
will function primarily as the executor of the board's will; on
the other hand if the superintendent has a large amount of
executive independence, then the board will operate primarily
in an advisory capacity.
One important indicator of the relationship between the superintendent and the board is whether the superintendent sits on
the board, and, if so, in what capacity.
In all of those states
in which the superintendent is constitutionally established as
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ex officio chairman of the board of education (Indiana, Kentucky,
Mississippi, Missouri, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania and Washington),
the superintendent also is constitutionally established as an
elective officer, and the board is either not constitutionally
established or is established only on an appointive basis.
Thus, in these states the superintendent clearly is predominant.
On the other hand, in all of those states (except Louisiana)
which constitutionally provide for an elected state board,
(Colorado, Hawaii, Kansas, Michigan, Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio,
the board itself appoints the superintendent,
Texas and Utah)
who either serves on the board as secretary or may not sit on
In those cases the superintendent is quite
the board at all.
evidently subordinate to the board.
,

Other states have authority relationships which are not as
clearly structured as these, for instance either constitutional
or statutory appointment of both the superintendent and the
board.
As Table 1 indicates, however, the post-World War II trend
is clearly in the direction of increasing policy-making of the
state board vis-a-vis that of the superintendent. This is
evident in the fact that the number of elective state boards of
education increased from three in 1947 to eleven in 1969, while
the nximber of elective superintendents fell from thirty-one to
twenty in the same period. Moreover, the number of superintendents
appointed by state boards grew from eleven to twenty-six between
Hawaii provides the most prominent example of
1947 and 1970.
this transition by its change in the space of ten years from
an appointive to an elective state board and from a superintendent
who was a voting member of the board to one who is a nonvoting
secretary to the board. This trend generally is justified in
terms of the need to separate policy-making from administrative
functions. 46
The actual working relationship between the superintendent and
the state board is complex in any state.
Professional expertise,
public accountability, administrative efficiency, representation
of diversity and executive and legislative influence all have
bearing in varying degrees on each of the different issues
confronted by the board and the superintendent. General guidelines established by constitution or by statute can only set the
tone for the practical relationships, leaving the specific
responsibilities to be worked out on a day-to-day basis.

Method of Selection
There generally are two methods for selecting the state superof education.
One is direct popular election, for a term usually
consistent with that of the other constitutionally elected
officials; the other is appointment, either by the state board
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of education or by the governor.
At one time, the election of
the chief state school officer was the method used in most of
Today, only twenty states use this method, and
the states.
only six of these by constitutional language. Conversely, since
1947 the number of states having superintendents appointed by
the state board has grown from eleven to twenty-six, with four
additional states using gubernatorial appointment.
In other
words, in the past twenty-five years, approximately a dozen
states have changed from elective to appointive methods of
selecting their superintendent.
No state which has changed
from an elective to an appointive method has returned to the

elective method.
The reason most often suggested for the apparent increase in
popularity of appointment of the superintendent by the state
board of education is a relatively recent change in the
relationship between the chief state school officer and the
state board.
In the past, the superintendent, as an elected
official, commonly was charged with a many policy-making
functions, as well as administrative duties.
But Reeves notes
that:

Just recently the state board of education has
reawakened to its duty to reflect interest as a
body of laymen, and formulate the broad goals, and
determine the means of attaining them.^'
With this reawakening and the addition of new duties, which
are constantly increasing, the board has been required to
reassess its role as policy-maker and to separate administrative
functions from its own work.
By choosing its own administrator,
the board can insure efficient execution of its policies.
However, this pattern, of change, varies from state to state,
and in this like other educational matters, generalization is
difficult.

Arguments for Election of the Chief State School Officer
Proponents of the elective method of selecting a state superintendent of education maintain that:
A popularly elected chief state school officer more
1.
directly reflects the wishes of the people.
The autonomy of the chief state school officer and
2.
independence inherent in the elective method facilitates
efficiency and coordination.
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An elected official is directly accountable to the
3.
electorate.
4.
An elected official holding a constitutionally established
office can work directly for the educational needs of the state,
whereas one appointed by the governor may find himself competing
with other agencies and departments for priority.

In Montana, an elected chief state school officer has
5.
worked with ease and advantage in the structure of state government.

A single elected supervisor of an educational system
6.
combines the responsiveness of elected official with a unified
leadership lacking in multi-member body.
An elected superintendent allows for flexibility of
7.
policy with changes in administration through the elective process.
Arguments for an Appointed Chief State School Officer
Those who believe that an appointed chief state school officer,
particularly one appointed by the state board of education,
creates the best administrative system maintain that the appointive
method affords the following advantages:

Appointment affords freedom from time-consuming political
1.
activities (the election system results in excessive amount of
time spent on campaign activities) .^^
2.
The state board of education may obtain the most highly
qualified superintendent and replace incompetent ones. High
qualifications thus are maintained and enforced. ^^
3.
Continuity of programs is more easily established.
(The turnover of staff with each new elected officer causes
problems of continuity of policy, as well as technical diffi-

culties) 50
.

4.
In the relationship between the state board of
education and the superintendent, the locus of responsibility
Dualism in responsibility results from the election
is clearer.
of a superintendent and either election or appointment of the
state board of education.
Since the state board is suppose to
make policy and the superintendent is supposed to execute that
policy, the board should appoint the administrator. ^^

5.
Politically oriented educational officers may let
political biases affect decisions in educational policy development.
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The highest professional competence can be acquired
6.
through appointment, without losing the advantages of lay
control which is retained in the state board. On this point,
one commentator makes the following observations:
[T]he chief state school officer should be appointed
by the State Board of Education without regard to his
residence, his "politics" or any other extraneous
factor; in brief, he should be appointed wholly on the
basis of his ability to direct the state's system of
.^2
education
.

.

.

The election of a superintendent:
1.

Establishes residence restriction for candidates;

2.

Results in a low and static salary;

3.

Begets a short tenure for the officeholder;

Subjects the selection of candidates to the vicis4.
situdes of politics. ^2
Lee Chamberlain and L. Kindred, proponents of the appointive
method of selection, observe:

Students of educational administration contend that
the professional aspect of education should be
vested in a state superintendent of schools [who]
should be a trained executive responsible to
the state board of education and
therefore
should be appointed. ^^
.

.

.

Montana Situtation

Montana's Constitution creates the office of superintendent
of public instruction [Art. VII, Sec. 1] and provides that
the person who holds the office be elected on a basis similar
to that for other executive officeholders:
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The executive department shall consist of a governor,
lieutenant-governor, secretary of state, attorney
general, state treasurer, state auditor and superintendent of public instruction, each of whom shall
The officers of
hold his office for four years
the
lieutenantexcepting
department,
the executive
reside
terms
of
office
their
during
governor, shall
thev
shall
keep
the
where
government,
at the seat of
oerform
shall
paoers
Thev
and
public records, books
such duties as are prescribed in this constitution
[Art. VII, Sec. 1]
and by the laws of the state
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

The officers provided for in section 1 of this article,
shall be elected bv the qualified electors of the
[Art. VII, Sec. 2]
state
.

.

.

No person shall be eligible to the office of governor,
lieutenant-governor, or superintendent of public
instruction, unless he shall have attained the age of
[Art.
thirty years at the time of his election
VII, Sec. 3]
.

.

.

The superintendent of public instruction has no constitutional
grant of power except as a member of the state board of education [Art. XI, Sec. 11]. The manv specific powers, functions
and duties of the superintendent are defined bv statute,
generally Sections 75-5704 to 75-5709 of the Revised Codes of
Montana 1949. One of the more important grants of power is
found in Section 75-5709, where the superintendent is given
discretionary authority in appeals from local school board
controversies
,

For further discussion of the duties and powers of the
Montana superintendent of public instruction, see the studv
on the executive in this series of reports for the Montana
Constitutional Convention.

There have been many unsuccessful attempts in Montana to
change the status of the superintendent of public instruction
Fifty years ago. Governor
from elective to appointive.
"Let us nominate and elect the chief
Joseph Dixon stated:
executive of the state, then give him full power to name his
assistants in administering the various departments of state
"55 This proposal, which was not adopted.
government
.

.

.
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would have had the superintendent appointed by the governor.
In 1927, the concept of an appointed superintendent of public
instruction found its way to the Montana Legislature. An
amendment which would have had the superintendent appointed
by' the state board of education was rejected.
In 1947, although no constitutional amendment affecting the
mode of selecting the superintendent of public instruction
was proposed, report of the Joint Committee on State Governmental Organization stated:
"Present day administrative
reorganization is providing for fewer elective officials,
usually only three including the governor. "^^
In 1958, the Peabody Report stated that the "average lay
voter cannot judge the professional competence of the candidate
[for superintendent of public instruction] "^"^
However, no
recommendation was made by the Peabody Commission that this
office be made appointive. Another study in 1958, the Durham
Report, recommended that there be two governing boards for
education in Montana: a state board of public instruction
for public education matters and a board of regents for higher
education, composed either of ex officio members from the
other board or of independently selected members.
In this
framework, the Durham Report urged that the superintendent be
appointed by the state board of public instruction. ^°
.

No amendment recommending a change in the method of selection
of the superintendent appeared in the legislature the following
year, although an act was passed creating the ex officio board
of regents.
However, in 1960, the superintendent of public
instruction's biennial report pointed to the hazards of electing
a superintendent of public instruction and urged that the
"office of the superintendent of public instruction be removed
from partisan politics."
The solution recommended was a
change from election on a partisan to a nonpartisan basis.
A Legislative Council report in 1962 recommended that the
governor's authority over the executive branch should be
implemented by eliminating most elective officials including
the superintendent of public instruction.
In 1969, a
Montana Constitution Revision Commission subcommittee included
the superintendent in its recommended change from election to
appointment of all major state executive officials (except
the lieutenant governor) by saying:

The cornerstone of the proposed executive article is the
limitation of elective officials to two:
the governor and
the lieutenant governor who would be elected jointly to
four year terms.
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Clearly, questions of election or appointment of the state
superintendent and, of the superintendent's relationship to
the executive branch of government have been seen as part of
the overall question of the structure of the executive arm.
Thus, fundamental considerations in the status of the state
superintendent have to do with the framework specified in the
executive article of a constitution. This need not be controlling, however, because the office of the superintendent
can be removed from the executive article and placed in the
education article.
If the office of the superintendent were established in the
education article, then the need would be even greater to
specify the formal relationship between the superintendent
and the board of education.
As noted previously, the
relationship in Montana between the state board and the
Inclusion of
state superintendent is particularly unclear.
the superintendent's office in the education article still
would require resolution of the issue of whether the superintendent should be elected, appointed by the board or
Specification also would be
appointed by the governor.
called for of whether the superintendent should sit on the
board as a voting member, and if so, in what capacity.

The form chosen for the executive branch as a whole also
might determine the relationship between the state superintendent and the state bureaucratic framework for the
In Montana, a
administration of educational programs.
state department of public instruction was formerly created
by the following statute:
For the purposes of organization of the staff and
administration of the duties and services of the
superintendent of public instruction, there is hereby
created under the office of the superintendent of
public instruction a department of public instruction,
shall be
of which department the superintendent
Revised Codes
the executive and administrative head.
of Montana
1947, Sec. 75-1301, since repealed].
.

.

.

[

,

The 1971 Montana executive reorganization act did not include
the constitutionally elective executive offices in the
reorganization of the executive departments. The former
department of public instruction, however, found itself in
a somewhat nebulous situation.
As an office headed by an
elected official (the state superintendent)
which provided
to some degree the staff of that official, it would seem to
possess the same measure of independence as the staffs of
other elected officials.
On the other hand, as the largest
state department, both in terms of finances and personnel.
,
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and one which is responsible for the administration of a
major state program, it supplied significant grounds for
treatment as a state executive agency, rather than as the
staff of an elected official. The issue resulted in the
creation of two offices:
a department of education,
(1)
comprising the Montana Historical Society, the Board of
Regents, the Montana Arts Council, and the Montana State
Library Commission; and
the office of the superintendent
(2)
of public instruction, which essentially consists of the
former department of public instruction, including the major
administrative, regulatory, leadership, research, planning,
advisory and service functions for the administration of
education in Montana.

The specification of the functions of state education
departments or staffs in universally seen as a statutory
matter (only two state constitutions even mention such a
department)
However, the relationship among the superintendent, the staff, office, or department of education and
the other executive offices of state government affects the
relationship between the superintendent and the state board.
A superintendent with his own large staff is in a stronger
position in relation to the board than is a superintendent
who acts as the head of a state department of education.
.

Alternatives
The major alternatives facing the Constitutional Convention
concerning the office of the superintendent of public
instruction are best framed i.i. terms of the following questions;
1.
Should the office of the superintendent be
established in the constitution?

If so, should it be established as at present in
2.
the executive article, or should it be moved to the

education article?
3.
Should the superintendent be elected, appointed by
the state board of education or appointed by the governor?

4.
What relationship should the superintendent have to
the state board of education, i.e., chairman, secretary,
member, nonvoting member, nonmember; what functions of
the superintendent should be specified?
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LOCAL EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION
Local School Boards

Although education is formally a state responsibility and a
function, major responsibility for operating and controlling
the public schools has been delegated to the local level in
This delegation has been carried
all but one state (Hawaii)
out primarily through statutes, but several states have constitutional provisions on local administration of schools.
.

Local control of education had its origins in education
committees appointed by local governments. These committees
eventually took a general supervisory role in public education matters at the local level. At the end of the nineteenth
century, the school committees (or boards as thev later were
called) appointed school superintendents for administrative
From that time until now, the school board has been
matters.
viewed as the policy-making body, and the superintendent has
become the executive officer and chief administrator for the
The dimension and scope of responsibilities of the
board.
superintendent have increased greatly in recent years from
that of a clerical nature to responsibility for implementation
of the board's policies and, dav-to-day administrative details.

Newton Edwards, a school law authority, has commented:
vested with
is
The local board of education
far reading authority in practically all matters concerned with public elementary and secondary school
education
The grant of powers makes the board of
education a sovereign governmental body in the same
class as the board of county commissioners and the city
council. ^-^
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Because of these important functions carried out at the local
level, some states have established local boards and/or
administrators through constitutional provisions. Eight
states provide for local boards in provisions such as the
following
The Legislature shall provide for the
California
appointment or election of the state board of education
and a board of education in each county. [Sec. 7, Art. IX]
.

Kansas
Local public schools under the general supervision of the state board of education shall be maintained,
[Article
developed and operated by locally elected boards.
.

VI

,

Sec.

5]

.
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Colorado
The general assembly shall, by law provide
for organization and school districts of convenient
size, in each of which shall be established a board of
education to consist of three or more directors to be
elected by the qualified electors of the district. Said
directors shall have control of instruction in the
public schools of their districts.
[Art. IX, Sec. 15]
.

Utah.
In cities of the first and second class the
public school system shall be controlled by the Board
of Education of such cities, separate and apart from
the counties in which said cities are located.
[Sec. 6,
Art. X]

Virginia
The supervision of schools in each school
division shall be vested in a school board, to be composed of members selected in the manner
provided
by law. [Art. VIII, Sec. 7].
.

.

.

.

Montana's Constitution does not create local school boards.
This is in keeping with what appears to be a general trend
toward omitting local educational provisions from state
constitutions. Of the seven states which recently revised
their constitutions (Alaska, Hawaii, Michigan, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Florida and Illinois)
only Florida includes
a provision on local school boards [Art. IX, Sec. 4;:]
The
Model State Constitution ,^^ drafted by the National Municipal
League, contains no similar provision. However, if particular emphasis on a decentralized structure of local control
were desired, such a provision might be in order.
,

.

Local School Superintendents
The superintendent of schools serves as administrative head
of the county or district educational system and often as
the executive officer of the local board of education.
Just
as school boards may be based at the county or district level,
the superintendent of schools sometimes is a county official
and other times is a specially designated administrative
officer for one or more shcool district.
Early superintendents, sometimes known as school managers,
visitors or headmasters, assumed a relatively minor role in
the operation of schools.
However, the significance of the
position became more apparent as increasingly important
functions and responsibilities were assigned to it:
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Boards found it increasingly difficult to direct the
administrative affairs of the schools and delegated
As
more and more responsibility to superintendents
the process continued, the concept that the board
should be a policy-making body with the superintendent
as its executive officer gradually evolved. ^5
.

Twelve state constitutions contain provisions for local
school officers. Examples of such provisions are:
A superintendent of schools for each county
California
shall be elected by the qualified electors thereof at
each gubernatorial election; provided that the Legislature may authorize two or more counties to unite and
elect one superintendent for the counties so uniting.
.

[Art.

IX, Sec.

3]

Virginia
[The state board of education] shall
divide the Commonwealth into school divisions
[and] certify to the school boards of each division a
list of qualified persons for the office of division
superintendent of schools [Art. VIII, Sec. 5].
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Georgia
There shall be a County School Superintendent
who shall be the executive officer of the County Board
of Education.
He shall be elected
The qualifications and the salary of the County School Superintendent
shall be fixed by law. [Art. VIII, Sec. 6].
.

.

.

.

There may be a county superintendent of schools,
Colorado
in each county, whose term of office shall be four years,
and whose duties, qualifications and compensation shall
be prescrived by law
The office of county superintendent of schools may be abolished by a county at a
general election..
[Art. IX, Sec. 6].
.

.

.

.

.

.

Of states which recently have revised their constitutions,
(Alaska, Hawaii, Michigan, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, New
Hampshire, Missouri and Connecticut), none has a provision
creating a county superintendent or local superintendent of
schools. The Model State Constitution also contains no comparable provision.
Illinois removed constitutional specification of the county superintendent in its recent constitutional convention.

Montana Situation

Article XVI, Section

5

of the Montana Constitution establishes
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the office of the county superintendent of schools:
"There
shall be elected in each county the following county officers
one county superintendent of schools
.

.

..."

.

Accordingly, at a general election the qualified voters in
each county elect by popular vote a county superintendent.
Other constitutional provisions in Article XVI, Section 5 and
Article IX, Section 2 specify qualifications terms, methods
of filling vacancies, and so forth, for the office.

Article XVI, Section 5 was taken from Section 11, Article XIV
of the 1884 constitution.
In 1938 Section 5 was amended by
setting the qualifications and terms of office of the county
officials enumerated in the section. Numerous attempts have
been made to remove the county superintendent as an elected
constitutional officer; amendments introduced in 1933, 1937
and 1961 proposing elimination of this office from the constitution were rejected by the respective legislatures.
In
1958, the Peabody Report of the Msntana Taxation Education
Commission recommended that the legislature initiate a constitutional amendment to remove all reference to the county
school superintendent.^^ In 1969, two reports, the Montana
Legislative Council study or the Constitution and the Montana
Constitution Revision Commission report suggested deletion
of that part of Article XVI, Section 5 which creates the
superintendent of schools.^' Likewise, in 1970, a report by
Dr. Vernon Sletten of the University of Montana recommended
that the constitutional status of this office be abolished. °°
The argument over retaining the constitutional status of the
county superintendent of schools revolves primarily around
constitutional brevity and administrative flexibility on the
one hand and the importance of the office, on the other.
For
instance, Sletten, who calls for deletion of the office from
the constitution, argues:

Many constitutions that dictate the organizational
structure of both state and local governments create
an inflexibility of local government that outlives
any current applicability °9
.

Others, who favor retention of the constitutional establishment of the county superintendent's office, hold that the
superintendent provides a vital link to the county schools
and supplies assistance to small schools without superintendents or even principals. Of course the office could
still be retained by statute, but some proponents desire
the protection of a constitutional provision.
For further
discussion of constitutional questions concerning county
officials, see the local government study in this series of
reports for the Montana Constitutional Convention.
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PART III

FINANCE
a man owe a debt and Adad innundate his field and
carry away Tproduce^ or y through lack of water, grain
have not grown in the field, in that year he shall
not make any return of grain to the creditor

If

.

.

.

Prologue to
The Code of Hammurabi
King of Babylon
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Most of the issues in the field of educational financing
are of a statutory rather than a constitutional nature.
However, some very broad questions concerning state responsibility for supporting an educational system, equal educational
opportunity and the equality of economic burden do invite
constitutional treatment. These questions have been dealt
with at length in previous chapters. However, one other
important cluster of issues in educational financing remains
to be discussed those issues which have to do with specific
alternative school finance programs.

—

While very few states have constitutional provisions which
enter into educational financing in any great detail, many have
provisions which (1) carefully avoid clauses which might restrict
state flexibility in providing financial support for schools,
but (2) provide some general direction to the course of school
financing in a state. An example is the recently passed
Illinois Constitution, which provides in Article X, Section 1
"The state has the primary responsibility for financing
that:
the system of public education."
An example with somewhat more specificity is Virginia's 1971
Constitution:
The General Assembly shall determine the manner in
which funds are to be provided for the cost of maintaining an educational program meeting the prescribed
standards of quality, and shall provide for the apportionment of the cost of such program between the
Commonwealth and the local units of government composing such school divisions. Each unit of local
government shall provide its portion of such cost by
local taxes or from other available funds.
[Art. VIII,
Sec.

2]

Such provisions insure the commitment of the state to adequate
financing of education, indicate where the general thrust of
that financing will be and allow for sufficient adaptability
of the state to cope with economic and social change.
The
specifics of the distribution of burdens and benefits are
left for the legislatures to provide according to what may
be constantly changing criteria.
The needs and structures of
education vary from state to state; constitutional provisions
vary accordingly. No single formula can anticipate the
requirements of a particular state. Considerations of constitutional language should take into account the existing
structure of educational financing in a state, desired goals
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to be attained through financing and potential alternative
financing programs. What follows is a general discussion of
these points in relation to Montana's system for educational
financing.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Education as an Investment
The traditional view of the cost of education as a drain on
society a sort of necessary evil is being replaced by an
economic view of education as an investment in social wealth.
Many economists are emphasizing that beyond the very important
functions of education in developing the full personality of
the individual and the competence of the citizen, there lies
a fundamentally economic side of education comparable to any
other investment of resources to expand an economic base.
Martin O'Donoghue, for instance, has analyzed the general
relationship between economic return and given levels of
educational investment.

—

—

Walter Heller reports:
[P]rivate research to date suggests that the average
rate of return on investment in formal education as
a whole is higher than the rate of return for business
investment.

Similarly, John Kenneth Galbraith observes:
[A] dollar or a rupee invested in the intellectual
improvement of human beings will regularly bring a
greater increase in national income than a dollar
or a rupee devoted to railways, dams, machine tools,
or other tangible capital goods.

Howard Jones concludes:
Over and above [the non-monetary] results of
education which by themselves are justification for
the investment- -are related outcomes which have an
economic significance in increased economic productivity, justifying the assertion that the money invested
in education results in a yield in monetary dividends
which more than repays the principal invested.

—

**

One study shows that the contribution of education to economic
growth between 1929 and 1957 actually exceeded the contribution

-220-

FINANCING EDUCATION

of physical capital in the same period. 5 Thus, there seems to
be little disagreement on the causal relationship between
educational investment and increases in economic productivity.
It follows that tax support of education, in contrast to many
other public expenditures, can be seen as a tax investment in
society, rather than as a tax outlay for a nonrepayable social
service.

National Trends in Support
Since 1900, there have been great increases in the total funds
devoted to education, but the increase has been only moderate
when viewed in terms of real dollars or as percentage of the
gross national product (GNP)
Werner Hirsch concludes from
an analysis of educational expenditures from 1900 to 1S58:
.

Costs in real terms exhibit amazing stability during
1900-1958. For the years for which data are available,
1922 was the low year with $1.37 daily expenditure per
pupil, and 1913 was the high year with $1.60. Over
the 58 years, an overall decline of about 3 per cent
was registered.^
Similarly, Tables 1 and 2 show that, while expenditures per
pupil more than doubled between 1950 and 1965, the national
expenditures for education rose only from 2.1 to 3.4 percent
of the GNP.

How much should the nation spend on education? The answer
appears to be the product of at least three complex factors:
the importance placed on noneconomic returns from education,
such as human enlightenment and an informed citizenry, the
economic returns to society from educational investment and
the nation's ability to provide support. On the present trends
in educational support, Jones observes:
[T]he average annual growth rate of school expenditures
during the last ten years has been 1.7 times the
average annual rate of increase in the gross national
product. These figures attest a growing effort to
support education but it is not an extraordinary
effort.
There were many years in the depth of the
depression when educational costs were more than 3.5
per cent of the gross national product.^

—

Jones suggests that in order to support education adequately
in the future, 4 to 5 percent of the annual increase in the
gross national product must be channeled into education.
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TABLE

1

TOTAL AND PER PUPIL EXPENDITURES FOR PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND
SECONDARY EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES, SELECTED YEARS,
1949-50 to 1965-66

Total
expenditures

School year
1949-50
1951-52
1953-54
1955-56
1957-58
1959-60
1961-62
1963-64
1965-66

$

5,837,643,000
7,344,237,000
9,092,449,000
10,955,047,000
13,569,163,000
15,613,255,000
18,373,339,000
21,444,434,000
25,824,635,000

Expenditures
per pupil in
average daily
attendance
$259
313
351
388
449
472
530
573
659

Source:
U. S., Office of Education, "Progress of Public
Education in the United States of America 1963-64," Report
of the Office of Education, U. S. Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare to the Twenty-Seventh International
Conference on Public Education, Geneva, Switzerland, July
7-17, 1964 (Washington:
U. S. Government Printing Office,
Table 12 P 18.
1964)
,

,

.
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TABLE 2
THE INCREASE IN THE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, SELECTED YEARS 1950-1964, AND THE
EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES FOR PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS AS PERCENT
OF THE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT

I
N
N

w
I

Calendar
year

Gross National
product

School
year

Expenditures
for education

Educational
Expenditures
as per cent of
gross national
product

1950
1952
1954
1956
1958
1960
1962
1964

$284,599,000,000
346,999,000,000
363,112,000,000
419,180,000,000
444,546,000,000
502,601,000,000
556,199,000,000
633,500,000,000
(Est.)

1949-50
1951-52
1953-54
1955-56
1957-58
1959-60
1961-62
1963-64

$ 5,837,643,000
7,344,237,000
9,092,449,000
10,955,047,000
13,569,163,000
15,613,255,000
18,169,057,000
21,444,434,000

2.1
2.1
2.5
2.6
3.1
3.1
3.3
3.4

Source: Figures for the gross national product (in millions of dollars) taken
from U. s. Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics, "National
Income and Product, 1963" Survey of Current Business XLV (January 1965): 15.
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Whether this will occur depends on competing governmental
programs in roads, space, military affairs, health and other
services:
In the final analysis the question is one of values.
As a nation the United States spends more for
recreation, more for transportation, and more for
tobacco and alcoholic beverages than it does for
education.

However, education presently does hold a high position in
relation to spending for other governmental activities, as
indicated by Tables 3 and 4.

Sources of Support
The largest single source of revenue for educational purposes
Table 5 shows that local
is still the local property tax.
sources of revenue for education outweigh state and national
sources in most states and in the nation as a whole. Property
taxes contribute approximately 87 percent of total revenue
derived from local sources. ^ However, property taxes have
declined substantially in this century as a producer of state
and local revenue, as shown in Table 6, which provides a breakdown by soiirce of state and local government receipts between
1929 and 1966.

Property Tax Versus Other Taxes
There is substantial disagreement among economists over the
merits of the property tax as a substantial source of state
Burkhead, for instance, contends that it
and local income.
is a viable form of taxation:

On the whole, the statistical findings here support
the conclusion that the property tax is a far better
fiscal instrument than most of its critics have
allowed.
There is every reason to believe that it
will continue to hold its relative fiscal importance
This wilx
in state-local public finance structures.
be accomplished by the increases in the base of
property subject to taxation and by increases in the
rate of tax.^O
On the other, Garvue catalogs many of the difficulties which
arise with property taxation:
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TABLE 3
TREND IN DISTRIBUTION OF TAX RESOURCES FOR SELECTED FUNCTIONS OF ALL GOVERNMENT
(FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL) (GENERAL EXPENDITURES IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

1942

FUNCTION

I
N
N
V1
I

TOTAL
National defense and
international relations
Education
Natural resources
Highways
Interest on general debt
Health
Hospitals
Postal system
Public welfare
Police protection
All other

1950

AMOUNT

PERCENTAGE OF
TOTAL

$43.5

100.0

26.6
2.7
2.5
1.8
.2
.9
.5

.9
1.3
.4
5.7

61.14
6.20
5.74
4.13
0.45
2.06
1.14
2.06
2.98
0.91
13.10

1960

AMOUNT

PERCENTAGE OF
TOTAL

$60.7

100.0

18.4
9.6
5.0
3.8
4.9
.7
2.0
2.3
3.0
.9
JO. I

30.31
15.81
8.23
6.26
8.07
1.15
3.29
3.78
4.94
1.48
16.63

1965

AMOUNT

PERCENTAGE OF
TOTAL

$128.6

100.0

47.5
19.4
8.4
9.5
9.3
1.0
4.2
3.7
4.5
2.0
19.1

36.93
15.08
6.53
7.38
7.23
0.77
3.26
2.87
3.49
1.55
14.85

1966

AMOUNT

PERCENTAGE OF
TOTAL

AMOUNT

PERCENTAGE OF
TOTAL

$174.0

100.0

$189.4

100.0

55.8
30.0
11.0
12.3
11.4
1.8
5.9
5.3
6.4
2.8
31.3

32.06
17.24
6.32
7.06
6.55
1.03
3.39
3.04
3.67
1.60
17.98

60.8
34.8
10.3
12.9
12.3
2.1
6.3
5.7
7.0
3.0
34.2

32.10
18.37
5.43
6.81
6.49
1.10
3.32
3.00
3.69
1.05
18.05

Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States. Washington, D.C., Bureau of
the Census, 1967.

TABLE 4
~rend in Distribution of Tax Resources for Selected Functions of State and Local
Governments (General or Direct Expenditures in Billions of Dollars)

1942

FUNCTION

I

1965

1966

PERCENT-

PERCENT-

PERCENT-

PERCENT-

AGE OF

AGE OF

AGE OF

AQE OF

PERCENTAGE OF

TOTAL

AMOUNT

TOTAL

AMOUNT

TOTAL

AMOUNT

1ldrAL

AMOUNT

TOTAL

S9.2
2.6

100.0
28.2
2.1
16.3
2.1
4.2
13.0
4.2
2.1

S22.8

100.0

$51.9

100.0

582.8

31.5
3.0

18.7

36.0

$74.5
28.6

100.0

7.2
.7

38.3

33.3

100.0
39.1

2.2

3.8

16.8

2.4
14.8

A
1.4

6.1

.5

3.5
2.1

2.1

.8

3.5
2.1

2.0
12.3
.9
5.0
6.8
2.8
1.4
2.6
1.4

1.4
3.2
12.2

Education
Natural resources

N
N
<Tl

1960

AMOUNT

TOTAL

I

1950

.2

Highways
Health

1.5
.2

Hospitals
Public welfare
Police
Fire protection
Sanitation and sewage
Housing and urban renewal
Local parks and

.4
1.2
.4
.2
.2
.2

2.1

.5

recreation
Interest OP general debt
All other

.I
.6
1.3

1.1
6.5
14.1

.3
.5

2.9
.8

3.1

1.7
12.7

1.2
9.4
.6
3.2
4.4
1.9
1.0
1.7
.9

1.3

.8

2.1
13.6

l.7
6.5

2.3

I 8.1
I. I
6.1

1.7
12.2

.s

16.3
1.0

3.6

4.5
6.3
2.5

1.9

1.3

3.2

2.4

1.7
3.2

1.6

1.3

1.7

1.5
3.2
12.5

1.1

1.4

1.2

2.5
9.3

3.3

2.7

12.4

10.l

8.4

6.0
8.4

3.3

1.0
6.0
8.2

3.3
1.8
3.1

1.8

SOURCE: Statistical Abstract of the United States. Washington, D. C., Bureau of
the Census, 1967, p. 423.

TABLE 5
PERCENTAGES OF REVENUE ESTIMATED FROM FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL SOURCES, 1965-66

PERCENT OF REVENUE FROM

PERCENT OF REVENUE FROM
Federal
Sources

State
Sources

Local
Sources

United States,
total
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California

7.8%
15.4
27.5
13. 3
20.1
6.4

39 .1%
60.8
51. 4
36.3
43.4
38.5

53 .1%
23.8
21.1
50.4
36.5
55.0

Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey

Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia

8.9
5.1
5.7
9.4
12.0

24.6
32.8
75.5
48.8
61. 4

66.4
62.0
18.9
41. 8
26.6

Hawaii
Idaho
I 11 inois
Indiana
Iowa

11. 2
7.5
5.7
5.7
4.7

61. 5
38.5
22.9
37.1
13. 5

Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland

8.3
14.2
6.0
10.8
7.3

Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri

9.6
6.1
6.5
20.0
8.5

State

I
Iv
Iv

State

Federal
Sources

State
Sources

Local
Sources

8.0
7.2
8.2
6.1
4.5

27.9
5.9
51. 9
10.7
21. 2

64.1
86.9
39.9
83.2
74.4

New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio

13.6
6.0
11. 8
7.6
5.0

65.3
44.2
65.9
26.1
27.4

20.9
49.8
22.3
66.3
67.6

27.3
54. 0
71. 3
57.3
81. 8

Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina

14.1
7.9
7.1
7.6
17.3

29.4
26.5
41. 7
31. 6
59.7

56.6
65.6
51. 2
60.8
23.0

21. 6
52.0
69.2
29.0
32.0

70.1
33.8
24.8
60.2
60.6

South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont

17.0
11. 7
7.0
9.0
8.3

11. 9
49.5
52.0
49.0
26.2

71.0
38.7
40.9
42.1
65.4

22.1
43.9
38.0
51. 0
31. 8

68.3
50.0
55.6
29.1
59.7

Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

11.1
6.1
7. 2
7. 4
6.3

39.4
58.3
52.1
23.8
42.0

49.5
35.6
40.7
68.8
51.7

-.J

I

Source:
Data from National Education Association, Estimates of School Statistics,
1965-66, Research Report 1965-Rl7 (Washington, 1965), Table 10, p. 32.

TABLE

6

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT RECEIPTS, SELECTED YEARS,
1929-1966
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[Property taxes] have necessitated recourse to shortterm financing to cover operating deficits, which
ultimately had to be funded. They have encouraged
long-term borrowing for activities that might have
better been financed out of current revenue. They
have necessitated extensive special legislation in
some states to relieve individual jurisdictions,
thereby in effect shifting the local governing bodies
appropriating function to state legislatures. They
have impaired the ability of local officials to budget
effectively where specific limitations apply to
particular governmental functions. They have imposed
onerous burdens on administrative agencies and added
to the already overcrowded dockets of the courts.
Where property tax limitations are especially rigid
and communities have reached their tax limit, assessors
are often subjected to conflicting pressures from
governing bodies seeking additional property tax
revenue and from taxpayers who wish to prevent property
They are thus forced into policytaxes from rising.
making positions with control over the level of local
governmental spending. ^^

Local Versus State Support
Even more important than the disputes over particular sources
of revenue (property tax or other forms of taxation) is the
issue of locus of the funding authority state or local.
Traditionally, the fundamental revenue source for local schools
However, there has been a strong
was the school district.
movement toward increased state financing of schools. The recent
Serrano decision, discussed in Chapter IV, of this study, has
added a great deal of legal impetus to this movement.

—

Plans to transfer almost all funding of the public school system
to the state level are under consideration in most states.

Future decisions in the courts may make the question a moot
one; however, at present the prospect of state funding is still
The major arguments for a change to primarily state
debated.
funding of schools are based on the need for equal educational
opportunity and for a sufficient and stable source of financial
support. One source sununarizes the points in favor of state
financing as follows:
It would tend to equalize tax ratios throughout
1.
the state.
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It would permit redrawing of school district
2.
boundaries into more efficient units without so
great a concern for tax consequences.
,

It would permit all districts to benefit from
3.
the taxes paid by industry.
4.
The burden of tax free property in districts
would be equalized.

It would permit local school boards and administrators to concentrate their energies on educational
matters rather than the yearly fight for budgets and
bond issues.
5.

It would produce a level of educational opportu6.
nity that would be more equal throughout the State
for all children. 12

Critics of the move to state financing argue that such a system
would detract from the quality of some schools and would remove
These
a substantial degree of power from local school boards.
views are articulated in one source as follows:
[State funding] would lead to greatly increased state
control of public schools. It is almost axiomatic^
that the agency which provides the funds is in a
position to exercise a large measure of control

....

While substantially full support might improve the
programs of inferior schools, it would lower the
quality of education in the better schools and make
it impossible for local citizens to restore these
quality programs despite their willingness to do so.
Local citizens might well show less interest in the
welfare of their schools if they are frustrated in
their efforts to improve their prograuns . ^ *
Tax Effort
States vary areatly in their total rates of taxation and in the
taxes levied for the support of education. These differing tax
rates combined with large disparities in average per capita
income reveal significant differences in tax efforts and in
corresponding revenues available for education. Table 7 compares
the states in terms of general and educational revenues as a
percentage of personal income, showing a high of 8.9 percent
in New Mexico to a low of 5 percent in Nebraska.

-230-

TABLE 7
EFFORTS OF THE STATES TO SUPPORT STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL
FUNCTIONS IN RELATION TO THEIR FISCAL CAPACITY , 1969

Stat, 11nd Local
Ge1iera.l

N,t
Persona l
ln<"ome

Stat,

I
[\J

w
......
I

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
lllinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
l\laine
.Maryland
l\1assachusetts
l\lichigan
Minnesota
Mississippi

(I Million,<)

5,669
950
3,879
3,157
60,198
5,233
9,626
1,502
14,857
9,425
2,135
1,346
33,992
13,197
6,88!)
5,787
6,046
6,681
1,984
10,784
16,107
24,258
9,3!)1
3,048

General
Revenue
of Stat,
and Loral
Govt'rnmcnt,
From Own
So urcc,.,b
(I Million,)

1,1 22
183
826
584
12,822
1,052
1,394
281
2,7 40
1,685
466
299
4,898
2,179
1,352
1,034
1,171
1,547
359
1,879
2,841
4,6!)4
1,954
763

Sic.Le and
Local
Rei,enue for
Etementaru

Revenue
of State
and Local
Government..
a, a

and
Seconda ry

P~rcentage

Educationc-

Pcraonal
Income

(I Mill,o n.,)

31 2
59
299
1!)4
3,900
346
543
108
!>41
541
136
96
1,831
864
484
386
347
498
128
729
840
1,563
691
239

of Net

19.79
19,26
21.29
18.50
21.30
20 ,10
14.48
18.71
18.44
17.88
21.83
22,21
14.41
16.5 1
19.63
17.87
19,37
23.16
18.09
17.42
17.64
19.35
20.81
25.03

(22)
(27)
(11)
(30)
(10)
(20)
(4!))
(28)
(31)
(34)
( 7)
( 6)
(50)
(43)
(23)
(35 )
(24)
( 5)
(32)
(38)
(37)
'( 26)
(15)
( 3)

Elementt1r11
and Secondary
Education
~a
Percentage
of N,t
l'eraonal
Income

5.50
6.21
7.71
6.15
6.48
6.61
5.64
7,19
6,33
5.74
6.37
7.13
5.39
6.55
7.03
6,67
5.74
7.45
6.45
6.76
5.22
6.44
7,36
7.84

(43)
(30)
( 6)
(31)
(23)
(19)
( 41)
(11)
(27)
(38)
(26)
(13)
(45)
(21)
(14)
(17)
(38)
( 9)
(24)
(16)
(48)
(25)
(10)
( 5)

Revenue for
Elementaru
a. fld S£rondaru
Educat ion a.a
a 1~crcentage

of G,ncral
f{et•<nu e of
State and Local
Got'ernmcnt."
From Ou:n
Souree!J

27.81
32.24
36,20
33,22
30.42
32.8!)
38.95
38.43
34.34
32.11
2!).18
32.11
37,38
39.65
35.80
37.33
2!>.63
32, I!)
35.65
38.80
29.57
33.30
35.36
31.32

(47)
(32)
(16)
(27)
(40)
(28)
( 4)
( 7)
(24)
(34)
(45)
(34)
(10)
( 2)
(17)
(12)
(42)
(33)
(20)
( 6)
(43)
(213)
(21)
(37)

TABLE 7 (Continued)

I
N

w

N
I

Mis!>_uri
Montanr.
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New ;llexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oldaroma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
,Ctah
Vermont
· Yirginia
Washington
\Yest Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

11,036
1,476
3,739
1,434
1,696
21,834
1,898
58,080
9,924
1,260
28,278
5,280
5,025
29,954
2,409
4,370
1,387
7,196
24,513
2,096
983
10,374
9,137
2,961
10,792
764

1,758
312
693
285
263
3,406
473
12,472
1,721
322
4,196
1,022
1,025
4,739
403
786
302
1,284
4,086
443
198
1,796
1,845
602
2,262
196

609
119
187
85
91
1,248
169
4,057
585
90
1,499
299
403
1,842
124
291
82
422
1,331
176
74
652
571
226
713
50

15.93
21.14
18.53
19.87
15.51
15.60
24.92
21.47
17.34
25.56
14.84
19.36
20.40
15.82
16.73
17.99
21.77
17.84
16.67
21.14
20.14
17.31
20.19
20.33
20.96
25.65

TOTAL U.S.

514,043

95,011

32,069

18.48

(44)
(12)
(29)
(21)
(47)
(46)
~ 4)
( 9)
(39)
( 2)
(48)
(25)
(16)
(45)
(41)
(33)
( 8)
(36)
(42)
(12)
(19)
( 40)
(18)
(17)
(14)
( 1)

5.52
8.06
5.00
5.93
5.37
5.72
8.90
6.99
5.89
7.14
5.30
5.66
8.02
6.15
5.15
6.66
5.91
5.86
5.43
8.40
7.53
6.28
6.25
7.63
6.61
6.54
6.24

(42)
( 3)
(50)
(33)
(46)
(39)
( 1)
(15)
(35)
(12)
(47)
(40)
( 4)
(31)
( 49)
(18)
(34)
(36)
(44)
( 2)
( 8)
(28)
(29)
( 7)
(19)
(22)

34.64
38.14
26.98
29.82
34.60
36.64
35.73
32.53
33.99
27.95
35.72
29.26
39.32
38.87
30.77
37.02
27.15
32.87
32.57
38.73
37.37
36.30
30.95
37.54
31.52
25.51

(22)

( 8)
(49)
(41)
(23)
(14)
(18)
(31)
(25)
(46)
(19)
( 44)

( 3)
( ,; )
(39)
(13)
(48)
(29)
(30)
( 1)
( 11)

(15)
(38)
( 9)
(36)
(50)

33.75

Source: National Educational Finance Project; Alternative Programs For
Financing Education. Gainesville, Florida, Vol. 5, 1971. pp. 74-75.
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MONTANA SITUATION
More sections of the Education Article [Art. XI] in the
Montana Constitution are devoted to educational financing
than to any other single subject:
It shall be the duty of the legislative
Section 1.
to establish and maintain a general,
Montana
of
assembly
system of public, free, common
thorough
and
uniform
schools.

Section 2. The public school fund of the state shall
consist of the proceeds of such lands as have heretofore been granted, or may hereafter be granted, to the
state by the general government known as school lands;
and those granted in lieu of such; lands acquired by
gift or grant from any person or corporation under any
law or grant of the general government; and of all
other grants of land or money made to the state from
the general government for general educational purposes,
or where no other special purpose is indicated in such
grant; all estates, or distributive shares of estates
that may escheat to the state; all unclaimed shares and
dividends of any corporation incorporated under the laws
of the state, and all other grants, gifts, devises or
bequests made to the state for general educational
purposes.

Section 3. Such public school fund shall forever remain
inviolate, guaranteed by the state against loss or
diversion, to be invested, so far as possible, in public
securities within the state, including school district
bonds, issued for the erection of school buildings,
under the restrictions to be provided by law.
Section 4. The governor, superintendent of public
instruction, secretary of state and attorney general
shall constitute the state board of land commissioners,
which shall have the direction, control, leasing and
sale of the school lands of the state, and the lands
granted or which may hereafter be granted for the
support and benefit of the various state educational
institutions, under such regulations and restrictions
as may be prescribed by law.
Section 5. Ninety-five per centum (9 5%) of all the
interest received on the school funds of the state,
and ninety-five per centiim (95%) of all rents received
from the leasing of school lands and of all other income
from the public school funds shall be apportioned
annually to the several school districts of the state in
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proportion to the number of children and youths
between the ages of six (6) and twenty-one (21)
residing there in respectively, but no district shall
be entitled to such distributive share that does
not maintain a public free school for at least six
months during the year for which such distribution is
made.
The remaining five per centum (5%) of all
the interest received on the school funds of the
state, and the remaining five per centum (5%) of
all the rents received from the leasing of school
lands and of all other income from the public school
funds, shall annually be added to the public school
funds of the state and become and forever remain an
inseparable and inviolable part thereof.
It shall be the duty of the legislative
Section 6.
assembly to provide by taxation, or otherwise, sufficient means, in connection with the amount received
from the general school fund, to maintain a public,
free common school in each organized district in the
state, for at least three months in each year.

Section 12. The funds of the state university and
of all other state institutions of learning, from
whatever source accruing, shall forever remain
inviolate and sacred to the purpose for which they
were dedicated. The various funds shall be respectively invested under such regulations as may be
prescribed by law, and shall be guaranteed by the
state against loss of diversion. The interest of
said invested funds, together with the rents from
leased lands or properties shall be devoted to the
maintenance and perpetuation of these respective
institutions.
In addition, several sections elsewhere in the Constitution have
The most significant
an important bearing on educational finance.
of these are Article XII, Sections la and 9:

Section la. The legislative assembly may levy and
collect taxes upon incomes of persons, firms and
corporations for the purpose of replacing property
These income taxes may be graduated and
taxes.
progressive and shall be distributed to the public
schools and to the state government.
The rate of taxation on real and personal
Section 9.
property for state purposes, except as hereinafter
provided, shall never exceed two and one-half mills
on each dollar of valuation; and whenever the
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taxable property of the state shall amount to six
hundred million dollars ($600,000,000.00) the rate
shall never exceed two (2) mills on each dollar of
valuation, unless the proposition to increase such
rate, specifying the rate proposed and the time during
which the rate shall be levied shall have been submitted to the people at the general election and
shall have received a majority of all votes cast for
and against it at such election; provided, that in
addition to the levy for state purposes above provided
for, a special levy in addition may be made on live
stock for the purpose of paying bounties on wild
animals and for stock inspection, protection and
indemnity purposes, as may be prescribed by law, and
such special levy shall be made and levied annually
in amount not exceeding four mills on the dollar by
the state board of equalization, as may be provided
by law

The primary concerns articulated in these provisions, briefly
summarized are (1) that the state insure full support of a
public school system; (2) that the source of this support be
secure and productive, and (3) that state funding be distributed on an equitable basis. Guided by these provisions, the
state has developed a program for financing the public school
system composed of three major elements: the interest from the
public school fund and income from school lands; county and
school district taxation, and state income and other taxation.
The total funding system for public schools in Montana may
best be described in the form of diagrams in Tables 8 and 9
indicating the component parts.
Beyond the revenues raised
by the basic county property tax levies (25 mills for elementary and 15 mills for high schools), the state contributes
interest and income monies, earmarked tax funds and direct
appropriations to bring school districts up to a basic minimum
level--or foundation of funding. To the degree that this
support is still inadequate to maintain a basic educational
program, as it is in most cases, the schools must rely on county
deficiency levies, district permissive levies and district
voted levies to make up the difference. Tables 10 and 11 show
the performance of the state foundation program between 19 61
and 1971. Table 12 shows the variation in the composite funds
in the foundation program during the same period.

—

As indicated by the tables, the existing foundation program
still leaves a preponderant burden for school financing on
the local level; on the average more than 70 percent of school
funding derives from local sources.
More than 30 per cent of
this funding over the past ten years has come from district
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TABLE

8

SOURCES OF REVENUE FOR SCHOOL DISTRICT GENERAL FUND
BUDGET SUPPORT

General Fund Revenue

hOLindacio;-.

I'ermisslve
ILevy (District]

'

Interest and
Income (State]

"Basic
;o.

Levy

Voted Levy
(District)

J

Program
(State and
Count

County
Equalization

Forest
Funds

i

j

Taylor
Grazing

eflciency
Levy (County)

>lisc.

Collec,

CasH
Reapprop

Earmarkec
Revenue

Direct
Approp,

50% of

of Corp.
Lie. Tax

/U.S^ 01 1\

/ana

fta?

>

'Royalties

/
/L.

Source:
A Study of Basic Educational Funding, Methodology
in Montana; January 1972, (Working Draft) Dolores Colburg,
Office of Superintendent of Public Instruction.
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TABLE

9

SCHOOL FINANCING UNDER PROVISIONS OF 1969
FOUNDATION PROGRAM LAW

F.LKMKNTAUY SCHOOLS

TOTAL

G1:NEI?AL

FUND CUDOKT

MAXIMUM PERMISSIVE BUDGET

X

ucr n^ii:.i><-/ i ^\
a J Alt, DEFICIENCY
s^ STATE
vX
x;
County Levy

x;;;

-FOUNDATION PltOGRAM
(80% of Maximum
Permissive Budget)

•^ V.W\\\WVW nX
STATE EQUALIZATION

^:

:

COUNTY EQUALIZATION

SJ'ATK OEFICIENCV
Counly Levy

STATE EQUALIZATION
;

(Basic 25-mill County levy)

COUNTY EQUALIZATION
(Basic 15-mill County levy)

INTEREST & INCOME

SHADED AREAS INDICATE
PROPERTY TAXES

Source: Here's How! (it works)
Montana Education
Association, Helena, Montana, 1970. p. 8.
,
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TABLE 10

PUBLIC SCHOOL REVENUE - AMOUNT FROM EACH SOURCE
1961-62 through 1969-70

ToCal Revenue
All Funds

PUBLIC SCHOOL REVENUE - PERCENT FROM EACH SOURCE
1961-62 through 1969-70

.80--

'

Local

.60--

.50--

°
c
o

.40-

o
Oi
o

.30--

fi

-.20--

I

State

.10--

—

-* Federal

H
1961

62

H
63

64

6S

66

67

68

69

Year

Source: Annual Report of the Office of Superintendent of
Public Instruction, 1970-71.
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TABLE 11

PUBLIC SCHOOL REVENUE - AMOUNT FROM EACH SOURCE
1961-62 through 1969-70

140General Fund
Budget

Foundation Prograoi
Revenue

Voted Levy Revenue

Pemissive Levy Revenue

PROPORTIONAL DISTRIEUTIOM OF GENERAL FLIiD REVENUE BY
SOURCE 1961-62 through 1970-71

.80-^

Foundation Program
Revenue
.60

•

50-r

.40--

.30-Voted Levy Revenue
"•permissive Levy Revenue

4

-1-

1961

62

63

64

65

66

1-

67

68

69

70

Year

Source: Annual Report of the Office of Superintendent of
Public Instruction, 1970-71.
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TABLE 12

FOUNDATION PROGRAM AMOUNTS AND FUNDING REVENUE
BY SOURCE 1961-62 through 1970-71

100

—

Amount of
Foundation
riogram

County
Equalization Aid

State Equalization
Aid Actual Payment
,

Foundation
Program
Revenue

County
Deficiency Levy
I & I Actual
Paymen t

1961

J

62

Source: Annual Report of the Office of Superintendent of
Public Instruction, 1970-71.
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taxes levied above and beyond the foundation program support.
Local wealth thus remains a major factor in school financing.
Table 13 provides a graphic illustration of the large disparities in per pupil expenditures and tax burdens in a sample
of wealthy, average and poor Montana school districts.

A recent study of the foundation program concluded:
1.

As district wealth increases, the per pupil general
fund expenditure increases indicating that wealthy
districts tend to spend more per pupil than poor
,

(The correlation coefficient between
districts
district wealth and per pupil expenditure is .365.)
.

2.

As wealth increases, the amount of state aid per
pupil received by the district tends to increase
The correlation coefficient is .130 which, though
small, is nevertheless significantly positive.
This
indicates that the goal of providing state aid in
inverse proportion to district wealth is not being
realized in Montana.
.

In fact, the data strongly suggest that, at least
for elementary districts, the opposite is true (this
trend was not observed for high school districts see Section IV); i.e., the wealthier elementary
districts are receiving more state funds on a per
pupil basis than the poorer districts. This is
partially explainable by the fact that many of the
disproportionately wealthy districts are small,
enrollment-wise, and the foundation program for very
small schools is disproportionately large on a per
pupil basis. However, a more important factor
here is that school districts, irrespective of their
wealth, receive interest and income money on a per
census child basis, even though the entire foundation
program portion of the general fund budget can be
financed entirely out of the basic county 25 mill

levy.
3.

As district wealth increases, the size of the district levy required to support the general fund
budget tends to decrease . The correlation coefficient is - .307.) Furthermore, as wealth increases, the amount of district funds per pupil
(raised by the district levy) tends to increase
(correlation coefficient - .141).

4.

As district wealth increases, the county property tax
levy (basic levy -f deficiency levy) required for
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TABLE 13
COMPARISON OF DISTRICT'S ABILITIES TO PROVIDE VARIOUS LEVELS OF FISCAL EFFORT
IN TERMS OF PER PUPIL GENERAL FUND EXPENDITURES - ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS

Count y

Dis t.
i\C•.

,'i.S3

I

,_

--

? .::r Pur-,i 1
F·:::ie nd i. tur es

District
Contrib u tion

Dist. Levy
Re q. (mills)

I

Ta x . Val. I
State
!Contribution Pc·r Ai:B
i'

,,
15-G

298

$ 471

$ 94

27.25

Powder River

22

75

$1030

$560

3.35

$

49

$167 , ( 49

Cascad e

o/J

3

$2470

$44~

2 .17

$1374

$2 05, 219

Flat head

50

768

$ 503

$ 97

37.22

$ ·213

$

Golden Valley 41-M

35

$1180

$492

10.40

$

$ 47,377

Raval ii

$ 199

$

3,461

I

..,.

N

N

I

I

89

2,628

►

Jefferson

5

29

$ 970

$443

51. 95

$ 221

$

Nusselshell

9

28

$1353

$652

17.86

$ 189

$ 36,544

8,541

Source: A Study of Basic Educational Funding, Methodology in Montana; January
1972, (Working Draft) Dolores Colburg, Office of Superintendent of Public
Instruction.

FINANCING EDUCATION

support of the foundation program (and thus, the
general fund budget) tends to decrease
(The
correlation coefficient is - .211.)
Furthermore,
wealthier districts tend to receive more county
funds per pupil than poorer districts.
(Correlation coefficient * .281).
.

5.

As district wealth increases the total property
tax levy (county levy -f district levy) tends to
decrease (correlation coefficient = - .322)
[emphasis added]

In addition, the following results are worthy of comment.
6.

Although nearly 18% of the state's total property
taxable valuation is located in elementary districts
which have individual wealth in excess of $15,000
per pupil, less than 3% of the state's elementary
pupils reside in those districts.

7.

Although the average district levy in the state
was 13.2 mills, 88.5% of the pupils in the state
reside in the districts which had district levies
in excess of 19 mills, and less than 68% of the
state total taxable valuation was located in these
districts. Further, the average of the district
general fund expenditures for these districts was
less than $600 per pupil compared to the average
district expenditure of $799 for the state as a
whole.

8.

Finally, it might reasonably be asked if it is
possible that school district per pupil expenditures are more strongly dependent on school size
than on district wealth, so that the positive correlation observed between wealth and expenditures
actually results from the fact that many of the
smaller districts are also among the wealthier in
the state.
To evaluate this possibility, per pupil
expenditures were correlated with district wealth
for each of two school size categories....
[The] results indicate that even for districts of the
same size, the per pupil general fund expenditure
tends to increase as district wealth increases. The
results, therefore, tend to refute a hypothesis that
the positive correlation between wealth ad per pupil
expenditure is actually due to a more basic relationship between school size and per pupil expenditure.
(Essentially the same results were observed for high
school districts; these are described in Section IV). 14
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Another indication of inequalities inherent in the Montana
school financing system is Montana's place in a ranking of
The
the states on the basis of relative equalization.
National Educational Finance Project has developed an "equalization score" for the school financing programs of all fifty
Seve.Tial factors are conbined in the composite score,
statej..
such as differences among rich and poor districts and the
degree of state versus local financing. As shown in Table
14, Montana ranks thirtieth among the states in its equalizaThis places it below California and Texas, two
tion score.
of the states in which the courts have declared the present
financing system to be inviolation of equal protection rights
guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Such evidence together with total revenue considerations
suggest a possible need for change in the existing methods of
collecting and distributing funds to the Montana school
system. Almost any major change, however, would require some
modification of the extensive provisions in the present ConstiSince the constitutional
tution which govern school financing.
alternatives depend to some degree on the kind of system
envisaged, a brief discussion of major alternatives in school
financing systems, and a summary of possible constitutional
choices follows.

ALTERNATIVE SCHOOL FINANCING SYSTEMS
The National Educational Finance Project suggests five major
goals which a state educational finance program should accomplish:

Provide local school systems a level of support for
1.
an educational program commensurate with the relative financial
ability of the state.
Include provisions for innovation and improvement in
2.
instructional programs.
Include provisions for the identification and evaluation
3.
of alternative methods of accomplishing educational objectives.

Provide a system for local districts to develop program
4.
and financial data which permit accountability to the public.
5.

Substantially equalize educational opportunity t'lroughout

the state. 15

Clearly, no system yet devised will fully meet all these goals
However, a number of systems have been developed or
at once.
suggested which make major advances toward their attainment.
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TABLE 14

RANKING AND EQUALIZATION SCORES OF THE STATES
BASED ON THE NEFP TYPOLOHY FOR THE SCHOOL YEAR, 196 8-69

Rank
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The following state financing schemes are directed toward the
maximization of some or all of the goals of adequate support,
educational diversity, local control and equalization of tax
burden and distribution of funds.

Types of Systems
One author describes educational financing systems in terms
of three major types flat grant, foundation plan and percentage equalizing:

—

The typical flat grant is a fixed annual payment to
the district, based on the average number of pupils
in daily attendance.
This may have some equalizing
effect since a dollar given to both a wealthy and
poor district does reduce the proportionate disparity
between them. But the size of the flat grant is
often so small in relation to even the poorest district's total expenditures, and the disparity among
districts so great, that the equalizing effect is
trivial at best.

Under a foundation plan the state determines a uniform
"adequate" offering and a reasonable minimum tax
effort that a district should make to finance its
schools.
The state makes up any difference between the
foundation amount and the revenues raised by the
minimum tax effort. Suppose, for example, that a state
sets its foundation program level at $300 and requires
In a
a minimum participation effort of one percent.
district with an assessed value per pupil of $20,000,
a one percent tax would yield $200 per pupil, and the
district would receive a state subvention of $100 per
pupil.
If the district made a greater tax effort, say
two percent, it would receive the $100 state assistance,
plus the additional local tax revenues of $200, and it
would therefore spend $500 per pupil.
The foundation program equalizes, but only to a point.
Suppose that another district in this hypothetical system has an assessed value per pupil of $60,000. A one
percent effort in this district produces an offering of
$600, or twice the amount of the foundation guarantee.
The higher the state establishes the "adequate" offering,
But
the more its foundation program tend to equalize.
even if the program matches what the wealthiest district
would raise at the minimum effort, as soon as that district makes more than the minimxim effort wealth-determined
disparities reappear.
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Under an ideal percentage equalizing system, each district that makes the same tax effort is able to spend
an equal amount per pupil regardless of the district's
Effort and expenditure vary directly with one
wealth.
another, so that efforts of 1, 2, and 3 percent would
yield respective offerings of, say, $300, $600 and
The state accomplishes this by paying the dif$900.
ference between revenues raised at a given tax rate
The proportion
and the offering set for that rate.
paid by the state is thus inversely related to a district's wealth. The percentage equalizing plan could
be fully equalizing if a state incorporated the effortexpenditure relationship of its wealthiest district.
The state would pay each district that made a given tax
effort the difference between what it raised and what
the wealthiest district would raise with the same effort.
For a variety of reasons, none of the state plans in
actual operation is fully equalizing. A state may
choose to equalize only up to the level of some district
below the wealthiest (for example, the district of
average wealth)
it may impose a percentage or dollar
limit on the state subsidy; or it may guarantee to pay
a certain proportion of each district's costs regardless
of the ratio produced by the formula (a variation of the
flat grant).
[Citations omitted].^"
,

Particular Financing Plans
Numerous actual and theoretical educational finance plans are
described by analysts. The more important of these are:

—

Flat Grant Uniform Flat Grants Allocated to all District
1.
Regardless of Local Taxable Wealth and Amount of Local Taxes.
The state revenue is allocated on the basis of a flat
amount per child or per teacher or some other method
that does not take into consideration either the
variation in educational needs of the student population
or the variation in the taxpaying ability of the local
districts. This type of grant may be either general or
special purpose.

—

2.
Flat Grant Variable Flat Grants Allocated to all
Districts Regardless of Wealth.

This is a more sophisticated type of flat grant which is
allocated on a similar method to the uniform flat grant.
However, the units such as pupil or teacher units are
weighted according to variations in costs due to factors
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beyond the control of the boards of education. For
example, unit costs may vary due to grade level, type
of educational program, sparsity, etc.
This type of
grant also may be utilized in the form of general or
special purpose. 1^

Foundation Program --Strayer-Haig Formula-Unweighted
3.
Measures of Need. Educational needs are calculated in
terms of a uniform cimount per pupil or per teacher or
some other method that ignores the variation of educational needs of the student population and the yield
of a required local tax effort in proportion to ability
is deducted from the designated cost of the program in
order to determine the state allocation.

—

Foundation Program Strayer-Haig Formula-Weighted
4.
Measures of Need. Educational needs are calculated in
terms of weighted unit costs such as weighted pupils
or adjusted instruction units which take into consideration necessary unit cost variations, and the yield
of a required local tax effort in proportion to ability
is deducted from the designated cost of the program,
in order to determine the state allocation. ^°
Under power equalizing a district's
Power Equalizing
5.
offering a solely a function of its tax effort. Every
district that makes an effort of A percent may expend
If a given
M dollars; B percent, N dollars, and so on.
effort in fact yields less than the established corresponding offering, the state makes up the difference.
If the effort produces more than the offering, the
district must pay over any excess to the state. Power
equalizing is a more generalized principle than percentage equalizing in that the state's proportionate
share of a district's revenues need not remain constant
Thus, the effort-offering
at every effort level.
formula can be designed to encourage or discourage
[Citations omitted] ^^
particular levels of expenditure.
.

—

Voucher System or Family Power Equalizing If the "power
6.
equalizing" principle is transferred from the school district to
the family, the result is what has been described by many as
Under this system an individual family
the voucher system.
could choose the school its children would attend, according to
where it desired to spend an education voucher supplied by the
In one version of the system, proposed by Coons and
state.
Sugarman, the parents also would contribute a graduated amount
according to wealth to pay for the voucher and thus receive
benefits corresponding to degrees of effort.
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One author lists five major versions of the voucher mode of
financing:
(1) the free market version proposed by Milton
Friedman;
(2) the sliding-scale version^ which
sets the voucher value inversely to family income,
discussed by Dean Theodore Sizer and Philip Whitten;
(3) the "effort" model developed by John Coons;
(4) the "open schools" plan of James Coleman; and
(5) the regulated model developed by Christopher
Jencks and his colleagues at the Center for the
Study of Public Policy. ^

In general, the merits claimed for the voucher system are the
competitive incentive for better and more efficient schools,
stressed by conservative economist Milton Friedman; the
equality of opportunity inherent in the system, emphasized by
John Coons and Christopher Jencks, and the enhancement of
educational diversity, stressed by Judith Areen.

—

—

State-wide Financing General Property Tax Most of the
7.
above plans, because of their equalizing nature, place the
primary or sole responsibility on the state as the source of
One principle way to transfer the supply of revenue from
funds.
the locality to the state is to have the state assume the
administration of a statewide property tax. Under such a system
every property owner in a state would be taxed uniformly and
the funds would be distributed by the state according to one
of the above plans.
Such a system would eliminate the large
disparities in property taxation and would establish a uniform
system of assessment.

—
—
—

8.
Combined Property and Income Tax To alleviate some of
the difficulties of the property tax namely its relative
inelasticity and regressive character one Montana state
legislator has proposed a combined property and income tax for
the support of schools.
According to the author, the plan
would

abolish the property tax on habitable dwellings and
replace the revenue lost at the local level by taxing
the adjusted gross income of all citizens.
The rate
of taxation would be set in each local taxing district
at exactly the percentage needed to replace the lost
revenue.
It would be the same percentage for everyone,
but it would vary from year to year and from county to
county just as millages do.^l
.

.

.

Such a plan would have the advantage of retaining local control
over educational financing, while eliminating some of the
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inequities of local property taxation. However, it would
still sustain some of the factors which make education a
function of local wealth.

—

District Reorganization A technique for allocating the
burden and benefits of educational support on a more equitable
basis while retaining the advantage of local control is that
of massive redistricting.
This method of modifying school
finance can be accomplished either alone or in conjunction with
several of the plans mentioned above.
If boundaries are
redrawn on the basis of districts of approximately equal wealth
per school child, then the decisions concerning support could
be left to local determination without creating inequalities.
However, patterns of wealth tend to change and the prospect of
school district gerrymandering looms as a potential evil in
such a system.
9.

'

CONSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVES
The list of additional systems and variations on them could be
extended at length; the above suggest only the great variety
possible in school finance schemes which emphasize one or another
value.
The primary question facing the Constitutional Convention
would appear to be whether to include language to promote a
particular plan, to provide for school financing in only very
general terms, thus allowing for a variety of systems, or to
indicate a general direction for finance programs by specifying
broad guidelines to the legislature.

These general alternatives can be framed in terms of the following specific possible courses of action.
The Convention could:
1.
Retain all the existing provisions on educational
finance, thus leaving the present system unchanged (unless
required to change by court decision)
2.
Revise only those provisions dealing with taxation for
education (Art. XI, Sec. 6, Art. XII, Sees, la and 9) to provide
for taxation primarily at the state level or for other restructuring of tax support.
3.
Revise only those provisions dealing with the "'public
school fund" and the interest and income therefrom (Art. XI,
Sees. 2,3, 4 and 5) to allow for other management and investment
techniques, e.g., modifying the structure of the land board,
changing the percentage of the monies reinvested for capital
improvement, removing investment restrictions, and so on.
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Revise only the provisions dealing with the distribution
4.
of school funds (Art. XI, Sees. 5 and 6) to provide for greater
equalization of educational support.

Combine any or all of alternatives 2,3, and 4 to provide
5.
programs which allow greater flexibility in both taxation and
distribution programs.

Substitute for all of the existing sections on educa6.
tional finance a general provision establishing state responsibility and indicating the general thrust of educational financing
in the state, e.g., state rather than local financing of
This would provide siobstantial flexibility while
schools.
supplying broad guidelines to the legislature.

Eliminate all provisions on educational financing,
7.
thus leaving the question entirely to the legislature.
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